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Abstract 
  
 The topic of international justice has become, in the last two decades, a 
prominent part of political philosophy and an important subject for political 
philosophers  to address.   But there is yet a good deal of disagreement about the role 
that a conception of international justice should play in regulating the terms of 
international cooperation.  Some argue that international justice has a limited role to 
play, specifying norms for state conduct for a rather narrow set of issues.  Proponents 
of this limited view do not think that norms of international justice should include 
principles of distributive justice, which they take to be limited to domestic conceptions 
of justice.  On the other hand, there are those who argue for a very robust conception 
of international justice, one that essentially replaces the domestic conception and calls 
for economic redistribution spanning the whole world.  In the papers that follow, I 
engage with each of these positions on international justice, and sketch my own 
account of the right approach.  I contend that it is a mistake to limit the role of justice, 
including distributive justice, to only the domestic sphere, arguing instead that it 
should be extended to transnational systems of cooperation.  We have, I suggest, vast 
global  economic interdependence as well as international legal coercion, both morally 
relevant phenomena that require the application of principles of distributive justice; 
for, as I point out, there is much that takes place on the international stage that 
eventually makes its way to the level of individual citizens and affects their prospects 
 in a significant way.  I do not, however, go so far as to suggest that we simply replace 
domestic conceptions of justice with an international one.  It is my view that both 
domestic and international conceptions of justice are necessary, each working to 
address the subject-matter specific to it. 
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PREFACE 
 
 In the last two decades, international justice has become an important topic in 
political philosophy, and at the same time a deeply challenging one in the face of 
increasing globalization. Though globalization is a process that has been extant for 
centuries, its accelerating pace after the end of the second World War has left our 
world deeply commingled and entangled.  Effects of the decisions made in a particular 
state, once localized, now often resonate throughout the world, reaching places that 
were insulated from them not too long ago. The complexity of a globalized world is 
relevant to political philosophy, not so much in virtue of the complexity itself, but 
because of the moral problems it generates, problems that, in my view at least, are best 
examined from the standpoint of justice.   
 One important question concerns the method we use to address the complexity 
of the globalized world.  Should we simplify things as much as possible in order to 
formulate an abstract picture of the world, or should we confront the complexity head-
on?  The former strategy comes with the prospect of elegant solutions, and has been 
by far the dominant approach in political philosophy where questions of international 
justice are concerned.  My own approach, however, hews closer to the second strategy. 
 The central issue in much of the literature on international justice concerns the 
role of justice in the international, as opposed to the domestic, sphere.  One common 
position takes justice to have a very circumscribed role internationally, restricting the 
application of distributive principles in particular to the domestic sphere.  An equally 
 xi 
popular account, in contrast, treats international justice as the primary normative ideal, 
superseding domestic conceptions of justice, which are treated simply as particular 
cases of the general international conception.  Common to both of these approaches, 
however, is the method employed, which is to start with a more abstract conception of 
our complex, globalized world, with many of the actual details expunged.  While this 
method allows us to evaluate the merits of the relevant accounts of international 
justice more or less on purely philosophical grounds, this comes at the cost of 
abstracting away many details that, in my view, are ultimately deeply relevant to 
answering the very questions about justice that the fact of globalization leaves us with.  
As I see it, the most serious problems with the accounts of international justice that 
favor such an abstract approach arise from the fact that they miss certain important 
details, especially with respect to the two issues most central to assessing the role of 
justice internationally: the level of international coercion and the extent of global 
interdependence.   
 The poor empirics underlying much of the work on international justice is in 
large part what led me to confront the complexity of a globalized world more fully and 
directly in my work.  One of the papers in my dissertation is an attempt to give a more 
precise estimation of the extent of global economic cooperation, a task rarely 
attempted in the philosophical literature.  I do this by adapting a set of methods used in 
econometrics to the problem of measuring how much the economic output of 
particular states depends on the economic activities that take place outside them. My 
results here suggest that the level of global economic interdependence is considerable. 
For example, according to my methods of estimation, roughly 50% of the total 
 xii 
economic output of South Korea depends on economic activities outside it; the 
number is even higher in the case of the Netherlands – around 70%.  In my view, the 
sheer amount of global economic interdependence does make it morally significant 
with respect to questions of justice.   
 Another paper in my dissertation focuses on legal coercion.  It is often argued 
that since legal coercion is a feature only of domestic societies – the laws of a state 
generally apply only within its boundaries – such coercion generates duties of justice 
only within domestic society.  Even where legal coercion appears to operate 
internationally, the prevailing view has been to see it as playing so limited a role as not 
to generate significant duties of justice.  (Indeed, even those who think that the duties 
of justice apply internationally tend to dismiss the role played by legal coercion in 
generating these duties, grounding them instead in economic interdependence or 
purely humanitarian concerns.) My approach to this issue is once again driven by an 
appreciation of the actual ways in which coercion operates.  I focus on one particular 
case – the intellectual-property regime administered by the World Trade Organization 
– in an attempt to establish that legal coercion does prevail internationally and does 
generate significant duties of transnational distributive justice. 
 An approach such as mine, which focuses on the specifics of the ways in which 
our world is enmeshed, is likely to make us countenance a situation where any single 
individual is a member of overlapping coercive regimes or multiple systems of 
economic cooperation.  The same individual might thus be encumbered with duties of 
justice concurrently imposed by different regimes or systems.  There is no difficulty, 
 xiii 
of course, if these duties can be fulfilled all at once, but in the likely scenario where 
they make competing demands on the individual, or where the totality of the demands 
imposed is too burdensome, the question of priority becomes important.  Developing 
an account of how to prioritize competing demands of justice, though difficult, is not 
something I believe to be ultimately intractable.  But these concerns I leave for my 
future work on justice. 
 
 
. 
 
 
 
 1 
CHAPTER 1 
 
Overview and Introduction 
 
 
International justice has received a good deal of attention from several 
prominent political philosophers in recent years, but it is a field that is still in its early 
stages: the types of problems that arise within the international sphere and have to be 
dealt with from the standpoint of justice is a subject that is still being articulated, and 
there is no consensus at this point about what the overall problematic, in the Kuhnian 
sense, should be.
1
  Nevertheless, I think two distinct approaches or ways of thinking 
have emerged that have predominated recent work on international justice.  Both 
approaches owe their origin to John Rawls’s writing on conceptions of justice for 
domestic society.
2
  The impetus behind them is the idea that Rawls’s work on 
domestic society should serve as the starting point and a model for how we ought to 
deliberate about international justice.  The first approach to international justice 
essentially tries to replicate what Rawls does for domestic society, but on a much 
larger scale, where the entire world comes into play.  This way of thinking basically 
assumes that there ought to be a conception of international justice and that we have 
                                                 
1 By the problematic I mean the core set of problems that political philosophers agree should 
be dealt with when doing international justice.  
 
2 See John Rawls, A Theory of Justice, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1971; see also 
John Rawls, Political Liberalism, New York: Columbia University Press, 1993. 
 
 
 
 
 2 
duties of distributive justice that extend beyond what we owe to our compatriots.  
What remains to be done is to work out this conception and explain how it fits in with 
the other social demands placed on us: does it replace the domestic conception so that 
our terms of cooperation are regulated by a single global conception, which posits one 
and the same duty of distributive justice owed to compatriots and non-compatriots, or 
does it adduce duties of distributive justice to both compatriots and non-compatriots, 
but where these duties differ in their content -- duties owed to our compatriots being 
much more demanding?  The second approach, on the other hand, takes a rejectionist 
view to international distributive justice by drawing a sharp distinction between the 
domestic and international spheres.  Proponents of this approach argue that 
distributive justice should be applied within domestic society and that internationally 
egalitarian justice simply has no place.    
 In the three papers, I examine the writings of political philosophers who 
embrace international justice and of those who reject it.  In all three papers, I also try 
to carve out my own view of international justice and adduce what I think is owed to 
the global poor. The first paper is devoted to the work of Charles Beitz and Thomas 
Pogge, who favor a very strong position on international justice.
3
  In the second paper, 
I discuss the writings of Thomas Nagel and Michael Blake, who come out against 
having a conception of distributive justice apply internationally.  The paper is mostly 
critical in tenor, and I maintain that a basic assumption made by Nagel and Blake is 
                                                 
3
 It must be noted that this is the case with the early writings of Pogge.  Pogge in his later 
writings abandons the Rawlsian approach to doing global justice in favor of examining how 
we in the West harm the global poor and the obligations that follow from this.   See Thomas 
Pogge, “Severe Poverty as a Violation of Negative Duties” in Ethics and International 
Affairs 19/1 (2005), pp. 55–83. 
 3 
not borne out by empirical evidence.  In the third paper, I offer a case study that 
illustrates why I think Nagel and Blake are wrong about their conception of the 
international realm.  The case study deals with the intellectual property regime 
administered by the WTO, and I use it to establish two fundamental claims: that the 
global poor are deeply affected by this regime; and in light of this, there are duties of 
justice that transcend state borders.  Below I explain in detail what I do in each of the 
three papers.     
 
Paper One  
Charles Beitz and Thomas Pogge are two important political philosophers who 
are proponents of a robust notion of international justice: they call for extending 
Rawls’s liberal conception of justice to the rest of the world.4  Beitz and Pogge argue 
that the world is essentially a single system of cooperation in the way that Rawls 
imagines domestic society to be: a cooperative venture that encompasses terms of 
cooperation and generates a pattern of entitlements.  But if this is in fact the case, 
according to Beitz and Pogge, the world qua system of cooperation has to be regulated 
by a liberal conception of justice in the same way as domestic society.   In fact, for 
Beitz and Pogge, the world qua system of cooperation has absorbed domestic systems 
to such an extent that, according to them, we ought to think of the world as being 
                                                 
4 Charles Beitz, Political Theory and International Relations, Princeton NJ: Princeton 
University Press, 1999; Thomas Pogge, Realizing Rawls, Ithaca NY: Cornell University Press, 
1989. 
 
 4 
permeated by a single global system to which a liberal conception of justice should 
apply and a purely domestic conception be done away with.     
 In the first paper, I examine Beitz’s and Pogge’s arguments for extending 
Rawls’s special conception to the world as well as their criticisms of Rawls for not 
doing this himself.  In A Theory of Justice, Rawls employs a conception of domestic 
society that takes it to be independent and insular.  Beitz and Pogge criticize Rawls for 
conceiving domestic society in this way.  I claim that there is something right about 
their criticism of Rawls, but I also maintain that the criticism has to be restated if it is 
to avoid getting Rawls wrong in an important way.  In fairness to Rawls, it has to be 
noted that the assertion about domestic society is a product of his method of working 
out regulative ideals for different cooperative regimes – a method that moves in 
stages, from subject-matter to subject-matter.
5
  Once Rawls is done with domestic 
society, he dispenses with the conception that domestic society is independent and 
insular.  If Beitz and Pogge are suggesting that Rawls is making an empirically false 
assertion about domestic society, then their criticism is without merit -- Rawls does 
                                                 
5
 Indeed, this is how Rawls proceeds: first, he develops a conception for domestic society and 
only later a conception for what he calls a society of decent peoples – though the latter 
consists of a set of norms specifying how peoples should conduct themselves, and hence is not 
a conception of justice meant to regulate terms of cooperation among individuals.  John 
Rawls, The Law of Peoples, Cambridge: Harvard University Press 1999, pp.11-30 and also 
pp.62-74.  For Rawls, in order to construct a conception for domestic society, we have to 
focus exclusively on this subject and abstract away the rest of world – hence the need to 
conceive domestic society as independent and insular.  But once we move on to the 
international arena, we bring the world back in.  The problem with Beitz’s and Pogge’s 
criticism of Rawls, I suggest, is that they are less charitable to Rawls than they should be – the 
nuance about methodology is not given enough credit.  Nevertheless, the methodological 
maneuver of abstracting away the rest of the world when designing a conception of justice for 
domestic society is still empirically problematic, because even when we are thinking about 
how to regulate terms of domestic cooperation, we have to think about how such cooperation 
is connected with the rest of the world.  
 5 
not in fact think that domestic society is independent and insular.  I contend, however, 
that the objections put forward by Beitz and Pogge can also be viewed as attacking 
Rawls's actual method for working out a domestic conception of justice.  For Beitz 
and Pogge, it does not make sense to go from the domestic case to the international; 
there is just one system of cooperation, and that system is global.  Seen in this light, as 
an attack on Rawls's approach to justice, their criticism, I suggest, does have merit: 
prying society away from the rest of the world, even when this is done for a 
methodological reason, is still problematic.  However, I also claim that Beitz and 
Pogge go too far in positing a single global system of cooperation.  That, I argue in the 
paper, is simply not the case -- the world just isn't one global system, but has a much 
more complicated structure.  
My take on what is happening in the international realm is that globalization 
has transformed the world into something that is structurally very complicated, and 
there is unfortunately no way to avoid dealing with this complexity when discussing 
international justice.  If we look at the last sixty years, we see a remarkable 
proliferation of supranational agents that have been endowed with political authority 
and certain powers, and as a result individual states have had to negotiate control over 
their domestic affairs with these agents.  But to sweep everything into a global 
catchall, as Beitz and Pogge do, is a mistake – it is this complexity that exposes their 
view of the world as overly simplistic.  We have different regimes of cooperation.  
States can be construed as systems of cooperation, but so can the international trade 
regime regulated by the WTO, the European Community, the Organization for 
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), various regional trade blocs.  
 6 
These cooperative regimes, in many cases, interact and mutually reinforce one 
another’s cooperative activities.  But from the standpoint of justice, it is important to 
distinguish them because, as I will try to show, some of the regimes that have an 
international presence and reach generate outcomes that affect the wellbeing of 
individuals, much like states. 
Nevertheless, Beitz and Pogge are on to something that I think is right and has 
important implications for international justice.   What I think is correct about their 
position is that the world has gone global, but it has done so with respect to economic 
cooperation.  It is important to separate economic cooperation from other forms of 
cooperation: if we generalize too much and construe cooperation as cooperation per 
se, then it would not be right to say that the world has gone global and that states as 
distinct systems of cooperation are a thing of the past.  However, if we limit our 
construal to economic cooperation, then I think there is an identifiable global system 
of cooperation and one that is increasingly absorbing individual states to a point where 
economic activity that takes place in China or Germany is more properly characterized 
as involving this global system, rather than China or Germany viewed as separate 
systems of economic cooperation.  It is for this reason that Rawls's method is 
problematic, since by separating domestic society from the rest of the world, Rawls is 
implicitly treating economic cooperation as domestic.
6
       
                                                 
6 In his The Law of Peoples, Rawls makes it much clearer that he regards economic 
cooperation as something that for the most part takes place inside domestic society and among 
fellow citizens.  See his, The Law of Peoples, pp. 35-43. 
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 Having specified what I think is right about the Beitz and Pogge position, I 
argue that a conception of justice should apply to this global economic system.  But I 
do not believe that this eliminates the need for a domestic conception of justice, since 
the state still remains a system of cooperation in an important sense and as such has to 
be regulated by justice.  To this extent, I am in agreement with Rawls that conceptions 
of justice have to be worked out in stages.   Yet, for my argument to be at all 
convincing, it is essential that I be able to make a case that there is indeed a global 
economic system of cooperation.  And so, much of my first paper is devoted to 
establishing this.   
I try to do this in two ways: one is conceptual, the other quantitative.   First, I 
suggest that if we look at the production history of a good or service, which we 
consume as Americans, we are bound to find a foreign input in its production chain.  
In other words, the production of a good or service at some point involves a factor of 
production – in the form of labor, capital, or land – that originates outside the US.  
And without the foreign input either that type of product would not exist for us to 
consume, or if it did it, it would have a different economic value.  Because so many of 
the products we consume are generated under similar conditions, I suggest that we can 
generalize inductively that much of what we consume involves foreign contribution.  
The genesis of the foreign component as well as its integration into the production 
process constitute a form of  international cooperation.   By generalizing over so many 
products, we can say that there is plenty of transnational or international economic 
activity taking place.  But moreover, because a similar thought experiment can be 
carried out by going from country to country, a case can be made that what is 
 8 
occurring is both global and vast,  thereby suggesting the presence of a global 
economic system.   
Of course, the conceptual approach has certain drawbacks, and so to be more 
precise, I offer another argument for a global economic system that is more 
quantitative in nature.  To make my case for a global economic system, I use an 
econometric method called input-output analysis.  The method allows for an 
estimation of how much of a country’s total economic output depends on economic 
activity that takes place outside it.  This is done by extracting the rest of the world and 
thus leaving a country in complete economic isolation, and then measuring the 
resulting loss in total output.  I use data for ten member countries of the OECD to 
measure the decrease in their economic output.  The results vary from a 22% to a 71% 
drop in output, and the average decrease for all ten states is 50%.  If my calculations 
are correct, they show a remarkable degree of reliance by a state on the contributions 
made by the rest of the world for generating its national economic output.   
It has to be noted, however, that from the study we may generalize that such 
dependence is likely to be exhibited by the rest of the OECD members and the 
advanced developing countries.  This of course leaves out some of the poorest states in 
the world.
7
  Still, if we consider the OECD states and the eleven most advanced 
developing states, we are confronted by the fact that their combined GDP constitutes 
                                                 
7 Part of the problems is that there is lack of data on these countries, which makes it difficult to 
make any precise determinations about their level of dependence.  But it is I think a reasonable 
conclusion that many poor states – though certainly not all – are not plugged into the global 
economic system. 
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92% of the world’s total GDP.  In other words, these countries, at least for now, are 
the engines of economic production.   And if these states exhibit economic reliance on 
one another, we can still conclude that there is a global economic system – though not 
all countries are participants or participants to the same extent – and that this system is 
vast with a substantial economic output.  
Having made a case for a global economic system, I maintain that distributive 
principles of justice should apply to it, and this is an important step in my argument.
8
  
I hold this position because I argue that the market is simply incapable of generating a 
fair distribution of the cooperative product of this system.  In the paper, however, I do 
not try to adduce what these principles should be and how the cooperative product 
should be divided – though I am inclined to think that they are going to be much less 
egalitarian than Rawls’s difference principle.9  The reason for this reluctance is that 
before we are in position to put forward distributive principles, we have to delineate 
all the systems of cooperation to which justice as a social virtue is applicable and 
                                                 
8 This is an important step because the real question is what follows from this fact of economic 
interdependence, and I argue that what follows is that the product of a global system of 
economic cooperation has to be divided in accordance with principles of justice, though not 
the difference principle.  
 
9 I think that these principles are not going to be as egalitarian as the difference principle 
because the demands placed by the economic system on the individual cooperator are  
qualitatively different from those generated by the state qua system of cooperation.  It has to 
be acknowledged that legal coercion brings another moral dimension to large systems of 
cooperation and what it takes to make these systems just.  Principles of distributive justice 
have to reflect this difference in the seriousness and scope of demands for cooperation, 
suggesting that we can't be egalitarians everywhere there is cooperation that affects individual 
economic entitlements. But this is not to say that the way to reflect this difference is by 
rejecting distributive principles where the demands on the individual cooperator are less 
comprehensive and all-encompassing than that of the state.  We need different principles, 
though these principles are still distributive. 
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prioritize where the need for justice is the most urgent.
10
 And I think that this project is 
still incomplete.   
Paper Two 
As I mentioned earlier, Beitz and Pogge propose that a liberal conception of 
justice apply directly to the world.  This is a pretty controversial and radical position, 
as I argue in my first paper.  But there are those who think that justice has no place 
internationally.  Thomas Nagel and Michael Blake are both proponents of such a 
position, and have put forward a view that restricts a liberal conception of justice to 
domestic society.
11
  According to Nagel and Blake, Rawls is ultimately concerned 
with the presence of legal coercion in domestic society: his special conception is in 
fact a response that aims to justify such coercion to those subject to it, i.e. members of 
society.  Both Nagel and Blake accept Rawls’s premise that it is the presence of 
coercion that makes the application of a liberal conception of justice to society or the 
state necessary – otherwise, there is only pure coercion and that is morally 
unacceptable.  They contend that the international sphere does not merit being 
regulated by a conception of justice because it is not coercive in the way that the 
individual state is.   Both conceive international coercion in similar terms, as 
something that is not directed at individuals; rather, it is a phenomenon that explains 
state behavior, exercised by states against other states.    
                                                 
10 In the third paper, I suggest that the need is most urgent where there is an already existing 
injustice. 
     
11 Thomas Nagel, “The Problem of Global Justice,” Philosophy and Public Affairs, 33, no. 2 
(2005): pp. 113-147; Michael Blake, “Distributive Justice, State Coercion, and Autonomy,” 
Philosophy and Public Affairs, 30, no. 3 (2002), pp. 257-296.   
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Nagel and Blake, however, differ about what it is about state coercion that calls 
for a liberal conception.  For Nagel, as citizens, we live under a unified sovereign 
power and are subject to a system of laws and institutions that are coercively imposed.  
This system, which we can neither defy nor avoid, determines how well or badly our 
lives will go, and so a justification is owed, especially to those who do not fare 
particularly well under this scheme.  For Nagel, the demand for justification is directed 
at fellow citizens because it is fellow citizens who are ultimately responsible for the 
imposition of this coercive system.   That is to say, citizens are “participants in a 
collective enterprise of coercively imposed legal and political institutions.”12  This 
collective imposition of coercive laws and institutions, according to Nagel, engenders 
a special relation among fellow citizens.  The significance of this special relation is 
that it entails associative duties of justice toward one’s fellow citizens.  For Nagel, it is 
these associative duties of justice that are meant to justify the imposition of coercive 
laws and institutions.  Moreover, because the demand for justification is directed at 
our fellow citizens, who are in a sense complicit in our being coerced, duties of 
justice, if they are to provide adequate justification, would have to be quite robust.  
Nagel thinks that such duties would have to include duties of distributive justice that 
generate a fairly egalitarian distribution of economic entitlements.  Nagel, however, 
does not believe that the same applies to the international sphere.  The main reason for 
this is that despite the presence of certain forms of coercion, individuals as participants 
in a global enterprise are simply not socially connected by a special relation and are 
thus not bound to one another in a way that would require them to achieve social and 
                                                 
12
 Nagel, “The Problem of Global Justice,” p. 128. 
 
 12 
economic equality.  Whatever coercion there is internationally is conducted by states 
against other states, and so citizens of one state are not in any way implicated in the 
coercion of those in another.   Consequently, for Nagel, the international realm 
remains a justice-free zone. 
Blake’s position on global justice is in many respects similar to Nagel’s.  His 
account is grounded in what he calls the liberal principle of autonomy.
13
  For Blake, 
the principle of autonomy entails that persons have a right to be autonomous agents 
and are entitled to circumstances or conditions that are necessary to make this 
possible.
14
  Blake thinks that persons can be denied their autonomy in a variety of 
ways.   In particular,  individuals may be denied their autonomy through outright 
coercion – though not all violations of individual autonomy involve coercion of one 
form or another, Blake insists.  Acts of coercion, Blake writes, are “prima facie 
prohibited by the liberal principle of autonomy.”15    Of course, Blake takes coercive 
acts by the state for the sake of maintaining social order to be necessary.  The issue for 
him is what in fact justifies these acts of coercion.  Ultimately, Blake concludes that a 
justification for state coercion can only be achieved by applying a liberal conception 
of justice to a domestic basic structure.  His conclusion is thus the same as Nagel’s, 
though his rationale is different: for Blake, coercion has to be justified because 
otherwise it would violate the liberal principle of autonomy.  
                                                 
13 Blake, “Distributive Justice, State Coercion, and Autonomy,” p. 267. 
 
14 Ibid., p. 271. 
 
15 Ibid. 
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 What is interesting about Blake is that his assertions about global justice once 
again resemble Nagel’s.  When Blake turns his attention to the international sphere, he 
sees violations of the principle of autonomy in the form of terrible deprivations – such 
as starvation, malnutrition, disease – that affect the global poor.   He argues that we in 
the West have a duty to remedy these deprivations.  But once the global poor enjoy 
circumstances that allow them to be minimally autonomous, our duty to them comes 
to an end and we have no further obligation to make the world any less unequal.  And 
although Blake concedes there is coercion that pervades the international sphere, he 
maintains that such international coercion does not affect individual autonomy.  For 
him, international coercion is something that affects only states, and never descends to 
the level of individual citizens, and it is for this reason that demands for distributive 
justice do not extend to the international sphere.     
In the second paper, I undertake to closely examine the arguments against 
global justice put forward by Nagel and Blake.  A common problem that I find with 
their views is that neither Nagel nor Blake get international coercion right: they simply 
don’t look at international coercion carefully enough, and it is their superficial 
treatment of the subject that leads them to say that only states are affected.  My 
criticism of Blake essentially comes down to this particular point.  And it seems to me 
that were he to develop a more nuanced view of coercion, one that takes into 
consideration how international coercion affects individual wellbeing,  his account 
would probably resemble mine in many respect, since we both take coercion as 
something that has to be justified by way of a liberal conception of justice.   
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However, my problems with Nagel run much deeper.   In my mind, Nagel 
draws too close a connection between duties of distributive justice and his special 
relation.  One basic problem, addressed at the beginning of the paper, is that Nagel is 
particularly unclear about how the special relation arises in a social context.  He states 
that citizens are bound by the special relation when coercion exercised by the state is 
done in their name.  But what does this mean?  In the paper, I try to unpack this  
metaphor and suggest a more concrete explanation.  I then offer a discussion of 
political legitimacy and how this concept is used by Nagel to make his case against 
global justice.   Political legitimacy is important because, according to Nagel, the 
special relation is present where there is political legitimacy – and so, for instance, in a 
politically legitimate state, citizens are connected by the special relation and therefore 
owe a duty of egalitarian justice to one another.  This suggests that, for Nagel, what 
makes a coercive social arrangement an appropriate site for distributive justice is that 
it is politically legitimate.  Moreover, what also appears to follow is that the 
international sphere is not only not coercive in the right way, but that it lacks political 
legitimacy.  Unfortunately, Nagel is not clear about what he means by political 
legitimacy, and so in the paper I suggest several interpretations of how political 
legitimacy may be understood and draw out certain implications that follow from each 
of these interpretations. 
Specifically, I argue that restricting distributive justice to where there is 
political legitimacy and persons are linked by the special relation is much too strong.  
The view implies that there can be duties of distributive justice only where there is 
political legitimacy.  The problem with this result is that we have no way to condemn 
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states that clearly appear to be economically unjust simply because they are not 
politically legitimate and where citizens are not connected by the special relation.  If 
Nagel is right, then not only can we not say what makes a plutocratic state, where the 
majority is economically exploited, unjust, but we don’t even have the conceptual 
resources to say that it is unjust in the first place.  Before we can make that judgment, 
the plutocratic state has to be transformed so that it has political legitimacy. I argue 
that this result is so counter-intuitive that is makes Nagel’s account of distributive 
justice simply untenable. 
This is, however, not the end of what I think  is wrong with Nagel’s view.   
Another problem with his account is that we are prevented from aiming at justice ab 
initio.  That is because we first have to aim at political legitimacy, since this is how the 
special relation comes into existence. Once there is political legitimacy only then can 
we aim at establishing a just regime.   But I think this entirely misconstrues how we 
think about justice, for justice is the highest social virtue of a political arrangement 
and as such it functions as a political ideal.  And we do not work our way up to 
thinking about the ideal in stages; we think about the ideal from the very start.
16
  How 
we get there is a different and an important question, but in answering it, we take the 
ideal as both our guide and ultimate destination.  Nagel’s insistence on the special 
relation and political legitimacy as factors of constraint on what we as citizens owe 
                                                 
16 This does not mean that the ideal can be worked out in a straightforward way.  I think with 
respect to international justice, a conception of justice is something that is very hard to work 
out.  But if we are in a position to construct a conception of justice, I think that we will treat it 
as an ideal and take it as our guide for how ultimately the  international realm should be 
regulated.  
 16 
one another as well as to others frustrates such thinking, which makes his whole 
approach to justice deeply unsatisfying. 
In the paper, I try to be as charitable to Nagel as possible, and I supplement his 
account in several places to make it more convincing than it would otherwise be.  In 
the end, however, there are simply too many deficiencies.  That is not to say, however, 
that all conceptions of justice that construe duties of justice as associative are doomed, 
just the version put forward by Nagel.  
 At the end of the second paper, I suggest, but don’t develop, an example of 
what I consider international coercion that affects individual wellbeing worldwide. 
The purpose of the example is to reiterate my criticism of both Nagel and Blake that 
they fundamentally misunderstand the nature of coercion that takes place in an 
international context.  
 
Paper Three 
In the third paper, I take the example mentioned in the second paper and turn it 
into a more developed case study on international coercion.   The subject of the case 
study is the intellectual property regime administered by the WTO through the TRIPS 
Agreement.  I argue that the proliferation of the Agreement’s intellectual property 
requirements throughout the world has made access to essential medicines more 
difficult for the world’s poor.  Moreover, I claim that these standards are coercively 
enforced under any plausible view of coercion.  The case study is meant to show that 
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Nagel and Blake are wrong in thinking that international coercion is somehow kept at 
the level of individual states.   But in addition, it is also meant to illustrate the need for 
international justice because, as I insist, a justificatory response to the problem of 
access has to come in the form of justice.   
The paper is organized into several parts.  The first third of the paper is 
devoted to explaining the TRIPS Agreement.  Here, I discuss the history of the 
Agreement and how it came to be.  I then go on to explain the substance of the 
standards of intellectual property protection, and focus specifically on patent 
protection.  Having done that, I examine what this means for individual member states 
if they wish to comply with the Agreement’s standards on patent protection.  I do this 
by looking at what India had to do to bring its national laws into alignment with 
TRIPS.  After expounding what states must do to comply, I then discuss the 
consequences that a member state would face if it chose to eschew compliance.  At 
this juncture, I argue that given these consequences, state compliance should be 
construed as a product of coercion enforced by the WTO.  Finally, I delve into the 
various provisions in TRIPS that are meant to ease the burden of compliance on poor 
developing and least developed member states, and argue that they won’t solve the 
problem of access and that the global poor will continue to see an increase in the price 
of many essential medicines. 
In the second part of the paper, I discuss why I think there is, first and 
foremost, a duty of justice to make essential medicines affordable to the global poor.  
In the process of making my case, I try to dispose of several objections that may be 
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made against my position.  First, I argue that the problem of access undermines the 
assertion that international coercion affects only states.  It is in some sense trivially 
true that states are affected by TRIPS, for they have to bring their national laws into 
compliance. But it is precisely this transition toward compliance that makes individual 
citizens subject to the WTO’s intellectual property regime, though the regime is given 
expression by the national laws of a state.  Second, I suggest that requiring individual 
states, especially those that are poor and developing, to deal with the problem of 
access on their own would be profoundly unfair.  Finally, I address an objection put 
forward by Nagel that individual citizens as participants in a global regime are not 
related to one another by his special relation.  I argue that the duty to assist the global 
poor in having affordable medicines does not require the presence of this special 
relation.  What necessitates the duty makes it associative, but certainly not in the way 
that Nagel imagines it to be.    
In the third and final part, I argue that what encumbers us as participants in the 
global trade regime, of which the intellectual property regime is a part, with a duty of 
justice is the fact that we are members of a collective, construed as a system of 
cooperation, that generates an unjust outcome.  The basis of the duty is thus collective 
responsibility for the harms caused by the WTO’s trade system.  In making my case 
for collective responsibility, I rely on David Miller’s considerable contributions to this 
area.   Specifically, I employ his concept of outcome responsibility.  I argue that 
outcome responsibility requires that we respond to the injustice generated by the trade 
system in the following way.  First, we have to put an end to the ongoing injustice.  
This will mean making sure that the harm is no longer being generated and that past 
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victims of the injustice are compensated as much as it is practicable.  However, 
making sure that the harm does not recur may require institutional changes.  What may 
also be required is that the WTO be redesigned in such a way that the inaccessibility 
of essential medicines is no longer a product of its intellectual property regime.  For 
this to happen, the TRIPS Agreement would have to be rewritten and member states 
would have to modify their laws to reflect these changes.  In addition, certain other 
institutions would have to be created - i.e. those that would oversee economic 
assistance so that essential medicines are made affordable.  Outcome responsibility, I 
claim, also requires that as participants in the global trade system we contribute 
toward the transformation of the WTO, a transformation that once in effect would 
eliminate the injustice of the inaccessibility of essential medicines once and for all. 
Although I endorse outcome responsibility as a way to ground our duty to the 
global poor, I don’t support the proposition that all individual participants in the global 
trade system should be held outcome responsible.  There are I argue important 
exception to this rule.  Miller himself offers two types of exemptions to outcome 
responsibility.  In the paper, I offer a rather lengthy analysis of Miller’s arguments for 
these exemptions.  In the end, I find his rationale for them unconvincing; nevertheless, 
I think that Miller is right about one of his exemptions, though I offer my own defense 
for it.  Furthermore, I suggest that there is yet another exemption to outcome 
responsibility, which Miller does not discuss.  I then apply the exemptions that I think 
are right and propose which participants in the global trade system should be held 
exempt.    
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At the end of the third paper, I briefly discuss a more general worry that I think 
arises from the way in which the WTO administers the global trade regime.  The 
WTO’s basic objective is to liberalize trade, and its main line of argument is that this 
is economically beneficial for individual member states, specifically, because 
liberalization leads to economic growth.  There are, I suggest, two problems with the 
WTO’s embrace of liberalization.  First, the empirical evidence does not support a 
simple nexus between a state’s liberal trade policies and economic growth.  Several 
influential studies supporting a link between liberalization and growth have recently 
come under heavy criticism.  Other studies have been conducted that suggest that a 
rush toward greater liberalization can actually damage a state’s economy.  The WTO’s 
trade policies can thus harm a state as it moves toward liberalization, and the risk of 
failure is much higher with respect to developing and least developed countries.  This 
suggests a second problem with the WTO’s trade policies: there is an uneven 
distribution of risk with the developing and least developed countries facing a higher 
probability of being harmed by liberalization.  I argue that it is unjust to saddle already 
vulnerable states with a higher risk of failure when they are just as instrumental for the 
operation of global trade.  Making the allocation of risk from liberalization more 
equitable would go a long way toward rectifying this injustice.   
A great deal of research has recently been done that points to institutional 
quality as a causal factor for economic growth.  And when combined with liberal trade 
policies, the goodness of institutions appears to lower the risk of a state suffering an 
economic downturn as it integrates within the global trade regime.  I argue that one 
possible way for the WTO to correct for the uneven distribution of risk that stems 
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from its policies of trade liberalization is to assist individual members states in 
constructing better institutions.  Of course, which institutions have relevance and how 
institutional goodness is to be measured are difficult questions and there are no 
generally accepted answers to them.  So the approach to institutional quality, I 
propose, should involve some flexibility and room for individual states to experiment 
with institutional design.  But, in addition, it should be incumbent on the WTO to keep 
up with the latest research in economics and revise its policies, if need be, to reflect 
real advances that have been made inter alia in theories of economic growth, 
economic development, and institutional design.  In this way, the WTO would be in a 
position to impart such knowledge to states still struggling to see significant and 
sustainable gains from trade liberalization. 
 
The Three Papers Taken Together 
The second and third papers naturally complement each other because they are 
both about international coercion and why justice should be our response to it.  At the 
end of the third paper, I offer what I think would be a more just international trade 
system: it is one that, unlike the present regime, makes essential medicines accessible 
to the global poor.  But that is simply a remedy of one particular injustice and so is 
hardly a conception of international justice.  Of course, all along in the two papers I 
have been saying that the required response to international coercion that affects 
individual entitlements is a conception of justice, which includes distributive 
principles.  Although my proposal at the end is much more modest, I firmly believe 
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that ultimately what is required is a conception of justice.  The difficulty for a 
theoretician of international justice is that globalization has thrust the world into, what 
I call, a state of institutional or structural flux.  In other words, the world is in the 
process of restructuring itself, moving away from a state-centered model to something 
much more structurally complicated. And this structure, with its multiple centers of 
power, is constantly evolving.  Before the advent of the Uruguay Round, there was no 
legally enforceable international intellectual property regime, but now there is.  And of 
course once intellectual property became internationalized, the kinds of injustices that 
could arise out of the WTO’s trade regime also became more variegated and diverse.  
This makes it very hard to come up with a single conception that can address all these 
injustices.  It seems to me that the best we can do presently is to deal with injustices 
that emerge in the international context in a piecemeal fashion until the world reaches 
a point of structural stability or equilibrium.  When that happens, it will become easier 
to describe how the international realm is organized.  Moreover, with structural 
stability, the pattern of individual entitlements will be more predictable.  At this point, 
I suggest, we can say with greater confidence what would be the ideal way to regulate 
terms of cooperation within the international sphere, an ideal that would be embodied 
in a conception of international justice. 
In the first paper, I face the problem of structural flux or instability once again.  
Of course, the concern there is not about coercion.  Instead, it is about the distribution 
of the cooperative product of a global economic system of cooperation.  I argue that 
the distribution has to be a just one.  I maintain that the distribution has to accord with 
the appropriate principles of distributive justice because when it is left up to the global 
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market or even the contribution principle, individuals who are disadvantaged by the 
outcome have legitimate reasons to complain – a complaint which can only be 
assuaged by a just division of the cooperative product.  However, in the paper, I don’t 
venture to say in what such division would consist.  The difficulty is that it is not clear 
what the global economic system will look like in ten, twenty, thirty years.  It will 
probably be larger and more encompassing.  But it may also be more rule-based and 
coercive.  Furthermore, there are other cooperative regimes that generate their own 
particular harms, which have to be examined and prioritized in light of their 
seriousness.  This complexity of global economic cooperation makes it very hard to 
construct a conception of justice that responds to current problems and anticipates 
future ones.
17
  And so, I think, once again the best we can do at this point is to 
confront egregious forms of injustice that prevail in the here and now and try to 
dismantle them one by one. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
17 In other words, we don't yet have a fixed set of subject-matters for which we can work out 
conceptions of justice.  That is because given the changes in global structure, we have 
individual subject-matters still in the process of formation and also new ones coming into 
existence.  
 24 
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CHAPTER 2 
 
 
Economic Globalization and International Distributive Justice
1
 
 
 
 
I. Introduction 
In the last thirty years, political theory has offered an extensive examination of 
domestic society.  By now the main problems of domestic justice are well understood 
and several conceptions of justice have been put forward as solutions.  An account of 
the main problems that a theory of international justice should focus on, however, is 
still being debated.  The theories of international justice that have been offered in 
political philosophy typically take as their starting point a certain independent 
conception of domestic justice and work outward from there.  I suggest in this paper 
that there is something deeply problematic about this method.  It is my contention that 
theories of domestic and international justice cannot be worked out independently of 
each other and, furthermore, that a conception of international justice must be given a 
certain kind of epistemic priority.  I argue that before we can apply a conception of 
justice to domestic society, we must be in a position where we can specify what we 
owe to the rest of humanity, something we cannot do unless we have a conception of 
international justice already on hand.   
                                                 
1
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I arrive at this position by examining the economics of globalization, which 
has transformed domestic society and engendered a worldwide economic system that 
is supplanting individual society as the primary unit of economic cooperation.  The 
provision of social and primary goods – and their subsequent conversion into 
capabilities – within domestic society depends to a large extent on the cooperative 
product of this international economic system.  Each domestic society appropriates a 
certain share of the international product and uses it for its own internal cooperation, 
which in turn generates further social and primary goods that get distributed among its 
members in a certain way.  There is a presupposition here that whatever share of the 
international product that a given society appropriates is something to which it is 
entitled. But I argue that we cannot simply assume this, and that we must first have a 
conception of international justice that applies to the intentional economic system, and 
see whether a society is in fact entitled to the share that it takes.    
The paper consists of several sections.  First, I discuss a certain conception of 
domestic society that was made prominent by John Rawls, and suggest how this 
conception should be interpreted by placing it within the context of Rawls's overall 
theory of justice.  Next, I argue that even a more nuanced construal of Rawls's 
understanding of domestic society has been made obsolete by the process of 
globalization, and offer what I think is a more accurate account of society and its 
nexus to the rest of the world.  I then proceed to explain how cooperation within 
domestic society exhibits a relation of dependence on the international economic 
system and why this has the result of giving international justice priority.  I also bring 
up certain objections for my position and attempt to offer responses to them.  Finally, I 
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suggest a quantitative way that dependence on the international economic system can 
be measured and draw certain conclusions based on the results obtained. 
 
II. 
In his A Theory of Justice (hereafter ATJ), John Rawls offers a certain 
conception of society that has been influential in political philosophy for quite some 
time.
2
  The conception, however, has not been without its critics who have argued that 
Rawls has gotten it wrong in important ways.  My aim in this section is threefold.  
First, I  suggest that some of the criticisms directed at Rawls are based on a misreading 
of Rawls.  I then claim that even with a more accurate reading of Rawls, he is still 
vulnerable to the objection that he presupposes a view of the world that is obsolete.  
Finally, I explain why getting a more accurate description of society is a critical task  
for global justice.   
To simplify things, I will break Rawls’s conception of society into three 
distinct claims – which I take to be about the basic features of society – and then 
discuss each of them in turn.  First, society is supposed to be a system of cooperation 
for mutual advantage that generates a cooperative product.
3
  Second, it is seen as a 
                                                 
2
 John Rawls, A Theory of Justice, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1971, pp. 3-114.  
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 The possibility of self-advancement for all through cooperation is of course what makes the 
formation of society rational in the first place.   Cooperation is a constitutive feature of society 
and I do not dispute this.   But making cooperation the central feature of society should worry 
us, for it leaves out so many other things that seem as important.  By no means does 
cooperation exhaust all there is to society; plenty of other things happen in addition to 
cooperation. There is, for a start, plenty of non-cooperation – crime, for instance.  And 
furthermore, we don’t just cooperate, whatever that may be; we attend places of worship, go to 
work, protest wars, have children, see concerts, buy gifts for our loved ones, argue about the 
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system that has a coercive structure.   And finally, it is supposed to be a system that is 
closed and self-sufficient.
4
   
 It is the last assertion that has generated most of the criticisms of Rawls’s 
conception of society.  Charles Beitz and Thomas Pogge, two noted political 
philosophers who advocate for a cosmopolitan approach to justice, have been 
especially critical of Rawls for assuming domestic society as closed and self-sufficient 
and for not extending his special conception of justice to the rest of the world.
5
  Both 
                                                                                                                                            
rightness or wrongness of abortion, and so on.   It would be misleading to say that all this is 
about cooperation.   
     There is also something else that happens within society that seems to transcend 
cooperation.  We enter society in a rather vulnerable state.  We have no choice but to accept 
that society will leave an indelible imprint on our identities, though there is no way to predict 
exactly what that imprint is going to be.  There are no fixed identities that are handed to us.  
The number of elements that form them is large yet finite; their combination also finite yet 
larger. Which combination we’re given is a matter of chance, but also something that is 
incomplete and not immutable.  At some point, we can transpose the elements, add new ones 
to generate a new combination.  Yet, we are to a great extent still dependent on society as the 
repository for these elements and an incubator for new ones.  Society performs this function 
for us, but we would be hard-pressed to call it a matter of cooperation.  Simply saying society 
is a system of cooperation does not quite capture this important dimension.   
     So it does seem that society is much more than just a system of cooperation.  Many have 
rightly pointed out that to view domestic society as something that is only about cooperation 
for mutual gain sketches a rather narrow conception that leaves out important details that are 
constitutive of society and have nothing to do with cooperation.  However, I don’t think we 
can escape the fact that viewing society as a cooperative enterprise captures something very 
important.  After all, society as we understand it is the locus of much of the cooperative 
activity in which we engage - though it is not, as I shall argue, the exclusive arena for such 
engagement.  So I will try to work with this assumption, but qualify it by saying that it is only 
a conception that approximates what society is, and I will do this in order to suggest a certain 
problem that a theory of international justice has to address. 
 
4
 To anticipate things a bit, it has to be pointed out that this characterization of domestic 
society as being closed and self-sufficient is more a tactical assumption than anything else, 
reflecting Rawls’s method for developing conceptions of justice for distinct subject-matters, 
and not in the end a substantive claim about the world.  I develop this point later in the paper.   
      
5
 Charles Beitz, Political Theory and International Relations, Princeton NJ: Princeton 
University Press, 1999; Thomas Pogge, Realizing Rawls, Ithaca NY: Cornell University Press, 
1989. 
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Beitz and Pogge contend that certainly now domestic societies are not closed or self-
sufficient, and that probably -- with very few exceptions -- they have not been this 
way for a very long time.
6
  Societies, they suggest, have interacted with one another 
for a very long time in all sorts of interesting ways, and have become, especially now, 
remarkably interdependent and interconnected.  In such an interconnected world, 
people participate in a cooperative system that extends beyond their own domestic 
society and encompasses much of the world, as the process of globalization becomes a 
permanent feature of our world.  What this implies, for Beitz and Pogge, is that 
domestic society is no longer a distinct unit of cooperation, where principles of justice 
could be applied; to the contrary, a system of cooperation that a conception of justice 
should address is more global in scope, and any theory of justice that assumes 
otherwise has to be viewed with a great deal of skepticism.   
 Both Beitz and Pogge take a critical stand against Rawls because they think he 
embraces an empirically false view of the world, which leads him, incorrectly 
according to them, to put forward a conception of justice that ignores the rest of the 
                                                 
6
 There are of course societies that try to be closed and self-sufficient.  North Korea comes to 
mind at this point.  But even North Korea is not entirely closed and it is certainly not self-
sufficient.  Its disastrous economic policies have left millions starving, and forced the 
government to ask for assistance from its traditional enemies, the U.S. and Japan.  North 
Korea has also tried to export its military hardware and expertise to other states.  This has 
been difficult to do because most of the world does not want North Korea selling its weapons 
to other states, especially to other rogue states.  But it does suggest that it is willing to engage 
with others, even though the reasons for this are quite nefarious.  Still it is hard to dispute that 
North Korea remains the most closed society in the world, but it is not a pure autarky.  And 
this I think suggests just how difficult it is to be completely closed in the world today.  Pure 
autarkies are certainly very rare, and even if we appeal to the past for examples, they are still 
the exception rather than the rule. 
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world.
7
  To the extent that this stand takes Rawls to be making a substantive claim 
about domestic societies, that they are closed and self-sufficient, their criticism is 
somewhat unfair to Rawls -- and there is some evidence that suggests that Beitz and 
Pogge do attribute this view to Rawls.
8
  The criticism is unfair because it fails to place 
the ostensibly problematic conception of domestic society in a proper context, given 
Rawls's particular aims in ATJ.  Nevertheless, I do think that Beitz and Pogge are on to 
something important in their discussion of a cooperative system becoming global.  
Their  key insight about the structure of the world still poses a problem for Rawls and 
his project of constructing a domestic conception of justice.  But to explain why I 
think Rawls is vulnerable to the cosmopolitan challenge, coming from Beitz and 
Pogge, I have to clarify why Rawls assumes domestic society to be closed and self-
sufficient, something that is obviously empirically false.   
 A more accurate reading of Rawls is that his characterization of domestic 
society as closed and self-sufficient is not meant as a factual claim, but rather as an 
approximation, assumed ab initio so as to make the project of constructing a 
conception of justice for domestic society more manageable.
9
  Rawls thinks that to 
have a complete theory of justice, one has to say something about international society 
as well.  But once the constructivist project reaches that stage, domestic society would 
have to be described more accurately so as to reflect its relation to the rest of the 
                                                 
7
 See Beitz, Political Theory and International Relations, pp. 143-153; Pogge, Realizing 
Rawls, Chapter 6. 
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 See especially Beitz, Political Theory and International Relations, p. 170.  
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 ATJ, p. 108. 
 
 31 
world.
10
  Rawls doesn’t himself do this in ATJ because there he is preoccupied with 
giving a conception of justice for domestic society, a difficult and an important 
problem in itself and one requiring his full attention.
11
   
      This approach to the subject of justice reflects Rawls’s overall method in doing 
a theory of justice.  Rawls does not argue for a grand and unified conception of justice 
that applies to everyone, everywhere, and at all times.  There is no such conception for 
Rawls.  Instead, he thinks that there should be multiple conceptions, each designed to 
apply to a different subject-matter.  Rawls’s starting point is his special conception for 
domestic society.  But then one has to move outward, beyond domestic society, and 
provide principles for the international order.
12
   
      In light of this sequentialist approach to justice, the assumption that domestic 
society is closed and self-sufficient in ATJ is thus pragmatic.  Its purpose is to imagine 
what society would be like if it were isolated from the rest of the world.  A 
fundamental role of a conception of justice for domestic society is to specify how the 
burdens and benefits of social cooperation should be distributed, and it is essential in 
developing such a conception to demarcate the effects of domestic institutions – not 
international ones – on the prospects of individual citizens.  The assumption that a 
                                                 
10
 See John Rawls, The Law of Peoples, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1999, pp. 32-
42.  Rawls touches on this in ATJ.  See A Theory of Justice, pp. 377-78. 
 
11
 Rawls does discuss in ATJ what principles nations may adopt in the original position, but 
the discussion is quite brief and has to do with principles for regulating conflict between 
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domestic society is closed and self-sufficient allows Rawls to look at only those 
effects that are caused by domestic institutions, and adduce principles of justice that 
apply to and regulate these institutions and their effects.  The institutions that survive 
the act of abstraction thus fall within the purview of a domestic conception of justice.  
But once there is an acceptable conception of justice for a domestic society, Rawls 
seems to think, one can then proceed to develop a conception of justice for a different 
subject-matter.  The assumption that domestic society is closed and self-sufficient 
would be very problematic for Rawls and his constructivist project if he were to carry 
it across to the other stages, where a different subject-matter is at issue.  Rawls does 
not do this, and this is evinced by his later work on international relations, in 
particular, in his The Law of Peoples.
13
  There he clearly states that his earlier 
characterization of domestic society was meant only as a rough approximation, 
motivated by the desire to make certain simplifying assumptions and make things 
more manageable.  Once Rawls gets to the international sphere as the relevant subject-
matter, as he does in his The Law of Peoples, he characterizes domestic society as 
entangled with the rest of the world, since, at this point, it is such entanglement that is 
in need of being regulated by a set of international norms.
14
 
So what is wrong with Rawls’s overall position if he eventually drops the 
problematic conception of domestic society as closed and self-sufficient?  I think that 
although Rawls ultimately acknowledges that there is interaction among domestic 
societies, once this becomes morally relevant for him, he still manages to under-
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describe the extent of such inter-societal ties.  In a Rawlsian world, trade is conducted, 
foreign investments are made, treaties are forged, and so on, but all these activities 
pale in comparison to what goes on inside domestic society.  Domestic society 
continues to have a certain kind of pre-eminence for Rawls, for it is a place where the 
most pressing and profound problems of justice are found.   
What we notice when Rawls's actual view of domestic society is brought to the 
foreground -- the view that says there is interaction among societies -- is that his 
approximation of society as closed and self-sufficient seems prima facie reasonable: 
much goes on inside domestic society, which has nothing to do with the rest of the 
world, and thus it makes sense to focus on domestic society and ignore what happens 
outside it, at least for now.  The challenge, coming from Beitz and Pogge, is that, they 
would argue, this seeming reasonableness is in fact quite illusory because Rawls's 
characterization of  interaction among societies is still not sufficiently empirically 
accurate.  For Beitz and Pogge, what goes on internationally subsumes what happens 
domestically, and so to privilege domestic society as the locus of cooperation is a 
mistake.  But, moreover, they would claim, so is Rawls's methodological move, even 
if it is made for pragmatic reasons, because to focus on domestic society and ignore 
the rest of the world implicitly invokes this impoverished view of global interaction.  
For Beitz and Pogge, domestic society on its own isn't a system of cooperation; rather,  
it is part of a larger system that is global.  And so, to pry away domestic society from 
the rest of the world is thus just another way of denying the presence of an all-
encompassing global system.  According to them, when adducing principles of justice, 
one has to begin with the world.   
 34 
It is important to note here that this line of attack on Rawls does not 
presuppose the attribution of the wrong interpretation of Rawls, the one that says that 
he actually thinks domestic society to be closed and self-sufficient.  Even when 
Rawls's conception of domestic society in  ATJ  is placed in a proper context, Beitz 
and Pogge can be seen as making legitimate complaints against him.  What is more, I 
maintain that up to a point their criticisms are actually right.  Although I disagree with 
their conclusion that domestic society is not an appropriate subject-matter for 
distributive justice, they do point to something that Rawls gets wrong.  I, too, think 
that Rawls's view of global interactivity is incomplete and his use of domestic society 
as closed and self-sufficient, even when this is dictated by pragmatic considerations, 
troubling.  In what follows, I explain why I think Rawls’s conception of society is still 
flawed, and why Beitz and Pogge are right in their criticisms -- though up to a point.  
But I also argue that the conception of society put forward by Beitz and Pogge is also 
quite problematic.  My aim in the next section is to spell out what I think each camp 
get wrong about domestic society and  its relation to the rest of the world, what they, 
nevertheless, get right about it, and what implications flow once a more accurate 
picture of domestic society emerges. 
       
III. 
 The difficulty with Rawls’s conception is that he assumes that domestic society 
is a single system of cooperation.  I think this is a mistake.  Instead, we should think of 
society as consisting of and constituted by multiple systems of cooperation, not a 
single system.  Rawls’s cosmopolitan critics, on the other hand, mindful of the fact of 
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globalization, view society as essentially a subsystem of a single global system.  To 
this global system they apply principles of international justice, but reject any need to 
adduce principles of justice specifically and exclusively for domestic society.  Rawls, 
even as he rejects his earlier view of domestic society as closed and self-sufficient, 
does not go this far.  He does not give up the idea that there should be two separate 
conceptions: one for domestic society, and one for international.  And he does this 
because he regards the domestic and the international as constituting two distinct 
systems.   
      The difference between Rawls, on the one hand, and Beitz and Pogge, on the 
other, is in their understanding of domestic society.  The fact of globalization explains 
their disagreement over how to individuate the subject-matter of justice, but also opens 
them up to the charge that certain assumptions they make about the world are not quite 
right.  Rawls underestimates the extent of economic cooperation that exists worldwide, 
while his cosmopolitan critics focus too exclusively on economic activity and neglect 
other forms of cooperation.  By paying exclusive attention to economic cooperation, 
Beitz and Pogge insist – and I think rightly – that there is a global system of 
cooperation.  But they also seem to be committed to domestic society being part of the 
global system, a mere subsystem and nothing more.  Rawls, on the other hand, seems 
to think that when it comes to economic activity, most of it is conducted among 
members of domestic society, and consequently doesn’t regard it as a subsystem of a 
larger, worldwide system.  However, Rawls is wrong in thinking that domestic society 
is not a subsystem of a larger, worldwide system; it is in fact a subsystem of a certain 
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kind.  But Beitz and Pogge are also wrong in thinking that domestic society is merely 
a subsystem and nothing more; it is in fact much more than this. 
      I think that we can avoid these mistakes by invoking a more accurate 
conception of society that I suggested above.  Instead of conceiving of it as a system, 
we should imagine society as consisting of multiple systems or as a manifold of 
systems of cooperation – a system of systems perhaps, but not a system simpliciter.  
The systems that constitute it might be inter alia a political system, an economic 
system, a social system, a cultural system.   Each of these systems has a distinct 
cooperative product, and we individuate them in virtue of the product they generate.  I 
think it is right to say that domestic society consists of a political system, a social 
system, a cultural system, but not of an economic system.  The fact of globalization 
has produced an economic system that is international and rapidly moving toward 
becoming global in scope.  So Beitz and Pogge are right to think that there is an 
international system of cooperation.  But the system they isolate for us is essentially 
economic in nature.   Moreover, they are right that domestic society is a subsystem if 
we take it to be a subsystem of an international economic system.  But we must not 
forget that there may be other systems that are constitutive of domestic society.  I 
think in fact that there are: specifically, domestic society consists of a political system 
of cooperation.   This suggests that domestic society is more than simply a subsystem; 
even if we subtract the economic, domestic society continues to be a manifold or a 
system of systems.  Indeed, as Rawls himself puts it in Political Liberalism, domestic 
society is a system of cooperation where fellow members are to offer to one another 
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fair terms of cooperation that they can accept as free and equal citizens.
15
  If that is 
right, then it certainly deserves a conception of justice that applies exclusively to it, 
and Rawls is right in his sequentialist approach to justice by requiring a division of 
labor among the various conceptions of justice, each applying to a particular subject-
matter.       
There are perhaps four or more fundamental systems of cooperation, but I shall 
focus on only two of these systems: the political and the economic.  Members of an 
individual domestic society engage with one another in all sort of ways that we think 
of as being political.
16
  They vote, pay taxes, join political parties, offer donations in 
support of their favorite candidate, form unions, debate political policies, protest wars, 
and so on.  And from these activities we can, I think, discern the terrain of a distinct 
political system.  It is political, in part, because the cooperation that goes on in this 
system has a product that is political in nature.  Rights, liberties, laws, norms, reasons, 
institutions all seem to be a part of the cooperative product of a political system.  
Underlying this system are terms of cooperation that distribute the product among the 
participants in a particular way.  Now it seems right to say that these terms should 
conform to a certain conception of justice.  The burdens and benefits of cooperation 
should be distributed in some appropriate way.  Interestingly enough, Elizabeth 
Anderson, like me, distinguishes the political from the economic sphere and offers  a 
principle to regulate the terms of political participation, which she calls democratic 
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equality.
17
  I think there is something very appealing about democratic equality, 
though I won’t defend this principle here.  Instead, I shall simply use it in order to 
illustrate a certain problem that seems to arise for a theory of global justice.    
      Anderson thinks that a fundamental aim of an egalitarian conception of justice 
is to remove structures of oppression and domination, and she regards the provision of 
capabilities as the right approach to dissolve these structures.
18
   According to 
democratic equality, persons should be given equal access to capabilities that are 
necessary for them to participate on the basis of equality.  This is true for political 
participation.  Persons should have equal access to capabilities that would enable them 
to participate in a political system on an equal footing.  Persons are considered equal 
in a political system if and only if they are equal in the functionings to which they 
have access.
19
    Anderson also holds this with respect to economic participation.  But 
since I reject the idea that there is an economic system that is coextensive with 
domestic society, I will put aside the issue of equality within an economic system.   
      Capabilities are not directly a product of cooperation, but society generates 
social goods that can be converted into capabilities.  Primary goods are one such 
example of social goods generated by society through various systems of cooperation, 
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 To participate politically on an equal basis, for instance, you need to be able to make 
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and I shall confine my discussion to such goods, even though ultimately it is the 
distribution of capabilities, not primary goods, that is going to be equalized by a 
conception of justice.      
      Each system generates its own cooperative product.  The economic system 
generates, among other things, wealth and income.  There is of course more to its 
cooperative product than just wealth and income, but we think of these as being 
particularly important for generating capabilities, which is what we are after.  The 
political system engenders, among other things, rights and liberties, which are also 
quite essential for generating certain capabilities.  There is a division of labor in other 
words between the two systems in turning out capabilities.  This means that certain 
capability sets may require the operation of both systems and would rely on their 
cooperative products.    
      Anderson argues that democratic equality requires the provision of primary 
and secondary education for all participants in a political system.
20
  It seems perfectly 
reasonable to ask that citizens of a liberal democratic society – or any other polity that 
is similarly demanding and complex – should have as a matter of right those 
capabilities that can only be gained through extensive education.  Without it citizens 
cannot be said to enjoy equal standing.  But notice that primary and secondary 
education cannot be provided by political cooperation alone.  That is, we cannot rely 
merely on the product of political cooperation.  To provide education for all, schools 
have to be built, teachers have to be trained, texts have to be written, and much, much 
more, and of course all of these things have to be paid for.  Societies thus have to be 
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relatively prosperous to be able to provide primary and secondary education.  But this 
means that in addition to a political system of cooperation, we also need an economic 
one because part of the cooperative product of the economic system is necessary for 
the political system to function and generate its cooperative product.
21
     
      The dependency relation also flows in the other direction.  Economic 
cooperation depends on political cooperation.  The kind of economic activity that goes 
on in a modern post-industrial society simply could not exist without the rule of law, 
or without the public support of institutions that regulate such activity.  Without 
political cooperation of a certain kind, economic cooperation would simply not get off 
the ground, and so these two systems in particular mutually support and reinforce each 
other.  For the purposes of this paper, however, I want to explore the implications that 
result from the dependency relation that flows in one of these directions, viz. the 
dependency of the political system on the economic.  The move in the other direction 
is not less significant, but for my discussion here, it is sufficient to examine the flow 
just from the economic to the political. 
      As suggested earlier there is a dependency relation between an economic 
system and a political one.  In order to provide rights and liberties, members of a 
political system in addition to political cooperation must also rely on some part of the 
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cooperative product that is generated by an economic system.  If there is to be a right 
to education or health care, not only do you need consensus among the general public 
that indeed these are basic rights to which all citizens are entitled, pass the necessary 
legislation that gives these rights appropriate legal recognition and status, and 
establish institutions that guarantee that all persons have equal opportunity to access 
these rights, but you also need to set aside a certain portion of the state’s budget to 
build hospitals and schools, pay health care professionals, teachers and administrators, 
purchase equipment for hospitals and schools, support research in medicine and 
education, educate and train the next generation of doctors, nurses, and teachers, and 
so on. And all of this of course depends on the productive labor of persons engaged in 
economic cooperation.   Without economic cooperation and the goods that are 
generated by such cooperation, most of our rights and liberties would simply not exist 
in an institutionalized form.   
     How much of the economic cooperative product is going to be needed to 
achieve the political aims of a just society will depend on the content or substance of 
those aims.  The more substantial the aims the more costly it will be to achieve these 
aims; correspondingly, the more costly the aims, the greater the share of the 
cooperative product will be required.   In the U.S. where making an informed political 
choice can be demanding sometimes, a good secondary education at the very least is 
required in order for citizens to participate – in an election process, for example – on 
the basis of equality.  But of course providing a good secondary education is quite 
expensive, and so in an advanced liberal democratic society to participate politically 
on the basis of equality requires a quite extensive set of capabilities, capabilities that 
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are quite costly to provide and that require a much greater share of the product of 
economic cooperation. 
What distinguishes my relation to a fellow American from my relationship to a 
foreigner is the political system in which we participate, not the economic one.  
Citizens of France or Brazil don’t participate in the same political system as I do; the 
demands of political participation are placed on me and my fellow Americans.  This is 
why one may argue that I have a duty to my fellow compatriots to support a 
conception of justice that provides for those capabilities that are necessary for all 
Americans regardless of class, race, gender, etc., to participate on equal footing with 
respect to everyone else in America.  Correspondingly, I don’t have a duty to support a 
political arrangement that provides capabilities to Brazilians because Brazilians have 
their own political system of cooperation, and so they have duties to one another, but 
this system is different from the political system of which I am a member.  The 
political system of which I am a part is thus coextensive with the domestic society of 
which I am a member.  The same goes for Brazilians.  The political system of which a 
Brazilian is a part is coextensive with the domestic society of which she is a member, 
and this of course happens to be Brazilian society.  Without a fair distribution of 
capabilities within Brazilian society it is other Brazilians who take political advantage 
of those Brazilians who are disadvantaged from the standpoint of their capabilities, not 
me or other fellow Americans.  If the wealthy and powerful Brazilian minority has its 
way and elects an official who will represent their interests, and not the interests of the 
poor and disadvantaged, it is the poor and disadvantaged of Brazil who lose and the 
wealthy minority who wins, not the poor and disadvantaged in the U.S. who lose and 
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the wealthy who win – politically speaking.  We are part of two separate political 
systems, systems that generate duties which apply only to the members of each 
system.
22
      
     The problem that arises for a theory of global justice is the following.  To 
generate the required capability set for political participation in an advanced liberal 
democratic society requires that a substantial portion of the product of  the 
international economic system of cooperation be used.  Call this system Ew.  The more 
extensive the demands for political participation, the more extensive the capability set 
for equal participation is going to be.  As I argued above, one cannot generate the 
capability set through political participation alone.  To generate the set, one also has to 
rely on the product of economic participation.  How much of the economic product is 
going to be needed will of course depend on the specifics of political participation.  
But there is a further question that has to be asked, and that is: What is the proper 
share of the product of Ew that we as Americans are entitled to?  This question applies 
to members of any individual society who expect to use some portion of the product of 
Ew that is meant to fund the provision of capabilities that deal with cooperation that is 
other than economic.  A political system of cooperation is coextensive with 
membership of individual domestic society, or at least approximately so.  An 
economic system of cooperation, on the other hand, is not; economic cooperation is 
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integrationist of domestic societies, and involves the participation of citizens of other 
states.  And the general tendency that economic globalization is exhibiting is to 
integrate economic cooperation into a single worldwide system of cooperation.  
Therefore, its membership is certainly not coextensive with the membership of 
domestic society.  What we end up with is a split between the product of political 
participation and the product of economic participation; the former is, for the most 
part, generated by members of domestic society,
23
 but the latter is gradually moving to 
a point where it is generated by citizens of multiple domestic societies.
24
   
Each participant in this vast system of economic cooperation is clearly entitled 
to some share of the cooperative product.  Furthermore, participants in Ew are also 
participants in a system of political cooperation, which happens to be coextensive with 
their domestic society, and would require, in a liberal society, a large capability set if 
they are to participate on the basis of equality.  As I suggested earlier some part of the 
product of Ew has to be used to fund the provision of these capabilities.  Without the 
product of  Ew, there would no way to get political cooperation off the ground.  The 
type of political cooperation will of course vary from society to society.  In some 
societies political participation may be quite extensive.  Liberal democratic societies 
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are a case in point.  And if political participation is extensive, it is quite plausible to 
suggest that this will call for a richer set of capabilities.  Ordinary people need to be 
able to make reasonable political judgments and choices, and  this requires the right 
sorts of capabilities, which have to be made available if the ideal  of democratic 
equality is to be satisfied.   
      But notice that the capability set for an advanced democratic society will 
absorb significantly more of the product of  Ew – because the capabilities are more 
numerous and expensive to engender – than the capability set for a society that 
demands politically much less of its people where cooperation on the basis of equality 
can be more easily achieved.  If we as Americans have to use much more of the 
product of  Ew in order to generate the capability set relative to political participation 
in our democratic society, are we entitled to appropriate as much as we need to meet 
the demands of democratic equality?  Isn’t it possible that we may be taking away 
more than our fair share of the product of Ew – which is a product after all that is 
generated by lots of people many of whom are from very poor and underdeveloped 
societies – in order to supply our compatriots with those capabilities that are essential 
for their equality?  I think that the answer to the last question is a “yes,” and should 
give pause to constructing a conception of justice for domestic society as the first task 
of justice.  Before we go on and argue for an extensive capability set that is in line 
with the demands of democratic equality, we have first to show that whatever portion 
of the product of Ew we use is something that we can justify to the participants of Ew.  
If we take more than our fair share, then our eagerness to make sure that our 
compatriots have no grounds to complain against us might deprive others of their 
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chance to participate with their compatriots on basis of equality or on the basis of 
some other requirement or standard that is commensurate with their views of a just 
society.
25
   In funding capabilities that enable our compatriots to enjoy democratic 
equality, we may in fact be depriving fellow participants in an economic system from 
being able to realize fair terms of political cooperation with their compatriots.   
      So far I have argued that we as Americans, or as members of any other affluent 
society, in our zeal to make sure that political cooperation is fair and just might be 
inadvertently depriving members of other societies, in particular those that are poor 
and underdeveloped, from realizing fair terms of cooperation in their own society.  
There is at least the possibility of this and this should make us worry enough to 
establish how much of the product of Ew we are in fact entitled to before we go on and 
use some portion of it to supply capabilities to our compatriots.   
     I think that this worry pushes us in the direction of having to come up with 
principles of international justice that apply to economic cooperation and specify a fair 
division of its product for all participants.   Before we as Americans appropriate a 
certain portion of the product of Ew, we have to know what our fair share is of this 
product and whether the amount we think we need in order to realize our domestic 
                                                 
25
 Principles of justice are essential here because we have a vast economic product involving 
billions of participants across the world, which has to be divided in a way that expresses equal 
respect for these participants.  The fact that the economic system is not coercive does not 
eliminate the need for justice, since even under conditions of non-coercion the cooperative 
product of the economic system can be divided in a way that violates equal respect. What 
equal respect might mean under conditions where coercion is absent may be different from 
what it might mean when coercion is present – in a non-coercive context, expressing equal 
respect might be less demanding.  But this difference in the demands for equal respect does 
not eliminate the need for principles of justice, since in both contexts there has to be equal 
respect and it is up to a conception of justice to ensure that the appropriate standard of respect 
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conception of justice is something that we are entitled to.  And if not, then we have to 
reduce the demands that we have placed on that product, which of course might affect 
the kind of provisions that we are ultimately in a position to make to our compatriots, 
and in general the type of society that we can construct.     
 
IV. 
There are at least two important objections that one can make against my 
position that requires the specification of what constitutes a fair division of the product 
of Ew before domestic societies can appropriate their share of it.  Let me take up each 
of these objections one by one and offer a reply.  
A critic at this juncture might say that we already possess a mechanism for 
dividing fairly the product of Ew, and that is the market.
26
  What a society (or a state) 
gets from the product of Ew is basically what the market allows it to take, and since the 
market is fair or is a fair procedure of exchange, what a society (or a state) 
appropriates is not unfair to the other participants.  This may raise some eyebrows at 
this point, for it might seem that my critic shouldn’t be saying what is or is not fair 
because that is precisely what is at issue, what is and is not fair, and what is needed 
here is a conception of international justice to do this, which as yet we have not 
provided. But I don’t think we need to go this far, for presumably we do have certain 
pre-theoretic considered convictions about fairness, and perhaps my critic can make a 
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case that indeed the market can generate a fair division of the cooperative product of 
Ew. So how might this go? 
One way is to suggest that how much a society (or a state) should take away 
from the product of Ew should be in direct proportion to its contribution to the total 
product.  So the more it contributes to the genesis of the product of Ew the more it 
should get.  Let’s designate this the contribution principle. There is something quite 
appealing about this principle because it seems to capture a basic insight contained in 
our pre-theoretical understanding of fairness.  We seem to think that people should be 
rewarded for their greater contributions: if you gather twice as many bushels of corn 
as me, then it seems prima facie right that the wages you garner should be twice as 
much as mine.  Now what my critic has to say is that the market more or less satisfies 
the contribution principle: what a society (or a state) appropriates as a participant in 
the global market tracks more or less that portion of the product of Ew that reflects its 
collective contribution.  
As David Gauthier and Elizabeth Anderson have shown, however, we have 
strong reasons to think that it is very unlikely that the market – imperfect as it is in the 
actual world – can ever satisfy the contribution principle; and the global market is no 
exception to this.
27
 What an agent can in fact take away from the market is often the 
result of all sorts of positive externalities and rent-extraction behavior, either from 
asymmetric bargaining power or from exploiting the scarcity of a particular factor 
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input. These components of a market transaction of course have nothing to do with the 
agent’s productive capacity, and this is especially true in the global context.28 
There is little evidence to suggest that the global market in general satisfies the 
contribution principle.  Of course, even if it did, that alone would not solve the 
fairness problem. In a capitalist system, those characteristics that permit agents to 
respond to demand once information about demand is made available are clearly 
differentially distributed. Whether a certain agent at this time has the productive 
capacity to respond effectively and efficiently to present demand is to a great extent a 
matter of luck because demand as such is independent of considerations of who has 
the right productive capacity and how she acquired it, i.e. did she acquire it through a 
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jobs where no jobs are available can extract hugely favorable terms of cooperation from 
workers in poor and developing countries that are desperate for employment.  But the 
bargaining power a firm enjoys won’t matter to the contribution it makes because bargaining 
power and the productive contribution that a firm makes are causally independent of each 
other. Companies can also locate their plants in countries that lack even rudimentary 
environmental standards so that they can pollute without incurring the cost of pollution. 
Domestic  companies that are less mobile or simply don’t have the capital to relocate may 
have to abide by more stringent standards of their native country and bear the burden of 
paying for some of the pollution they produce.  The fact that there are no uniform and 
pervasive environmental standards permits some firms to produce goods without the added 
expense of covering the cost of pollution that results from such production. They can then 
offer their goods at a much better price than their less mobile competitors and remain more 
competitive even though their contribution in terms of the quality of goods produced is about 
as good as those made by their competitors.  There is no shortage of examples that illustrate 
that market allocation can radically deviate from the contribution principle.   
 Now if these externalities were to be corrected, the contribution principle might seem 
more attractive as a standard for economic reward.   The problem with such a proposal for the 
global market is that it is extremely difficult to eliminate all externalities.   Externalities that 
have to do with asymmetries in knowledge and information can generate a superior bargaining 
position for the knowledge holder.  And although certain kinds of information asymmetries – 
like insider trading – can be outlawed, asymmetry in knowledge as a whole cannot be 
eliminated.  So there will always be ways to generate unfair competitive advantages and stray 
from the contribution principle.  For a discussion of information asymmetries, see George 
Akerloff, “The Market for ‘Lemons’: Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism,” 
Quarterly Journal of Economics, 1970, 84, (3), pp.488-500.    
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fair process.  And of course those who have the productive capacity now given current 
demand may not have it later as demand changes. There is no reason to think that 
demand and one’s ability to effectively respond to it in any way track qualities of 
persons that they morally deserve.
29
 
  There is, however, another objection that can be raised against my position.  
Surely, Americans cooperate for the most part with other Americans and not with 
foreigners, and this suggests that we can in principle isolate that part of the 
cooperative product of Ew that is essentially a product of American economic 
cooperation as opposed to French or Mexican.  But if that is right, then we can also 
designate that portion of the cooperative product of Ew as something that should be 
distributed among Americans only.  Americans and only Americans are entitled to it 
because after all that portion of the total product is something that is generated by their 
cooperation and not anyone else’s.  Thus they can choose to distribute that portion of 
the product of Ew in accordance to principles of justice for domestic society including 
the principle of democratic equality, which requires the provision of capabilities that 
are necessary for political participation on the basis of political equality for all 
Americans.   
                                                 
29
 What this argument suggests is that the contribution principle does not account for the 
notion of moral luck, and in particular for brute bad luck.  Even if the contribution principle 
were to be applied to the global market, there would still the economically disadvantaged who 
ended up in such a position not because they made bad decisions, but because of certain 
historical or natural contingencies – they happened to have been born in a country where it is 
hard for most people to get a decent education; they were malnourished or sickly in their 
childhood, which affected their physical and intellectual development later in life; they are 
members of minority group that faces severe discrimination.  The contribution principle is 
much more appealing when people start off from a position of equality. But since there is no 
way to do this, we need some form of redistribution to justify to the economically 
disadvantaged the substantial burdens they are forced to assume.      
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      Superficially it may seem that Americans for the most part cooperate 
economically with other Americans, and that foreign participation is at best marginal.  
But appearances in this case are quite deceptive, for the contribution that foreigners 
make to American cooperation is not insubstantial by any means.  The imprint of 
foreign contribution can be found in almost any commonplace or everyday 
cooperative interaction that seems in any way to be economic.  We use roads and 
highways to get to our jobs, where we engage in what is quite obviously an example of 
economic cooperation among Americans.  The roads may be built by your fellow 
Americans – construction workers that hail from your town for instance – but the tools 
they use or the resources that go into making these roads may come from abroad 
where they are built or excavated by foreign workers.  Economic cooperation that 
takes place on American soil, as it were, is imbued with foreign involvement to such a 
degree that it is quite difficult to provide a case where economic cooperation among 
Americans does not in some way depend on the economic contribution made by 
foreign workers.  And if such foreign presence is this ubiquitous it is hard to imagine 
how we might be able to isolate and demarcate that portion of the total product of Ew 
that is generated by Americans only.  If there is such a thing it cannot be anything that 
is complete and thus quite unlikely to be of any use to anyone, including Americans.
30
  
                                                 
30
 This gives us another way to respond to the critic who says that the market constitutes a fair 
process for dividing the product of Ew.   If we cannot disentangle what is a product of 
American cooperation from what clearly isn’t - for it depends on foreign input – then there is 
no way that the market can satisfy the contribution principle if the kind of contribution we 
mean here is collective in nature.  In order for us to determine whether the market satisfies the 
contribution principle, we have to be able to demarcate what is and isn’t a result of American 
contribution to total product of Ew and then suggest the share of Ew  should be proportional to 
such contribution.  But since this is something that we cannot demarcate, there is no way for 
us to conclude that the market can ever satisfy the contribution principle.   
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      The above objection, however, can be made more precise, which would make 
it more difficult to respond to.   The worry my opponent brings up has to do with 
measuring economic cooperation worldwide.  Several questions have to be raised at 
this point.  How extensive is the economic system that I have in mind?  Is there a 
single system of economic cooperation, or are there many?  If so, what are they, and 
what becomes of global economic participation?  My answer is that if there are other 
systems of economic cooperation they are dwarfed by the international one, which I 
think implies that we had better take this system very seriously if we are to say 
something useful about distributive justice.  But I also want to go further than this and 
say that whatever economic activity we think is distinct from international cooperation 
– because it takes place domestically and is regulated by domestic institutions – is 
basically an illusion.  Domestic economic activity is in fact part of the international 
system, and domestic society serves as a site for economic activity, but it does not 
constitute a system.   
But my opponent at this point might say that I have offered little or no 
evidence to suggest that the fact of economic globalization is as pervasive as I say it is, 
and that there is a single economic system of cooperation.  Unlike me, she believes 
                                                                                                                                            
  Now it might be suggested that if receiving in proportion to one’s contribution means 
receiving in proportion to how much one’s product is valued by others, then a perfectly 
competitive market would be able to satisfy the contribution principle. I think that this 
suggestion has some plausibility to it.  One way we can do is by measuring  the value added to 
a commodity or an industry by American workers and then taking that as our measure of the 
amount of contribution made solely by Americans. The difficulty with this is that the value 
added measure does not eliminate all the ways in which American workers and industries 
depend on foreign inputs for their productivity.  For instance, it does not take into 
consideration products that were not purchased by an industry as an intermediate input, but 
were used by it nevertheless.  These include public goods, which are used by everyone, but 
also technical or scientific knowledge that is generated by government sponsored research.       
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that there are many systems of cooperation that are roughly coextensive with 
individual domestic society.  A domestic economic system is constitutive of individual 
domestic society, not unlike a political system or a cultural system of cooperation.  
Domestic society is thus a system of systems or a second-order system that regulates 
first-order systems of cooperation.  An economic system is one of the first-order 
systems that falls within the purview of domestic society; others that fall within the 
same purview are a domestic political system, a domestic cultural system, and so on.  
Moreover, these domestic economic systems are the dominant economic systems in 
the world, each with a cooperative product that can be traced largely to the cooperative 
labor of members of that society to which of course those members are naturally 
entitled.  The American economic system is a system of American society, and its 
cooperative product is something to which Americans are entitled.  And this 
cooperative product is so large that it can pay for the provision of those capabilities for 
all Americans that are called for by the principle of democratic equality.  The 
international economic system that I make such a big fuss over is merely one system 
along with the domestic ones.  And in fact it is probably a product of various domestic 
systems interacting with one another.  This system has a cooperative product, but that 
share of the product that can be traced to the contribution of a particular domestic 
system is considerably smaller than the cooperative product of that system.  Thus the 
cooperative economic product of an American economic system is significantly larger 
than its share of the international economic product that stems from international 
cooperation; it is so much larger that American society does not have to dip into that 
share in order to provide capabilities to its citizens so that they may engage in political 
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participation on the basis of political equality.  In other words, my worry – that first 
and foremost we have to delineate the proper share for each domestic society of the 
cooperative product of the international economic system before we can fund domestic 
political participation – isn’t really a serious concern because the cooperative product 
of a domestic economic system is sufficient to pay for the type of political 
participation that is called for by domestic principles of justice, even when these 
principles are very demanding like the principle of democratic equality.   So in order 
to defend my position, I have to say what is wrong with my opponent’s claims about 
globalization. 
      There are I think at least two ways to respond to this objection.  The basic idea 
behind my response is that most of the goods and services that we as Americans 
produce exhibit counterfactual dependence on foreign factors of production.  There are 
three counterfactual claims that can be made.  First, most final goods and services that 
we as Americans produce are counterfactually dependent on foreign factors of 
production. Second, the value or price of final goods and services counterfactually 
depends on foreign factors of production.  Finally, the size of the US GDP 
counterfactually depends on the global market.
31
  I contend that significant 
counterfactual dependence of any of the above type is evidence – though perhaps not 
conclusive evidence – that the international economic system is deep and extensive 
and with a product that is essential for domestic political participation.   
                                                 
31
 Recall that the GNP of a particular state is the value of all final goods and services produced 
by that state’s factors of production that are then sold in a given period. 
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Let’s look at an individual final good produced in the U.S.  Let gi be that good, 
and vi be its value.  If gi counterfactually depends (or c-depends from hereon) on a 
foreign input, it is an outcome of cooperative activity between foreign and domestic 
cooperators.  It should thus count as part of the cooperative product of the 
international system.  This seems right because foreign workers have played a 
cooperative role in the production of this good.  But how do we show there is such 
counterfactual dependence (or c-dependence)?  One way is to show that without a 
foreign factor of production a particular good would not have been made by American 
workers.  In other words, to establish that gi c-depends on a foreign input, we have to 
show that the following statement is true: If it weren’t for foreign contribution, gi 
would not have been produced.  I suggest we do this by looking for any foreign input 
at any point along the production chain of gi.  If there is such input and once this input 
is taken out, then presumably gi would no longer be made.  There is a break in the 
production chain and something essential for gi is not supplied.
32
  Moreover, this 
entails that vi also exhibits counterfactual dependence; if gi is no longer made, vi is 
equal to zero, and this obviously implies a change in vi.  But notice that gi is a generic 
example of any final good that includes a foreign input in its production chain.  Any 
                                                 
32
 In possible-worlds talk, a possible world where foreign participation is absent and gi is not 
made is closer to the actual world than one where foreign participation is absent but gi is 
made.  Let’s suppose that gi is assembled from various component parts in a U.S. factory, and 
that one of its component parts was made in a factory in Malaysia.  Now gi could still have 
been made in the U.S. provided the component part made in Malaysia is made in a factory 
somewhere in the U.S.  But of course in the actual world there is no such factory; it is 
something that first has to be built.  This suggests that a world where there is no factory in 
Malaysia and in the U.S. is closer to the actual world than one where there is no factory in 
Malaysia but there is one in the U.S.  The latter requires something further, viz. a factory in 
the U.S., which ex hypothesi in the actual world does not exist. 
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final good, therefore, that contains such an input in its production chain would c-
depend on foreign contribution.
33
 
     So if there is actual contribution of a foreign input at any point in gi’s 
production chain, a good case can be made that gi exhibits c-dependence on foreign 
participation.   This suggests that our task is the following.  If we can locate some 
amount of foreign contribution somewhere in the production chain of an individual 
good, we can say that the good exhibits c-dependence.  And if there is such 
dependence, that good is part of the cooperative product of the international system.  
This may not be so hard to do if we examine the whole production process of a 
particular good and all that this process involves – the raw materials that go into 
making the good, the plants and factories where production and assembly take place, 
the labor that goes into making the good, the labor that goes into the production of all 
the subparts and their subparts, and so on – at some point we are bound to find an 
element of foreign contribution.  And it seems that we can do this with respect to most 
of the goods that we produce.  There are simply too many goods that somewhere in 
their histories involve some element of foreign contribution.  Moreover, we can do this 
by going from country to country; the goods that citizens of other states consume and 
produce are similar to what we produce and consume, and their mode of production is 
also for the most part not unlike our own.  But if that is right, then the international 
system is deep and extensive and its cooperative product is quite large, which means 
                                                 
33
 Something similar can be said about final services.  But in many cases it would be the value 
of a service that exhibits c-dependence.    
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that our share of this product is something that we must rely on when making 
provisions for political participation.  
I think that we can say something similar about the value of final goods and 
services.  The value of a particular good that c-depends on foreign factors of 
production also c-depends on these foreign factors because they have values which in 
turn affect it. In another words, the value of a particular good is going to be affected 
by the value of all its production inputs that are part of its production history.  Now 
there may be goods and services that don’t c-depend on foreign factors of production. 
But the value of these goods and services may still exhibit c-dependence.  A particular 
service within the low to semi-skilled spectrum of labor has the value that it does in 
part because of the distribution of workers that possess that skill, and this of course 
goes on not just domestically, but also internationally.  If more foreign workers could 
freely migrate from a country or area where their skills are in low demand to a country 
or area where their skills are in high demand, then the value of that skill domestically 
would change.  Something very similar can be said about goods as well.  The 
counterfactual dependence of the value of final goods and services is far more 
expansive and includes many more goods and services.  I suggest that goods and 
services whose values exhibit c-dependence should count as part of the international 
economic system of cooperation – for they do depend once again on foreign factors of 
production.  If that is right, then this international system is quite large and so has to 
be taken seriously by us. 
The moral significance of c-dependence is that it shows that the things that we 
as Americans consume are in part generated by non-Americans and that, moreover, 
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were it not for such foreign participation, we as Americans would not have these 
things -- hence the need to think of economic cooperation as extending beyond the 
state.
34
  Of course, just how much foreign contribution for a particular type of good 
amounts to is something that c-dependence of goods does not reveal: all goods are 
treated similarly as long as they exhibit c-dependence.
35
  But, it might be argued, this 
insensitivity to the amount of contribution actually made by non-Americans is 
problematic, for it might be the case that the foreign input involved in generating 
particular goods is still quite minimal -- or fungible, for that matter -- which would 
support much less redistribution from the US to the rest of the world.  Singapore, 
being a small country, depends very heavily on imports to drive its economy, which is 
centered on exporting technological products.  But can the same be said of the US, 
which has the capacity to produce much, if not all, of what it needs?   
I think that c-dependence does not rule out that per good foreign contribution 
might be small in relation to that which is domestic.  That is certainly a weakness in 
my analysis and in its use of this concept.  But the actual empirical evidence suggests 
that foreign contribution is not minimal.  There are difference from country to country, 
but even with states such as the US and Japan there is significant economic 
dependence on foreign inputs.  In the next section, I try to use such data to make a 
                                                 
34
 Of course, it is possible that without foreign contribution, Americans would pick up the 
slack, as it were, and do all of the manufacturing of these goods.  But if this were to occur, 
assuming of course that across the board substitution of all foreign inputs with domestic ones 
could be achieved, the price of these goods would change - the American consumer would 
have to pay more for the same good.  So at least the economic value of goods consumed by 
Americans would be different if we abstract away foreign contribution. 
 
35
 This, however, is not the case if we take the economic value of a good as exhibiting c-
dependence, because presumably the greater the amount of actual foreign contribution, the 
greater the change to the economic value when foreign contribution is abstracted away.    
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stronger case -- and one which I hope will also give additional support to my argument 
above -- that there is indeed a global economic system of cooperation.        
My arguments on globalization thus far have been conceptual in nature.  
However, my claims would perhaps be more compelling if economic interdependence 
could be given a quantitative description and measured in a more precise way.   If it 
can be shown that the cooperative product of economic cooperation of, say, 
Americans or Chinese relies on cooperative contributions made by foreigners and if 
this reliance can be effectively measured, then I think we can say with more 
confidence whether there indeed exists at this point a global system of economic 
cooperation that is substantial enough to warrant being regulated by principles of 
justice.  In the next section, I  offer such a quantitative description of global economic 
interdependence and argue that for those states that are integrated into the global 
economy cooperation with the rest of the world is not peripheral but is quite deep.   
 
V.  
  Measuring a state’s dependence on the global economy for its cooperative 
product is not an easy thing to do given the sheer complexity of the interactions 
involved and the number of variables to consider.  There is, however, one specific type 
of econometric analysis that may be applied here, which I think can provide a 
reasonably accurate estimate of global interdependence.  The type of analysis I have 
mind is called input-output analysis.
36
    
                                                 
36
 There is considerable literature on explaining input-output analysis.  For an early exposition 
of this method, see Wassily Leontief, Input-Output Economics, New York: Oxford University 
Press, 1986; Hollis Chenery and Tsunehiko Watanabe, International Comparisons of the 
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  The modern version of input-output analysis was largely developed by Wassily 
Leontief in the 1930’s, 40’s and 50’s.37  The sine qua non of input-out analysis is that 
it models inter-sectoral linkages.  Sectors are the individual industries or sectors of a 
particular economic unit – it could be a state or a certain region within a state.  
Linkages are basically the flows of products between these various sectors, as one 
sector purchases products from another and then uses them as inputs to generate its 
own products, which again are either sold to other sectors as inputs or to final 
consumers for consumption.  What input-output analysis does is to model inter-
sectoral linkages in a way that allows certain predictions to be made.  Modeling 
sectoral linkages is important because ceteris paribus a rise or drop in final demand for 
the products of a certain sector will also affect demand for the products of those 
sectors that directly or indirectly supply the affected sector with their own products as 
inputs.  In other words, a rise or fall in demand in one sector is something that 
reverberates throughout an economy, and input-output analysis allows us to measure 
how widespread and significant the impact from the change in final demand is going 
to be on individual sectors as well as on the economy as a whole.
38
   
                                                                                                                                            
Structure of Production,” Econometrica, 26, 1958, pp. 487-521; Ambica Ghosh, “Input-
Output Approach in an Allocation System,” Econometrica, 25, 1958, pp. 58-64.  A more 
contemporary discussion of input-output analysis and some of the most recent developments 
in the field is found in Ronald Miller and Peter Blair, Input-Output Analysis: Foundations and 
Extensions, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009.  
 
37
See Wassily Leontief, “Input-Output Analysis and its Use in War Economies: Recent 
Developments in the Study of Inter-industrial Relationships,”  American Economic Review, 
May 1949, Vol. 39 Issue 3, pp. 211-225;  Wassily Leontief, Studies in the Structure of  the 
American Economy: Theoretical and Empirical Exploration in Input-Output Analysis, New 
York: Oxford University Press, 1953.  
  
38
 See Miller and Blair,  Input-Output Analysis, Chap. 2, for a detailed discussion of how 
input-output analysis is supposed to work and the purpose behind this method. 
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  For instance, a rise in demand for American-made automobiles in the U.S. 
means that U.S. auto manufactures have to increase their production of cars to keep up 
with demand.  But in order to increase their production of cars, these manufacturers 
also have to buy additional inputs from other industries: they have to purchase more 
steel, more electricity, component parts, and so on.  This means, in turn, that these 
other industries have to increase production of their products, and since they too use 
inputs in their production process from other sectors, demand for additional goods will 
continue to spread and encompass more and more sectors.  Input-output analysis gives 
us a way to measure how much more each of these interdependent sectors would have 
to produce in order to satisfy the change in final demand – in this case, consumer 
demand for American-made cars.
39
   
    Input-output analysis was used largely to predict how change in demand would 
affect the economy of a particular country or of a region within a country.  My 
intention here is to use input-output analysis to measure the extent to which the 
cooperative product – i.e. the total economic output – of a certain state depends on its 
participation within the global economy.  The way I aim to do this is to model sectoral 
interdependence of a particular state with the rest of the world, vis-à-vis international 
trade, and then apply input-output analysis to predict what would happen to a state 
when these global linkages are abstracted away.  The difference between how a 
national economy performs when it is plugged into the international system of 
                                                                                                                                            
 
39
 Change in demand is always change in final demand, which is essentially demand by 
individual domestic consumers, the government, or demand for exports.  Change in 
intermediate inputs is calculated in light of change in final demand. For additional explanation  
of the variables involved, see ibid.   
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economic cooperation and how it does in a hypothetical situation where the 
contributions made by the rest of the world are erased should give us an estimate of 
the extent to which a state that is part of the global economy depends on the rest of the 
world in generating its economic output.   
  Fortunately, data are now available that with certain modifications
40
 to the 
traditional input-output method will permit me to carry out these calculations.
41
  But 
before I can do this, I need to explain in some detail how input-output analysis works 
and some of the mathematics behind it.  
   Assume that a national economy can be divided into n sectors. Let xi be the 
total productive output of sector i and fi be the total final demand for sector i’s 
products.  The equation below expresses the way in which sector i distributes its 
product through sales to other sectors and to final demand:   
 
(1) 
                              
 
   
 
  
The term zij represents the inter-industry, or intermediate, sale by sector i to other 
sectors j – including itself when j=i.  The intermediate sales of every sector i together 
with final demand amount to the total sectoral output of an economy.  An equation 
                                                 
40
 These modifications are explained below.   
 
41
 Good data are available on individual states, usually through government agencies.  For 
instance, input-output data on the U.S. is collected by the Bureau of Economic Analysis 
(BEA), and made available at http://www.bea.gov/index.htm. But one of the best sources for 
input-output data – data that covers many countries – is the OECD’s Directorate for Science, 
Technology, and Industry.     
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similar to (1) can be written out for every sector, from 1 to n, as a way to express that 
sector’s inter-industry sales: 
(2) 
                        
                     
                     
                     
 
The equations in (2) can be represented in matrix form as follows: 
(3) 
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More compactly, (3) can be written as x = Zi + f, where i is a summation vector.  In 
producing its goods, a particular industrial sector will purchase more than just 
intermediate goods or inputs from other sectors: the sector also has to pay for labor 
and capital, and may use inventoried items that have been stored for future need.  
These are primary inputs, as district from intermediate ones, and are collectively 
referred to as value added in a sector.
42
     
                                                 
42
 See Miller and Blair, Input-Output Analysis, especially Chapters 2, 5, and 12, for an 
extensive discussion of the usefulness of primary inputs for inter-industry analysis.  Given my 
aim of examining global interdependence, primary inputs are not that relevant and so I will not 
rely on them in any way.    
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  The term zij denotes the absolute value of an intermediate input from sector i to 
sector j in a given period, generally a year.  However, the absolute value may not be 
good indicator of the importance of an input purchased by sector j from sector i.  A  
basic assumption made in input-output analysis is that inter-industry flows from sector 
i to j depend on the purchasing sector’s total output.  This of course makes sense since 
if the automobile manufacturing sector producers more cars in a given year, it would 
have also had to buy more steel from steel producers.  To signify the relative 
importance – and also dependence – of an intermediate input for a particular sector, 
the intermediate input is divided by total output of sector j, the purchasing sector.
43
  
The term zij is thus divided by xj, where xj is the total output of sector j.  If we assume 
that aij = zij/xj, then aij represents the ratio of input from sector i to the total output of 
sector j.  The term aij is called the technical coefficient and forms the crux of input-
output analysis.
44
  So for example, if i is the steel sector, j the automobile sector, and 
aij, the technical coefficient, is .1, aij represents the value worth of inputs, measured in 
dollars, from steel manufacturers for every dollar’s worth of output by automobile 
makers.  This means that if in the US in 2010, GM, Ford, and Chrysler produced $20 
billion worth of automobiles, they had to spend $2 billion on buying steel.   
  The equations in (2) can be rewritten by introducing aij, the technical 
coefficient, where zij = aijxj: 
(4) 
                              
                                                 
43
 Ibid. 
 
44
 Ibid. 
 65 
                           
                           
                           
 
The equations in (4) express the dependence of inter-industry flows on the total output 
of a sector.  Moving all the x terms to the same side, we get: 
 
(5) 
                           
                           
                           
                           
 
Combining the common x terms in each equation in (5), we now have: 
(6) 
                                   
                                    
                                    
                                     
 
In matrix form, (6) may be formulated as, 
(7) 
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where I is a n-by-n identity matrix, A is a n-by-n matrix of technical coefficients, x is 
a n-by-1 matrix of total output, and f is a n-by-1 matrix of final demand.  The above 
equation can also be written as, 
(8) 
x = (I – A)-1 f 
 
This equation will have a unique solution if (I – A)-1 is non-singular, that is, if the 
determinant of I – A is non-zero.  In (8), (I – A)-1, or L, is known as the Leontief 
inverse, after Wassily Leontief, who was the first to derive the equation in (8).
45
  This 
equation is the most fundamental one in all of input-output analysis and is the starting 
point for other alternative formulations of inter-industry linkages, which try to model 
more complex situations.   
  The equation in (8) is predominantly used for examining how changes in final 
demand, or f, will affect the distribution of intermediate inputs and total output of a 
national economy.  My aim, of course, is to go beyond the national economy and 
introduce economic interdependence in the form of international trade between a 
particular state and the rest of the world.  This will require me to employ a more 
complicated version of input-output analysis.  Yet because equation in (8) is still so 
important for even an interregional approach, it would perhaps be useful to illustrate 
with an example just what the above equation is supposed to do. 
                                                 
45
 Leontief himself did not coin this term, but because of the importance of (A – I)-1 others 
began to refer to as the Leontief inverse.  See ibid., Chapter 2, for more discussion.  
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  Suppose we have a simple closed economy that consists of three basic sectors, 
agriculture, manufacturing, and mining.  Suppose also that final demand for the goods 
produced by each of the sectors is 250, 400, and 100 and total output by each sector is 
1500, 2000, 1000 for agriculture, manufacturing, and mining in that order.
46
  Table 1 
illustrates final demand, total output and inter-sectoral flows.   
Table 1 
 Agriculture Manufacturing Mining Final 
Demand 
Total 
Output 
Agriculture 350 500 250 400 1500 
Manufacturing 350 750 500 400 2000 
Mining 250 450 150 150 1000 
Value Added 550 300 100   
Total Outlays 1500 2000 1000   
 
The first three columns of the table present sectors as purchasers of intermediate 
inputs from all three sectors and of value added, which inter alia can be labor and 
capital.  The total outlay represents that the total amount of expenditure made by the 
sector.  The rows present sectors as producers and sellers of their goods to each of the 
sectors – found in columns – and to final demand, which generally consists of 
individual consumers, as well as governments, who are interested in these goods as 
such.  The total output is the overall value of the goods produced by the sector.  The 
                                                 
46
 The numbers here represent the monetary value, in terms of dollars or euros for instance, of 
the goods made by a particular sector. 
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first three entries in the first three columns and the first three rows capture the inter-
industry flows in this basic economy. The values of the intermediate inputs have to be 
changed to technical coefficients.
47
 And technical coefficients are gotten by taking the 
value of an input bought by a sector and dividing it by the total output of that sector.
48
  
In Table 2, both the matrix of technical coefficients and the Leontief inverse are given.       
Table 2. 
A: Matrix of Technical Coefficients (I – A)-1: Leontief Inverse 
 
          
          
           
    
            
            
           
  
 
The matrix (I – A)-1, or L, allows us to predict what the total output of our 
hypothetical economy would have to be to meet an increase in final demand.  So if we 
assume that there is an across the board 10% increase in final demand for agricultural, 
manufacturing, and mining goods, the total output is found by multiplying L by   , or 
the difference in final demand. 
 
            
            
           
   
  
  
  
  =  
   
   
   
  
This means that to meet the increase in demand the agricultural sector’s output has to 
go from 1500 to 1650, the manufacturing sector’s from 2000 to 2200, and the mining 
sector’s from 1000 to 1100.  Because there are inter-sectoral linkages, an increase in 
                                                 
47
 Technical coefficients reflect the worth or value of inputs from sector i for every dollar’s 
worth of output or production generated by sector j.  This is done to relativize the worth of 
intermediate inputs so that inter-industry comparisons can be made.   
 
48
 Miller and Blair, Input-Output Analysis, p. 16. 
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final demand for goods produced by one of the sectors entails an increase in 
intermediate demand for the goods of the other sectors.  For instance, in order for the 
agricultural sector to generate more agricultural goods, it has to buy goods from both 
the manufacturing and mining sectors, because goods from these sectors are essential 
as inputs for the production of agricultural goods.  The same goes for manufacturing 
and mining goods.  In order to evince these sectoral linkages, examine what occurs 
when there is an increase in final demand of one unit for each of the sectors. 
 
            
            
           
   
 
 
 
  =  
    
    
   
 , 
 
            
            
           
   
 
 
 
  =  
    
    
    
   
 
            
            
           
   
 
 
 
  =  
    
    
    
  
The first calculation above shows that a unit increase in final demand for agricultural 
goods increases output of the agricultural sector by 1.92.  This makes sense since to 
meet the change in demand the agricultural sector has to first and foremost produce 
that one unit’s worth; the other .92 increase in sectoral output is the result of the 
agricultural sector depending on itself to provide those inputs that are necessary to 
meet the initial increase in final demand.  Moreover, that increase of one unit also 
stimulates the increase of total output of the manufacturing sector by 1.33 and of the 
mining sector by .74.  Similar results can be gleaned from the other two calculations.  
In every case where there is an increase in direct demand for one of the sectors, there 
is also an increase in indirect demand – in the form of intermediate inputs – for all 
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sectors and consequently an enlargement of the total output.
49
    What this says about 
even our basic example is that an increase of final demand for the goods of a sector 
stimulates an economy more widely by spreading to other sectors that exhibit inter-
industry linkages.  The economic impact the increase makes is thus not commensurate 
with but goes beyond the supply of simply those goods meant to satisfy the change in 
final demand.   
  Of course the real world is much more complicated than the example discussed 
above.  One significant extension of input-output analysis is its application to regional 
inter-industry flows.
50
  This can been done with regions of a particular country, say 
U.S. or Japan, or the regions can be countries themselves, for instance if countries are 
engaged in bi-lateral trade or are part of a regional trading bloc.  I use regional 
analysis as a variant of traditional input-output analysis to measure economic 
                                                 
49
 It is worth pointing out that the change in total output given an increase of a unit’s worth in 
final demand of a particular sector is given by the column in L associated with that sector.  
The sum of the entries in a column indicate by how much the rise of one unit’s worth of 
sectoral final demand affects the total output of the entire economy.  So for instance for every 
one unit’s worth of increase in demand for manufacturing, the economy as a whole has to 
expand its output by 5.16.  These column sums are known as multipliers and are often used to 
predict which sector would have the greatest effect on stimulating an economy as a whole. 
 
50
 For a good discussion of recent developments in as well as the various methods of regional 
analysis, see Miller and Blair, Input-Output Analysis, Chapters 3 and 12; for more detailed 
discussion, see John H. Dewhurst, Geoffrey Hewing, and Rodney Jensen (eds.), Regional 
Input-Output Modeling: New Developments and Interpretations, Aldershot, UK: Avebury, 
1991; Okuyama, Nabuhiro, and Takeo Ihara (eds.), Spatial Structure and Regional 
Development in China: An Interregional Input-Output Approach, Basingstoke, UK: Pelgrave 
Macmillan, 2005; Takahiro Akita, “Interregional Interdependence and Regional Economic 
Growth in Japan: An Input-Output Analysis,” International Regional Science Review, 16, 
1994, pp. 231-248; Geoffrey Hewings, Yasuhide Okuyama, and Michael Sonis, “Economic 
Interdependence within the Chicago Metropolitan Area: A Miyazawa Analysis,” Journal of 
Regional Science, 41, 2001, pp. 195-217; Ronald Miller, “Upper Bounds on the Sizes of 
Interregional Feedbacks in Multiregional Input-Output Models,” Journal of Regional Science, 
26, 1986, pp. 285-306; Alex Hoen, An Input-Output Analysis of European Integration, 
Amsterdam: Elsevier Science, 2002.  
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interdependence.  In my case, two regions are compared: one region is a particular 
state, and the other consists of basically the rest of the world.  What I want to show, 
using the regional method, is the extent to which the economy of a specific state, like 
the U.S. or China, depends for its productive capacity on the rest of the world.
51
 
  Regional input-output models as the name suggests compare the economies of 
regions.  Such analysis allows the modeling of not just intraregional flows among 
sectors but also interregional ones as well.  In a one-region case, the matrix of 
technical coefficients, A, captures the inter-industry flows of a single region.
52
  In a 
multi-region case, data on inter-regional, inter-industry linkages additionally have to 
be incorporated.
53
  This is accomplished by constructing a matrix of coefficients that 
captures inter-industry linkages from region R
i
 to R
j
 and one for R
j
 to R
i
 for all regions 
involved.
54
  In a two-region scenario, A
R1R2
 is the matrix of coefficients of flows from 
R1 to R2, and A
R2R1 
consists of coefficients of flows from R2 to R1.
55
  To complete 
the picture of inter-industry flows, we also need A
R1R1
, coefficients of intra-industry 
flows in R1 and A
R2R2
, coefficients of intra-industry flows in R2.  The term a
R1R2
ij = 
z
R1R2
ij/x
R2
j, that is the coefficient of  A
R1R2
 is found by taking the value of the 
                                                 
51
 Here of course I have in mind only international trade.  There are ways other than trade on 
which a state’s economy relies for its productivity.  For instance there is transference of 
technical knowledge, which can have a substantial effect on economic development.  There is 
also foreign investment and capital flows.  The effects of flows of knowledge and capital, 
however, have to be measured independently of inter-sectoral linkages. 
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 Miller and Blair, Input-Output Analysis, Chapters 3 and 12. 
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intermediate input sold by sector i in R1 to sector j in R2 and dividing it by the total 
output of sector j in R2.  Similarly, a
R2R1
ij = z
R2R1
ij/x
R1
j, or the value of the intermediate 
input sold by sector i in R2 to sector j in R1 divided by the total output of sector j in 
R1.  The coefficients found in A
R1R1
 and A
R1R2
 are calculated in the same way as the 
one-region case.  In a two-region case, we thus have not one but four coefficient 
matrices:
56
 
(9)  
 A
R =  
          
          
  
 
The inverse of (I - A
R
)
-1
 is more complex since it is a matrix that is made up of sub-
matrices, and is given in (10): 
(10) 
 
                                                                  
                      
  
 
S is the Schur
57
 complement and is equal to: (I – AR2R2)-1 – AR2R1 (I – AR1R1)-1AR1R2.   
  Regional analysis is designed to predict how changes in demand – either for 
intermediate inputs or goods for final consumption – that originate in one region 
would affect the total output of the relevant sectors and the economy as a  whole of 
another region – for example, how a drop in U.S. demand for American cars would 
                                                 
56
 Ibid. 
 
57
 For a discussion of component matrices, see Fuzhen Zhang (ed.), Schur Complement and its 
Applications, New York: Springer, 2005. 
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affect car-part manufacturers and the national economies of Canada and Mexico, 
where many of the parts used in the production of American cars are made.  My goal 
here, however, is a bit more ambitious, since I want to measure to what extent the U.S. 
or Chinese economies, for instance, depend on the rest of the world for their economic 
outputs – in other words, what would happen to the U.S. or Chinese economies if one 
were to abstract away the contributions made by the rest of the world?  To model this 
kind of abstracting away, in addition to regional analysis, I also use what is called the 
Hypothetical Extraction Method (HEM).
58
   
  HEM is a recent development in the field of input-output modeling, and it has 
been generally used to gauge the importance of a particular sector or industry to the 
rest of the economy by extracting that sector or industry and then measuring the 
impact this has on the total economic output.  The sector or industry in question may 
be a regional one or it may be one that is located in another region.  I use HEM to 
extract not a particular sector but an entire region, but the region I have in mind is the 
rest of the world.  I then measure the effect such an extraction would have on a 
specific country that is engaged in international trade.  
  To implement HEM when using regional analysis, A
R
 in (9) is reduced to, 
(11) 
                                                 
58
 For a discussion of the Hypothetical Extraction Method, see Erik Dietzenbacher and Jan van 
der Linden, “Sectoral and Spatial Linkages in the EC Production Structure,” Journal of 
Regional Science, Vol. 37, No. 2, 1997, pp. 235-257;  Guido Cella, “The Input-Output 
Measurement of Interindustry Linkages,” Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics, 46, 1, 
1984; .  See Ronald Miller and Michael Lahr, “A Taxonomy of Extractions,” in Michael Lahr 
and Ronald Miller (eds.), Regional Science Perspectives in Economic Analysis, Amsterdam: 
Elsevier, pp. 407-441; Miller and Blair, Input-Output Analysis, Chapter 12.  
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A
E
 =  
      
  
  
Here, R1 is a particular state whose economic dependence on the rest of the world is 
being examined.  R2 in A
R
 is the rest of the world.
59
  A
E
 reflects the extraction of 
linkages between a particular state and the rest of the world – linkages that are 
captured in A
R1R2
 and A
R2R1
 – and the extraction of the rest of the world itself qua 
independent region, thus leaving the state in isolation with respect to international 
trade.
60
  In this way, we can compare how a certain country fares post extraction.  The 
Leontief inverse of A
E
 is just, 
(12) 
L
E
 =  
            
  
  
 
The measure of dependence emerges when we compare the difference (in output) 
between L
R
f
R
  and L
E
f
E
, or in other words, the difference in output of state S when it 
is engaged in international trade and in output of that very same state when it stops. 
                                                 
59
 This is not entirely accurate since the data I use encompass 42 of the world’s largest 
economies.  Because their combined GDP constitutes 92% of the world’s total GDP, it is I 
think safe to say that the difference in trade with these countries and with that of the rest of the 
world is not going to be that significant. 
 
60
 In one version of HEM, only A
R1R2
 and A
R2R1
 are taken out but the intra-regional linkages of 
R1 and R2 are left in.  For my purposes, this difference in the two approaches does not in the 
end alter my results.  See Miller and Lahr, “A Taxonomy of Extractions,” pp. 407-441, for a 
discussion of this alternative version of HEM. 
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  The data I use are provided by the OECD’s Directorate for Science, 
Technology, and Industry.
61
  The OECD has compiled input-output tables for all 
member states
62
 and for eleven other states that aren’t members, but are some of the 
largest developing countries in the world.
63
  Individual tables for each state provide 
data on intermediate input flows of 48 sectors, final consumer demand by individual 
households, final demand by the government, investment and capital formation, 
exports, imports, and, finally, total sector output.
64
    
  I measure the global dependence of ten countries: U.S., China, Japan, India, 
Mexico, the Netherlands, South Korea, Germany, Canada, and Sweden.  Both imports 
and exports for each country are made endogenous so as to reflect flows between 
particular sectors of a country and the rest of the world.  Total output is measured 
when there is trade.  The rest of the world is then extracted and total output of a 
country is measured under this condition.   
  When the rest of the world is extracted, both imports and exports clearly drop 
to zero.  This does not mean, however, that individual sectors that import some of their 
intermediate inputs from foreign sources have to do without these inputs once the 
extraction occurs.  Thus, for example, if the U.S. agricultural sector imports some of 
its equipment used in production of its goods from China, once extraction happens that 
                                                 
61
 Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, Directorate for Science, 
Technology, and Industry, available at http://www.oecd.org/sti/inputoutput. 
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 Ibid. 
 
63
 Ibid. 
 
64
 In addition, the tables also give data on labor cost, taxes, infrastructure expenditures. These 
data that constitute the value added are less important for my study.  
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sector can no longer rely on China and instead has to purchase the required equipment 
from a domestic source.  Such import substitution is implicit in input-output analysis 
that employs regional HEM when final demand for the products of a sector is held to 
be the same before and after there is extraction.  If final demand for agricultural 
products remains the same in the U.S., input-output analysis assumes that the 
agricultural sector will have met that demand.  But if a certain intermediate input is an 
essential component of production of a unit’s worth of an agricultural good, that input 
has to come from somewhere, and if not from abroad, then it must come from a 
domestic producer.   The problem with this is that import substitution tends to 
underestimate the actual dependence of a sector – and of the overall domestic 
economy – on the rest of the world. 
  To correct for this, I use a variation of Hummels, Ishii, and Yi model (HIY 
model) for measuring vertical specialization.
65
   The model developed by Hummels et 
al was designed to measure “the imported input content of exports.”66  Instead of 
vertical specialization, I apply the HIY model to measure the imported input content 
of domestic final demand.  In this way, when a particular state is imagined to be 
economically isolated, the imported content of final demand is subtracted or taken out 
in order to approximate more accurately such isolation.  The imported share of final 
demand is defined as, 
(13) 
IMPORTED SHARE  =       
                                                 
65
 David Hummels, Jun Ishii, Kei-Mu Yi, “The Nature and Growth of Vertical Specialization 
in World Trade,” Journal of International Economics, 54, 2001, pp. 75-96.  
 
66
 Ibid., p. 78. 
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where s is a one-by-n matrix of 1’s – a summation matrix – AI is a n-by-n imported 
coefficient matrix, where aij is the value of an input imported from sector i by sector j, 
divided by total output of sector j, and fd is a one-by-n matrix of final demand of 
sector j goods.   
  Multiplying (13) by (I-A
R1R1
)
-1
 allows us to calculate the value of imported 
inputs used indirectly in the production of goods for domestic final demand.  In other 
words, multiplying the imported share ratio by the Leontief inverse measures the 
imported inputs in one sector whose outputs are then used as inputs by a second 
sector, and then by a third, and so on, until these imported inputs are eventually 
embodied in goods meant for consumption as final demand.   The final demand in 
post-extraction is thus adjusted by multiplying the original final demand by the above 
ratio, and the new final demand is thus, 
(14) 
fe = [   (       I  
           
 
The adjusted final demand is then used to calculate the post-extraction total output.   
The total output of a state once the rest of the world is extracted is found by 
multiplying L
E
, the inverse matrix where the world have been extracted, by fe, the 
adjusted final demand out of which all foreign inputs have been expunged.   
  The results of the calculations are summarized in Tables 3 and 4 below. 
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Table 3 
Country  Loss in Total Output from Extraction (%) 
U.S. 22%  
India 40%  
Sweden 65% 
Canada 55% 
Germany 58% 
China 63% 
Netherlands 71% 
Mexico 42% 
Japan 33% 
South Korea 54% 
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Table 4.
 
  
  What we see is a substantial drop in total output of every country used in the 
study.   The most precipitous decrease in output comes from Netherlands, which loses 
71% of its output when the rest of the world is extracted.  Perhaps it is not that 
surprising that Netherlands exhibits such a dependence, since it is after all a relatively 
small country.
67
  Other small to mid-sized economies that follow suit in this regard are 
South Korea, Sweden, and Canada.    
  One might suggest that states that have large economies do not rely on the rest 
of the world to the same extent.  The U.S. and Japan seem to exemplify this point in so 
far as their drop in output is the smallest of the group of ten countries analyzed.  
                                                 
67
 Smaller countries in most cases have no choice but to import a good deal of products, 
because they do not have the capacity to produce them domestically, and to look to foreign 
consumers to expand market share for their goods.   
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Nevertheless, a diminution of output by a fourth to a third is still very large.   What is 
more, other states that have large economies do not appear to instantiate this pattern of 
lower global dependence.  Both Germany and China, the third and fourth largest 
economies in 2005 in that order, based on the above results appear to have huge stakes 
in the global economy.   
  The dependence exhibited by Mexico and India falls somewhere in between.  
This may be explained by the fact that both Mexico and India are newly developing 
countries.  Their participation in the global economy is mostly focused on certain 
highly industrialized sectors.
68
  However, India has ambitions to become a global 
economic power and Mexico a more important regional player.  Their economic 
policies thus will only push them toward greater global integration.   
  Looking at the overall results, I think we can say that the ten countries used in 
the study show a deep and significant nexus to the economic activities of the rest of 
the world.  Moreover, these countries are fairly representative of other developed and 
developing countries, and so we can say about this larger set that such countries are 
also likely to exhibit a similar pattern of integration and dependence.
69
  What is more, 
this trend toward creating deeper economic interdependence seems to be growing: 
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 See Justino De La Cruz, Robert Koopman, Zhi Wang, and Shang-Jin Wei, “Estimating 
Foreign Value-added in Mexico’s Manufacturing Exports,” U.S. International Trade 
Commission, 2011, pp. 1-33; Dipti Prakas Pal, Erik Dietzenbacher, and Dipika Basu, 
“Economic Integration: Systemic Measures in an Input-Output Framework,” Economic 
Systems Research, Vol. 19, No. 4, 2007, pp. 397-408. 
 
69
 Unfortunately, data on many developing states is sparse or non-existent, and so the best that 
one can do at this point is to compare one country to another to which it is similar in relevant 
respects and for which adequate data is available.  
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trade barriers are being reduced throughout the world and the current mantra of 
developing states is the expansion of (high value-added) exports.   
  Global interdependence discussed in this section has to do with international 
trade.  But this still under-describes the kinds of economic cooperation that are global 
in nature.  Let me touch on two additional areas of cooperation.  One important 
phenomenon that I have not discussed is the dispersion of technical knowledge 
throughout the world.
70
  Ideas and innovations that originate in one area are used in 
another to develop products that are then used domestically or traded internationally.  
The development of these products of course owes a great deal to the original 
technical insight or foundation, and it is often difficult to capture and quantify the 
intellectual contribution in such a way that the economic value of products spurred by 
the contribution reflect this.
71
  Because knowledge flows have become so 
international, many products made and consumed domestically have a foreign input in 
the form of technical knowledge.  It is therefore important to recognize that technical 
knowledge should be seen as yet another type of factor of production.  The other type 
of global cooperation is the flow of capital: states invest in the economies of other 
states; states also prop up their domestic currency by buying or selling the currencies 
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Onder Nomaler and Bart Verspagen, “Knowledge Flows, Patent Citations, and the Impact of 
Science on Technology,” Economic Systems Research, December 2008, Vol. 20, Issue 4, pp. 
339-66; Yoo-Jin Han and Yongtae  Park, “Patent Network Analysis of Inter-industrial 
Knowledge Flows: The Case of Korea between Traditional and Emerging Industries,” World 
Patent Information, September 2006, Vol. 28, Issue 3, pp. 235-247. 
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 This is especially the case when the intellectual contribution is not being protected by 
intellectual property laws, either because these laws are not being enforced by the relevant 
state or it falls outside the scope of protection.  Moreover, input-output data does not register 
fees paid by domestic companies to foreign ones for using their patents.  So what is in 
actuality a foreign input does not get recognized as such. 
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of other states thereby linking the macroeconomic health of their economies to that of 
others.
72
  The inclusion of knowledge and capital flows as types of global economic 
cooperation would offer, I think, a more accurate picture of global interdependence 
than one suggested by mere reliance on international trade.  
  Measuring dependence exhibited by a state by applying HEM supports the 
contention that many countries are deeply integrated in the global economy.  But it 
also verifies my claim that the things that domestic society produces and consumes 
show c-dependence.  Recall that there is c-dependence if foreign workers played a 
cooperative role in the genesis of products consumed domestically.  This indeed seems 
to be the case if we interpret such cooperation as the use of foreign inputs by domestic 
sectors.
73
   Every sector of the countries examined in the above study use foreign 
intermediate inputs.  This suggests once again that there exists a global system of 
economic cooperation.  
  However, even if the global system of economic cooperation is such that it 
does not incorporate all domestic systems and that domestic economic cooperation can 
still be distinguished from its international counterpart when it comes to very large 
economies like the US and Japan, what I think is still undeniable is that the global 
                                                 
72
 Dilip K. Das, “Financial Globalization: Past and Present,” Economic Affairs, June 2011, 
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 I suggest that such dependence is counter-factual.  This is not to say that if the imported 
input were cut off production by the sector would never resume or come about.  A domestic 
substitute would eventually be found, but this would require some restructuring by the 
affected sector, suggesting that there would be disruption to its production process until a 
substitute is found.  
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economic system is extensive and substantial, and capable of generating a huge 
cooperative product.
74
  That system regardless of how it is in the end individuated has 
to be regulated by distributive principles of justice for the reasons I mentioned above.       
  It must be acknowledged, however, that the global economic system does not 
encompass every state in the world to the same extent. There are many countries that 
are on the margins of global integration with respect to the production of the global 
product of economic cooperation.  This means that they are going to be only 
marginally affected by distributive principles of justice meant for regulating the 
division of the global cooperative product.  But we must not infer from this that the 
countries that are left out, and which include some of the poorest and most desperate 
places in the world, are not part of something else where distributive justice prevails, 
and that something can be global as well.  Indeed, this is what I argue for elsewhere. 
75
    
  The role of distributive justice is to specify fair terms of cooperation for 
specifically large-scale systems of cooperation – systems where the demands of 
cooperation are such that interactions for the most part happen among strangers and 
the natural moral sentiment toward a fellow human being is too weak to guarantee an 
outcome that those involved can freely and self-respectfully endorse.  The state is one 
such example of large-scale systems of cooperation where a conception of justice must 
be applied to give rise to fair terms.  Of course, the state is special because it is a 
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 It seems to me that a case can be made only with respect to these states.  With respect to 
smaller well-integrated states, I think that their move toward complete immersion in the global 
economy is already complete.   
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 See my “International Intellectual Property, Coercion, and the Need for a Conception of 
Global Justice.” 
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coercive system of cooperation.  Yet that special feature, important as it is, does not 
make a conception of justice, and in particular distributive justice, inapplicable to 
large-scale systems of cooperation that lack coercion.  Such systems of cooperation 
still generate a cooperative product that gets distributed in a particular way, and that 
pattern has to be evaluated from the standpoint of justice.  The global economic 
system has a cooperative product that gets distributed through the operation of the 
global market.  But the global market isn’t the right  mechanism for generating a fair 
result.  Even if we assume that the market is somehow in line with the contribution 
principle, that still would not guarantee a fair outcome – hence the need for a 
conception of justice. 
  Where a system is marked by a pattern of entitlements that is coercively 
enforced, the need for a conception of justice is especially acute and duties of justice 
that emerge in response to coercion have to be particularly robust and demanding. 
What makes global cooperation so complex is that there are aspects to it that are 
coercive.  The WTO’s rules and regulations, for instance, are coercively enforced.  
And the WTO is part of the global system of cooperation in so far as it regulates how 
certain aspects of international trade are conducted among member states.  Yet, it 
would not be empirically correct to say that every aspect of global cooperation is 
coercively enforced.  The significance of this is that a conception for the global system 
has to respond to and deal with the heterogeneity imbedded in the structure and 
operation of global cooperation.  Indeed, we might conceive of global cooperation as 
consisting of distinct layers of cooperation, each requiring its own set of principles of 
justice: some of these layers will involve coercion, and others will not.  Embracing the 
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complexity of our world head-on results in broadening the role that justice can play.  
And so although there are lots of very poor states that play a marginal role in the 
production of the global economic product, those that are members of the WTO and 
subject to its rules will still fall within the sphere of moral concern provided by a 
conception of justice.    
  It must be said, however, that the presence of coercion internationally 
complicates how justice is to be applied in a global context.  Rawls himself eventually 
saw his special conception as a response to unjustified coercion imposed on members 
of domestic society.
76
  Whether Rawls also thought that coercion is a necessary 
condition for distributive justice in any other form is an issue that is open to debate.  
His reluctance in putting forward a conception of justice for international society 
suggests that he may have shifted his views toward taking coercion as a requirement 
for distributive justice.
77
  If Rawls did in fact veer in this direction, I would obviously 
disagree with him on this point, for it is my position here that distributive justice 
certainly has a place within non-coercive cooperative arrangements.  I think this 
because, in so far as the global economic system is concerned, there is no other 
alternative to justice that is capable of regulating the distribution of the cooperative 
                                                 
76
 See Rawls, A Theory of Justice.  
 
77
 I do think, however, that Rawls's reluctance in The Law of Peoples could be interpreted not 
so much as a shift toward taking coercion as a necessary condition than as his understanding 
of international relations as somehow not implicating the distribution of economic 
entitlements of individual citizens. If he did think that economic entitlements of individuals 
were being affected in the way decent societies dealt with one another, his conception of 
international relations might have included principles of economic redistribution, in which 
case coercion would simply be a sufficient, not a necessary, condition for distributive justice. 
See his The Law of Peoples, Part 1. 
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product in ways that recognize the equal dignity and respect of individual 
cooperators.
78
  As I argued above, neither the global market nor the contribution 
principle are up to this task.
79
    What the requirements of equal dignity or respect 
amount to will depend on the kinds of demands made and burdens placed by a 
cooperative system on the individual agent.  A coercive cooperative system, because 
its demands of cooperation are much more onerous, will generate duties of justice that 
require that fellow members show a great deal of moral concern for one another, as a 
way to justify the kind of commitment to cooperation that a self-respecting individual 
can make.
80
   But commitment to cooperation that is grounded in individual dignity 
and respect is something that is expected in non-coercive contexts as well.  The only 
difference is in the level of moral concern to be shown.  My claim is that only 
conceptions of justice have the flexibility to reflect this difference in moral concern 
without giving up the foundational requirement that terms of cooperation must extend 
equal dignity and respect to all cooperating members.           
                                                 
78
 The notion of equal dignity and respect has to be relativized here by limiting the scope of 
equality to members of a particular cooperative system.  That is, we construe equal dignity and 
respect in relation to members of a cooperative system.  
  
79
 Why I think these alternatives are problematic has to do with our considered judgments of 
how persons should be treated as cooperators: that differences in economic entitlements 
should not be based on unfair differences in bargaining power, that persons should not lose out 
economically on the basis of characteristics for which they are not morally responsible, and so 
on. 
 
80
 There is also the caveat that the demands for greater redistribution within a state -- because 
the state is one place where there is clear coercion of the individual -- have to, nevertheless, 
comply with appropriating a justifiable share of the cooperative product of the global 
economic system.  This might add another layer of complexity to the discussion of distributive 
justice both domestically as well as internationally.  However, the addition of coercion doesn't 
affect my discussion of democratic equality because I take democratic equality to be sufficient 
to justify terms of political cooperation in a state, which I have assumed to be a coercive 
system.   
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  Given the complexity of the world, theorizing about international justice is 
hard to do.  Part of this complexity has to do with the fact that the world is in a state of 
organizational flux.  There is continuous diffusion of sovereignty away from states 
toward regional and international institutions that perform few key functions that are 
only a subset of what states once did.  What is more, it is not clear how the world will 
eventually organize itself – that is, what its state of organizational equilibrium will be.  
This means that principles of justice we invoke now are a way to deal with current 
injustices of a still inchoate international system.  This response to existing injustices 
may be a temporary measure as the world moves toward a more stable position, where 
it becomes more clear how it is arranged and the role that states play within this 
arrangement.  Once there, a conception of international justice could be given that is 
more comprehensive and systematized.  But we are not there yet and have to live with 
a conceptually messy theory of international justice.       
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CHAPTER 3 
 
 
A Response to Nagel and Blake 
 
 
I. Introduction 
The subject of coercion has received a great deal of attention recently from a 
number of political philosophers writing on justice, especially those who focus on its 
international dimension.  This concern with coercion, in its modern inception, goes 
back to John Rawls’s political liberalism, which for many is the starting point for 
discussing legal coercion in relation to justice.
1
   
For Rawls, it is a basic fact about the nature of society that the state has the 
sole authority to enforce its laws.  This power of the state, to a great extent, defines 
what a state is meant to do – it is, in another words, its raison d’être.  But this power, 
according to Rawls, has to be justified to individual citizens of a state, for otherwise 
the state is engaged in pure coercion.
2
   Rawls famously argues that this justification 
can be achieved only by applying his conception of justice to the basic structure of 
domestic society.
3
  Rawls conceives of domestic society as a system of cooperation 
having a basic structure, which is a configuration of the major social institutions of 
                                                 
1
 Rawls’s concern with coercion becomes much more explicit in his later writings.  See John 
Rawls, Political Liberalism, New York: Columbia University Press, 1993, especially pp. 136-
40.  But it is also present in his earlier work.  See John Rawls, A Theory of Justice, 
Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1971, especially pp. 342-43.  
  
2
 Rawls, Political Liberalism, p. 264.  
 
3
Rawls, A Theory of Justice.  For a further elaboration, see Rawls, Political Liberalism.  
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society that assign fundamental rights and duties and divide the benefits and burdens 
generated through social cooperation.
4
  Coercion is justified when principles of justice 
are applied to the basic structure and regulate its terms of cooperation.   
Rawls’s idea that only a conception of justice can justify the existence of state-
based coercion has given rise to several important challenges to extending a liberal 
conception of justice globally.  Such challenges borrow this important insight from 
Rawls and argue that in the international case no comparable form of coercion exists 
and hence no conception of justice is required.  In this paper, I examine two such 
views: one put forward by Thomas Nagel and the other by Michael Blake.
5
   
Both Nagel and Blake make the same key claim: that the international sphere is 
not coercive in the right or relevant way, and conclude, on the basis of this, that a 
liberal conception of distributive justice is not required internationally.
6
  Nagel argues 
that justifying coercion demands an egalitarian conception of distributive justice only 
when citizens are connected by a political associative relation.
7
  This associative 
relation is present, according to Nagel, when the agency of individual citizens is 
                                                 
4
 Rawls, Political Liberalism, Chap. 1, especially pp. 15-22. 
  
5
 Thomas Nagel, “The Problem of Global Justice,” Philosophy and Public Affairs, 33, no. 2 
(2005): pp. 113-147; Michael Blake, “Distributive Justice, State Coercion, and Autonomy,” 
Philosophy and Public Affairs, 30, no. 3 (2002), pp. 257-296.  For another influential position 
on the limits of justice, see Richard. W. Miller, “Cosmopolitan Respect and Patriotic 
Concern,” Philosophy and Public Affairs, Summer 1998, 27(3), pp.  202-224. 
 
6
 It is important to emphasize here that both Nagel and Blake are rejectionists of conceptions 
of international distributive justice.  It is the requirements of economic redistribution,  they 
argue, that have no place within the international sphere.  When I refer to their rejection of 
international justice, I mean specifically their rejection of international distributive justice.  
 
7
 Nagel, “The Problem of Global Justice,” pp. 121,125.  Note, also, that Nagel uses the terms 
“will” and “agency” interchangeably throughout the paper.  I will follow suit in this regard. 
  
 93 
somehow implicated in the coercion of their fellow citizens by the state.
8
  When such 
special involvement of the will is present, citizens have a right to demand from their 
fellow compatriots  that the coercion to which they are subject be justified, and Nagel 
contends that this can only be done if the terms of cooperation are regulated by a 
conception of justice.
9
  Nagel insists that individual agency is not implicated in 
coercing fellow human beings in the relevant way in the international realm and 
argues that instituting a conception of justice to international terms of cooperation is 
not morally required.
10
   
Blake’s account takes as its starting point what he calls the liberal principle of 
autonomy.
11
  According to this principle, persons have a right to exist as autonomous 
agents and are entitled to those circumstances and conditions that would enable them 
to be such agents.
12
  Blake believes that persons can be denied their autonomy in a 
variety of ways.  For instance, they can be denied by being impoverished, starved, 
illiterate, marginalized by norms that stigmatize, physically or mentally disabled, and 
so on.
13
  But, and this is of particular importance to Blake, persons may also be denied 
their autonomy through outright coercion.  Acts of coercion, Blake writes, are “prima 
                                                 
8
 Ibid., p. 128. 
 
9
 Ibid., p. 129. 
 
10
 Ibid., p. 140. 
 
11
 Blake, “Distributive Justice, State Coercion, and Autonomy,” p. 267. 
 
12
 Ibid., p. 271. 
 
13
 Ibid., p. 272. 
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facie prohibited by the liberal principle of autonomy.”14  Yet, Blake notes, some 
coercive acts, in particular those of the state, are simply unavoidable and in fact 
justifiable.  The issue for Blake, as it is for Rawls and Nagel, is how should such 
coercion be justified.
15
  Blake, like Nagel, insists that state-based coercion has to be 
justified, but his reasons are different from Nagel’s.  For Blake, coercion has to be 
justified because otherwise it would violate the liberal principle of autonomy.  For 
Nagel, autonomy is implicated more obliquely. Coercion has to be justified because 
citizens of a state stand in an associative relation with one another, and it is in virtue of 
this relation that citizens have the right to demand such a justification.  Both, however, 
agree that to justify coercion, domestic society has to be regulated by a conception of 
justice; anything less than justice would mean that individual citizens are being 
morally wronged in a significant way.  Both also conclude, moreover, that justice 
should stop at the borders of a state and not be projected globally.    
My aims in this paper are several.  First, contra Nagel, I argue that the 
international realm is indeed a suitable place for having principles of justice regulating 
terms of cooperation.  I contend that Nagel’s own position on the conditions that make 
the application of justice germane can be used to argue that, even at the international 
level, implementing principles of justice, including distributive ones, would not be out 
of place.  I suggest that even where the relevant associative bond is not yet present, the 
mere presence of coercion still gives people a right to demand that such coercion be 
justified.  The substance of that justification may be less than a full blown liberal 
                                                 
14
 Ibid. 
 
15
 Ibid. 
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conception of justice, but, I argue, when applied to a system of cooperation it gives 
rise to precisely those conditions that make it appropriate to apply a conception of 
justice.  Next, I examine Blake’s position in some detail.  I argue that Blake 
substantially underestimates both the extent and the kind of coercion that persists 
internationally.  Blake acknowledges there is coercion internationally, but also 
downgrades it as being of a different, and thus of a less morally problematic, sort from 
the coercion that takes place domestically.  I suggest that Blake does not provide much 
of a basis for thinking that international coercion is so radically different from its 
domestic counterpart.  International coercion may be different because it is more 
complex and less tidy: there are a variety of actors on the international stage that wield 
the power to coerce, and the effectiveness and the extent of the power to coerce varies 
from actor to actor.   I argue, however, that these differences do not generate a moral 
reason to exclude the application of justice internationally.  Justice still has a place 
internationally, including distributive justice.  The form it takes internationally may be 
different from the domestic case, but this does not mean that it should be excluded 
outright as a regulative ideal.       
 
II. Nagel on Coercion 
Nagel asserts that we, as citizens of a particular state, live under a  system of 
laws and institutions that are coercively imposed.  We are joined together in a 
“political society under strong centralized control.”16  The operation of a coercive 
social system “generates differences in people’s expectations of better or worse lives” 
                                                 
16
 Ibid., p. 127.  
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that flow from characteristics that “they have done nothing to deserve.”17  Nagel 
contends that the imposition of these arbitrary inequalities in life prospects presents a 
“problem for the justification of [this] system.”18  By being part of a political system 
with a unified, sovereign state that “exercises sovereign power” over us and in our 
name, we acquire “a duty of justice toward one another through the legal, social, and 
economic institutions that sovereign power makes possible.”19  From this system, we 
can claim a right to justice, and in particular to equal treatment: “to equal citizenship, 
nondiscrimination, equality of opportunity, and the amelioration through public policy 
of unfairness in the distribution of social and economic goods.”20  But, Nagel insists, 
the duty of justice is not something that has universal application; instead, it is sui 
generis and is owed “only to those with whom we stand in a strong political relation” 
by being subject to a common set of institutions and laws that are coercively 
imposed.
21
  The obligations of justice “arise as a result of a special relation,” and are, 
what Nagel calls, associative.
22
  In other words, the duty of justice, for Nagel,  is a 
                                                 
17
 Ibid. 
 
18
 Ibid. Nagel points out that that the widespread inequalities in people’s life prospects is not 
something that they morally deserve, and so to that extent these inequalities are morally 
arbitrary.  Nagel notes that these morally arbitrary differences in life prospects were 
particularly vexing for John Rawls .  According to him, what presents a special problem of 
justification for Rawls is not the inequalities per se, but the context in which they are present.  
It is the fact that these inequalities are a product of a coercive system that makes justification 
so imperative. 
 
19
 Ibid., p. 121. 
 
20
 Ibid., p. 127. 
 
21
 Ibid., p. 121. 
 
22
 Ibid. 
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product of an associative special relation that we qua citizens find ourselves in as a 
consequence of “our shared institutions” that the coercive power of our state makes 
possible.
23
   
Thus, for Nagel the fact that we are members of the same domestic society and 
subject to the authority of the same state is of fundamental importance in determining 
the extent of our moral responsibility toward our fellow citizens: it is as citizens that 
we have a right to demand from one another that social and economic inequalities be 
eliminated or, at least, minimized.
24
  On this picture, the presumption against these 
inequalities is based not simply on the lower life prospects that many of our 
compatriots face from brute bad luck, but also on the claim that, as fellow citizens, we 
are bound to one another as a function of our common citizenship, engendered by the 
laws and institutions of our society.
25
  According to Nagel, what is objectionable is 
that “we should be fellow participants in a collective enterprise of coercively imposed 
legal and political institutions that generates such arbitrary inequalities.”26  In other 
words, what Nagel finds troubling about social and economic inequalities is that as 
citizens we are part of a common project or “enterprise” that is enabled by the 
coercive institutions of society and yet many of our fellow citizens, who contribute to 
this enterprise, suffer from lower life prospects with no reasonable means of escape.
27
  
                                                 
23
 Ibid. 
 
24
 Ibid. 
 
25
 Ibid. 
 
26
 Ibid. p. 128. 
 
27
 Ibid. 
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Our common citizenship, as a form of a special relation, thus makes us responsible for 
what happens to our fellow citizens and, in particular, encumbers us with duties of 
justice that demand that we ameliorate our compatriots’ social and economic 
deprivations.
28
   
However, it turns out that, for Nagel, the associative relation that engenders 
duties of justice does not come about simply because there is a coercive imposition 
(by the state) of a shared system of laws and institutions.
29
  For there to be an 
associative relation that is capable of supporting duties of justice, there must also be 
that “special involvement of agency or the will that is inseparable from membership in 
a political society.”30  This special involvement of the will, for Nagel, is not about 
becoming or remaining a citizen, but about the demands made on individual citizens to 
actualize what is “essential to life inside a society.”31  Such contribution on the part of 
individual citizens to enable society to function properly is the additional key feature 
of the citizenship relation that transforms it into something that is capable of 
generating substantial duties of justice.
32
 
                                                                                                                                            
 
28
 Ibid. 
 
29
 Nagel at times appears to suggest that the coercive imposition of a shared system of laws 
and institutions generates the associative relation among fellow citizens.  But his position is 
actually more nuanced than this.  The coercive imposition of a system of laws and institutions 
may be necessary, but it is by no means sufficient for the associative relation.  Additional 
conditions have to hold for the associative relation to come into existence.  Below I outline 
what these additional conditions are. 
    
30
 Ibid., p. 128. 
 
31
 Ibid. 
 
32
 Ibid. 
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This special engagement of the will is central to Nagel’s overall argument, for 
it is precisely such engagement that ultimately sets domestic society apart from the 
international realm.  After all, the international sphere is already comprised of regimes 
of cooperation that behave in ways that affect both state policy and the well-being of 
individual citizens.  Moreover, many of these regimes also encompass considerable 
coercive enforcement.  Yet, according to Nagel, participants of these international 
regimes do not find themselves in a political relation that engenders duties of justice.  
What this implies is that the coercive imposition of a shared set of institutions and 
laws is not enough to give rise to the kind of relation that Nagel thinks exists among 
citizens of a particular state; without the special involvement of individual agency, 
whatever associative bond there may be among participants on the international plane 
cannot be of the sort that generates duties of justice.
33
  It is, therefore, crucial to 
explore what this special involvement of the will really amounts to in order to see why 
Nagel is so skeptical about extending principles of justice globally.   
To understand what Nagel means by the will being involved, it is, I think, 
important to grasp the significance he places on the role that individual citizens play in 
“the collective life” of domestic society.  The difficulty in doing this is that Nagel’s 
discussion of the subject is terse and short on concrete detail, instead relying heavily 
on metaphor, which makes it hard to discern the basic assumptions on which his 
                                                 
33
 This is a crucial step in Nagel’s argument and I think makes his views on global justice 
quite powerful.  The reason for this is that Nagel does not have to deny that the international 
sphere is marked by a considerable amount of coercion – coercion that is such that it affects 
how states conduct both their foreign and domestic policies.  Rather, all he has to say – and in 
fact does say –  to deflect this rather obvious criticism is that that the coercion that is present 
internationally is of a different  sort: it is of a sort that simply does not place persons in the 
kind of relation that obligates them with duties of justice.      
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argument rests.
34
  What I try to do in my discussion of the special involvement of 
individual agency is offer my interpretation of Nagel’s position that tries to make 
sense of the abstractions and metaphors he employs.    
I think that, for Nagel, the special involvement of agency in the life of society 
refers to what individual citizens do, in their capacity as loyal citizens (committed to 
the integrity of their political system), that enables domestic society to run its normal 
course, which includes having its laws enforced.  Nagel seems to think there are 
several ways in which our individual agency is implicated in the functioning of 
society.  First, a demand is made on our agency to conform to the laws of our society.  
For the most part, this is our ineluctable fate: we are born into a society that has laws 
which we are required to obey; nor do we have the option to leave, if we happen not to 
agree with (some of) the laws that we are forced to obey – and even if we could, we 
would still end up having to obey the laws of the place to which we have moved and 
made our new home.  Thus, we almost always find ourselves in a context where 
society is regulated by laws and institutions that are coercively imposed.  We are, in 
other words, permanently cast as subjects made to obey the laws of some state.  
Being made to be obey laws describes one way our agency is implicated in the 
functioning of society.  But, according to Nagel, obedience alone does not explain 
why our responsibility toward our fellow citizens encompasses duties of justice.  The 
                                                 
34
 It seems to me that having details in this context is quite important. After all, as I suggest, it 
is this special involvement of individual agency that distinguishes domestic society from the 
international sphere.  Saying that citizens participate in the collective life of society doesn’t 
seem to do the job of separating the domestic from the international case.  We can certainly 
say that persons participate, for example, in the international trade regime by buying goods 
made abroad.  Nagel presumably doesn’t think that this implicates agency in the relevant 
sense.  So what is it about the involvement of a citizen’s will or agency in the life of her 
society that is so different from what occurs internationally?    
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reason for this is that mere obedience is not enough to engender the type of citizen 
relation that demands that concern for fellow citizens be in the form of justice: 
something else is required other than that we are forced to obey (the laws of our state).  
For Nagel, the additional element has to do with the coercion of fellow citizens being 
done “in our name.”35  What this means precisely is hard to say, but Nagel seems to 
suggest that our agency is further involved in the following ways.  First, we contribute 
to society through our political, social, and economic participation and cooperation.  
We are, Nagel writes, “assigned a role in the collective life of a particular society” and 
are “responsible for its acts.”36  In other words, through our active cooperation as 
citizens of a state, we actively assist our state in coercing our fellow citizens.  We do 
this, for instance, by supporting domestic laws and institutions “through which 
advantages and disadvantages are created and distributed.”37  As citizens, we 
contribute to the coercion of our fellow citizens by enabling the state to enforce its 
laws: through our conformity, we make it possible for the state to strike against a 
small minority of unruly or disobedient individuals and keep in check many others 
with the mere threat of prosecution or an imposition of a penalty.  Most of us, on the 
other hand, conform to the core legal norms of our domestic society because we think 
it is the right thing to do, not out of fear of reprisal by the state exercising its police 
                                                 
35
 Ibid. 
  
36
 Ibid., p. 129. 
 
37
 Ibid. p. 129.  This specific phrase appears throughout the essay.  Nagel relies quite heavily 
on this notion of a political system being in our name somehow.  Yet, he does not quite pierce 
the veil of ambiguity of this phrase, and relies too much its metaphoric connotation.  This 
makes hard to see what the argument really amounts to.  But I make it my task to make sense 
in more concrete terms what precisely this phrase might mean and how it affects Nagel’s 
overall argument that justice should be confined to the domestic sphere.  
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and judicial powers.  By cooperating and playing our respective roles in the 
“collective life” of society, we enable the state to carry on as a state, and, in particular, 
we enable the state to carry on by enforcing its laws.
38
  Such active participation, thus, 
makes us complicit in the coercion of our fellow citizens. 
However, when Nagel insists that coercion is done in our name, he has in mind 
more than just our participation in the coercion of our fellow citizens.  Our agency is 
also involved in so far we are the source of the state’s authority to engage in its 
coercive activities.
39
  We are the source of this authority, according to Nagel, because 
the “collectively imposed social framework [is] enacted in [our] name.”40  Such 
authorization further complicates the role that citizens play in coercing one another.  
For coercion being done in our name indicates involvement that goes beyond mere 
participation: not only does the state coerce with our assistance, but, in addition, does 
so with our collective affirmation that it has the authority to do so.
41
  We are thus 
doubly implicated by participating in and by serving as the source of the coercion 
done by the state against our fellow citizens.
42
   
                                                 
38
 Ibid., p. 140. 
 
39
 Ibid. 
 
40
 Ibid. 
 
41
 Moreover, the “social framework of laws and institutions” that is coercively imposed is also 
in our name in that it is enacted on behalf and for the sake of “all those governed by the [social 
framework].” 
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 Some writers have interpreted Nagel differently from me.   Andrea Sangiovanni is one such 
example.  According to him, Nagel thinks that what the state does to its citizens, by imposing 
its laws on them, has to be justified not because it coerces its citizen into obeying its laws, but 
because it places them in a position that they did not choose and from which they cannot 
escape.  That is, the situation that citizens find themselves in by being forced to obey the laws 
of their state is one that is involuntary.  Sangiovanni thinks that for Nagel it is the fact that 
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Let me briefly summarize my discussion so far of Nagel’s position on the 
limits of justice.  First, justice is the appropriate response to inequality where persons 
stand to one another in a particular associative relation.  This relation is present when 
(i) the laws and institutions of a political system are coercively imposed and (ii) the 
coercion is imposed in the collective name of all those who are members of this 
system.  The latter condition obtains when citizens contribute to state coercion and 
affirm that the state has the authority to coerce.  For Nagel, the citizen relation, within 
liberal democratic states, is a prime example of the associative relation that engenders 
duties of justice.  As citizens of such states, we come closest to being the authors of 
one another’s coercion.43  Moreover, the associative relation that Nagel has in mind 
simply does not exist, at this point in time, internationally, and hence the international 
                                                                                                                                            
persons don’t volunteer to become citizens that is morally salient and makes justifying 
obedience to laws a moral requirement.  Moreover, Sangiovanni also contends that for Nagel 
the real difference between the state and the international sphere is that the latter is voluntary, 
and thus there is no moral requirement to extend principles of justice globally.  However, I do 
not think that this interpretation is right.  Nagel is quite explicit that what sets the problem of 
justification for him is the existence of coercion, and coercion is, of course, not the same thing 
as involuntariness. And Nagel does appear to say that international regimes exhibit some 
amount of coercion.  Sangiovanni seems to think that coercion is not a necessary condition for 
requiring the application of justice in order to justify the existence of coercion.  Instead, he 
contends that involuntary membership in a regime is sufficient to trigger this requirement.  
Sangiovanni then goes on to criticize Nagel for insisting that international regimes are not 
suitable sites for justice when in fact such regimes are clearly involuntary, not unlike 
membership in a particular state.  However, Sangiovanni is mistaken if he thinks this is an 
objection to Nagel’s account.  Not only does Nagel not think these regimes are voluntary, he 
does not even think they are free of coercion.  Sangiovanni might be right that coercion is not 
a necessary condition for the application of justice, and this may be a legitimate criticism of 
Nagel.  But he ends up attributing a position to Nagel that Nagel himself seems to reject.  
Nagel thinks that justice is not appropriate internationally because the right kind of associative 
relation is not present there, not because the international realm consists of voluntary 
associations.  See Andrea Sangiovanni, “Global Justice, Reciprocity, and the State,” 
Philosophy and Public Affairs, 35, no. 1, 2007, pp.3-39.  
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sphere is not an appropriate site for the application of principles of justice.
44
  What is 
significant about Nagel’s assertion that the relevant associative relation is absent from 
the international space is that this does not commit him to the dubious proposition that 
the international sphere does not exhibit any type of coercion.  For Nagel, there is 
coercion – at least, its possibility is not being foreclosed – but it is not the sort that is 
capable of generating the requisite associative relation that necessitates duties of 
justice.
45
   
Now Nagel’s argument against global justice does not end here: Nagel also 
maintains that a state that exhibits a strong citizen relation is at the same time 
politically legitimate.
46
  This is an important result for Nagel: because justice applies 
where there is an associative relation among fellow participants and such a relation is 
present within systems of cooperation that are politically legitimate, a conception of 
justice is applicable to systems of cooperation that are legitimate.
47
  Nagel writes, 
“Justice applies only to a form of organization that claims political legitimacy and the 
right to impose decisions by force, and not to a voluntary association or contract 
                                                 
44
 Ibid., p.139. 
 
45
 See ibid., pp. 138-140. 
 
46
 Nagel does not give us a definition of political legitimacy, which is unfortunate because, as I 
will explain later, this notion plays an important role in his account.  However, Nagel does 
appear to connect the concept of legitimacy to the citizen relation: a state that locates its 
authority – and in particular its authority to coerce – in its  citizens is deemed to be legitimate.  
It turns out that, for Nagel, when coercion is exercised by a legitimate state enforcing its laws 
and institutions, cooperation within the basic structure of that state – and also the domestic 
society that it encompasses – has to be regulated by principles of justice.  
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 Political legitimacy appears to be a necessary condition for justice according to Nagel.  It is 
probably not sufficient also because it seems possible, at least in principle, to have a system 
that is legitimate yet not coercive.  But, as Nagel insists, coercion is essential for justice. 
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among independent parties.” 48  In other words, political legitimacy and the special 
involvement of individual agency in the coercive activities of the state go hand in hand 
and are prerequisites for the application of a conception of justice to a system of 
cooperation.   Interestingly, this also implies that if a state were not legitimate, no 
matter how much coercion it directed at its citizens, these citizens would not have the 
right to demand that their terms of cooperation be regulated by principles of justice.    
As Nagel keeps emphasizing, as citizens, we are deeply implicated in the 
coercive mechanism of the state.  The state, as an agent of coercion, depends on our 
participation to be in a position to coerce and to coerce effectively.  And where the 
state’s authority to coerce is derived from the people, that state is endowed with 
political legitimacy.
49
  All this, according to Nagel, transforms us into the authors of 
one another’s coercion.50  Political legitimacy is thus the other side of the coin of our 
deep involvement in and affirmation of the mechanism of coercion carried out by the 
state: where political legitimacy is present, we are the authors of one another’s 
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What it means precisely for the authority to come from the people is something that Nagel 
does not make clear.  I understand Nagel to mean that authorization essentially comes down to 
the recognition and acceptance on the part of  individual citizens that the state has to engage in 
coercion - so that, for instance, the rule of law is maintained.  Coercion, in another words, is a 
necessary political evil - one which we can’t do without; it is the only way to ensure that we 
have a stable and functioning society.  In some sense, authorization is about the state carrying 
out the will of the people – deep down coercion is something that ordinary citizens would 
generally approve of.  There may also be authorization from the people because to some 
extent ordinary citizens are willing participants in the coercive activities of their state . (Nagel 
mentions the general will at one point.  By the will of  the people I do not mean the general 
will.  And so it would be wrong to say that according to Nagel a legitimate state carries out the 
general will of the people.  Rather we participate in the general will, or the collective life of 
domestic society, and part of this means that we do this in a way that grants authority to the 
state to engage in coercive activities.)  See Nagel, “Problem of Global Justice,” p. 128. 
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coercion and are thereby ultimately responsible to what happens to our fellow citizens.  
This is a particularly insightful point: Nagel draws a conceptual link between the 
political legitimacy of a state and the deep citizen relation that necessitates duties of 
justice.  This allows Nagel to characterize the international sphere in another way: not 
only can Nagel can point out, as he does, that individuals who participate in 
cooperation within international regimes not stand in an associative relation to one 
another that compels the application of a conception of justice, but he can also say, as 
he does, that these international regimes are not politically legitimate.
51
  Justice, in 
another words, has no place within a system of cooperation until that system acquires 
the status of political legitimacy.  In the next several pages, I explore, in some detail, 
this particular line of argument, one that maintains that the international sphere lacks 
legitimacy.  I do this because Nagel’s use of political legitimacy brings to light a 
rather novel rationale for keeping distributive justice within the confines of domestic 
society.  Moreover, the rationale is worth our discussion, for it has certain rather far-
reaching implications for global political organization and governance.  In the end, 
however, Nagel’s reliance on political legitimacy as a way to demarcate the domestic 
from the international sphere opens him up to several difficulties, which I do not think 
can be overcome.     
Representative, liberal democracies are politically legitimate according to 
Nagel.  While the international realm is not.  But the lack of legitimacy internationally 
does not in any way suggest that the international sphere is a coercion-free zone.  As I 
mentioned earlier, Nagel does not commit himself to this proposition, which has been 
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quite thoroughly repudiated.
52
  On the contrary, he appears to have a fairly accurate 
picture of how the international space is structured.  Nagel is quite cognizant that what 
happens internationally often has far-reaching effects and understands that those who 
are affected naturally want to have a say or some manner of control in how 
international regimes are regulated.  He takes the global economy as one of the most 
important of such regimes.
53
  The global economy, for Nagel, is transactionally 
vibrant, becoming ever more widespread with deepening interdependence, and 
regulated by an expanding set of international norms.
54
  A functioning global 
economy, according to him, relies on the application of several interconnected areas of 
law, including contract law, intellectual property, international business law – which 
regulates the global financial system – numerous bilateral and multilateral treaties that 
deal with specific areas of inter-state commerce, and so on.
55
  In addition, there are 
various tribunals asserting jurisdiction and applying norms – often in ways that 
conflict – to resolve specific disputes.56  What is quite clear from all this – and Nagel 
is aware of this  – is that some sort of an enforcement of both international and 
domestic laws has to exist for the global economy to function at all.  Yet, Nagel does 
not consider the mechanisms of such enforcement capable of generating claims of 
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justice and equality among the various participants in the global economy.
57
  What is 
missing is that the global economy is not “coercively imposed in the name of all the 
individuals whose lives [it] affect[s].”58  Instead, on Nagel’s view, the global economy 
is a system of cooperation, set up by states for the sake of pursuing their interests.  
This makes the imposition of the global economic regime be in the name of individual 
states, which “represent and bear the primary responsibility” for the effects the global 
economy produces.
59
  But without the imposition of a coercive framework in the name 
of individuals who participate, international economic regimes, according to Nagel, 
lack political legitimacy.
60
 
Now, Nagel takes the international sphere to consist in more than just 
economic activity.  There are transactions, activities, and decisions done daily that 
have little to do with investment or trade.  New institutions and organizations, 
designed to harmonize and regulate “policies and practices” of individual states, enter 
the international scene all the time.
61
  Yet, these new institutions and organizations, 
along with the more established ones, do not, on Nagel’s view, represent citizens from 
participating states.  Nagel takes real actors on the international stage to be states, 
advancing their national interests.  The lesson to be drawn from this, he insists, is that 
                                                 
57
 Correlatively, the existence of such enforcement is also not enough to generate the relevant 
associative relation among fellow participants in the global sphere.  See Nagel, “The Problem 
with Global Justice,” p. 138.  
 
58
 Ibid. 
 
59
 Ibid. 
 
60
 Ibid. 
 
61
 Ibid., p. 139. 
 
 109 
international regimes are just not the sorts of things that are “collectively imposed” in 
the name of citizens; instead, these regimes bring together and facilitate cooperation 
among participating states as they “advance their separate aims.”62  Persons are thus 
given only an ancillary role in the “collective life” of international regimes of various 
ilk.
63
  The authorization that international regimes seem to wield in enforcing norms 
and regulations thus appears to be derived from individual states.  Yet, shifting the 
locus of authorization away from persons and toward states amounts to making 
international regimes politically illegitimate, for Nagel.
64
  Moreover, such a lack of 
legitimacy, Nagel thinks, infects pretty much all international regimes, not just the 
global economy.   
In his attempt to characterize the international sphere, Nagel casts a fairly wide 
net and concludes that the regimes and institutions that constitute the space of global 
cooperation lack political legitimacy.  Let us accept for the sake of argument that 
Nagel is right about international regimes being illegitimate – that in particular 
individual citizens either do not or are not in a position to affirm or accept that the 
regime has a right to coerce.  Even if we assume that Nagel might be right about this, 
what I find problematic about his position is that it says so little about what should be 
done about politically illegitimate regimes or systems of cooperation: do we, as 
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citizens, just sit back and assume a “wait and see” attitude until some form of 
legitimacy takes root, at which point, according to Nagel, it would make sense to talk 
about justice?  There is something profoundly unsettling and unsatisfactory about 
making fundamental social change wait on the sidelines in this way.
65
  For one thing, 
the international sphere is still characterized by rampant coercion.  Such coercion is 
not structurally as tidy as what occurs within domestic society, with the state as the 
sole agent of coercive enforcement.  But this does not make the coercion that exists 
internationally any less problematic and any less in need of a justification.  Even 
where a system of cooperation is politically illegitimate, any coercion generated by it 
has to be justified to its subjects, for otherwise there is only pure coercion, and this 
seems difficult to accept.  Even if we concede that international regimes are politically 
illegitimate, we do not also have to accept that no moral claims can be made against 
the illegitimacy of these regimes. 
I suggest that international coercion, along with the illegitimacy of the system 
within which it occurs as well as the illegitimacy of the agents that exercise it, cannot 
go morally unchallenged or unchecked.  The question is, what should be the 
appropriate response to illegitimate international systems of cooperation that 
propagate coercion?  Nagel’s response to the illegitimacy of international regimes 
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 The world is certainly not short on politically illegitimate states.  And it seems to me that 
even in states that are highly repressive, citizens bear some responsibility for one another.  
When a vulnerable minority is singled out by the state and subjected to unjust and oppressive 
treatment, other citizens, I suggest, have a duty to put a stop to such treatment.  In certain 
cases, the moral requirement to stand up to injustice may be defeated by other moral 
considerations – for example, the state may throw one into prison for a very long time.  But 
this is not to say that there is no duty to stand up to injustice.  Thus it does not seem right to 
say that we should wait for legitimacy before we begin to strive towards justice.  On the 
contrary, it seems that the push towards legitimacy often involves a struggle against injustice.  
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seems lax: he simply says that, at least, historically political legitimacy is generally 
established first, well before any attempt is made at creating a genuinely just society.
66
  
But this way of looking at political legitimacy does not sufficiently place it within a 
moral context.  What we want to know is not simply the historic trajectory that 
political transformations take, but also the normative implications of living under an 
illegitimate political regime.  And Nagel does not have much to say about this other 
worry.   
There are two things that can be said at this point about the presence of 
political illegitimacy within the international sphere.  First, it may still be the case that 
participants of  coercively imposed illegitimate regimes have responsibility toward 
their fellow participants, even if such responsibility falls short of the rigorous demands 
of justice.  Nagel, however, makes no mention of this possibility.  Instead, he favors a 
moderate version of universal basic rights that imposes duties of humanitarian 
assistance that transcend state borders.
67
  According to this view, as an American I 
may have a duty, for instance, to support a program that brings mosquito nets to 
villages in Burkina Faso.  But that duty is independent of any political connection I 
have to the people of Burkina Faso, and, in fact, no political relation is needed to 
trigger demands of humanitarian assistance to those outside my country.  
Unfortunately, this ignores that participants of even illegitimate regimes may still 
stand in some type of a political relation to one another that is substantial enough to 
entail mutual responsibility that is more demanding than the moral humanitarianism 
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Nagel espouses.  I will not, however, explore this possible alternative because I think 
there is a better way to deal with political illegitimacy. 
Second, participants of an illegitimate political regime may have a right to 
demand that, where there is coercion, such coercion be exercised by a legitimate 
regime or system of cooperation.  This may go some way, it may be argued, toward 
justifying the coercion.  It is to this second response to the coercion posed by 
illegitimate systems that I would like to turn my attention. 
On its face, the demand that there be legitimacy is plausible enough, but what 
precisely is signified by a progression toward legitimacy is not easy to say.  
Presumably it would be better to have a coercive system that is legitimate than one 
that is not: where there is legitimacy, the coercion done seems more palatable.  But we 
have to explain why legitimacy would have this effect of making coercion seem more 
justified.  To offer such an explanation, however, requires that we step back and 
examine what is meant by legitimacy in the first place.  Even though I have touched 
on the subject in light of my discussion of Nagel, I do not think that the notion of 
legitimacy has been clearly spelled out.
68
  Part of the reason for this is that Nagel 
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 As I have tried to make clear in my discussion of Nagel, there are two important notions for 
him that are conceptually linked: political legitimacy and the institution-mediated associative 
relation.  They also seem to go together: whenever the associative relation is found, a regime 
that expresses  the relation in its terms of cooperation is also characterized as being politically 
legitimate.  However, I want to focus on legitimacy and not so much on the associative 
relation.  The reason for this is that the invocation of political legitimacy is a novel idea in the 
context of discussing global justice.  As far as I know no one else talks about the political 
legitimacy of the international sphere.  But political legitimacy also exposes Nagel to a new 
set of objections.  For one thing, it  makes sense to demand that there be at least legitimacy in 
relation to coercive international regimes.  The same cannot be said about the citizen relation.  
The citizen relation is either there, which means that  citizens are encumbered with duties of 
justice, or it is not.  If the citizen relation is not present, then persons who are not so related 
cannot make demand on one another that the relation be established.  Legitimacy, however, 
appears to be different.   
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himself is terse and enigmatic about what he means by the term.  This much, at least, 
can be discerned about Nagel’s account of legitimacy: legitimacy appears to be 
conceptually linked to the associative relation that demands duties of justice.  But this 
still does not adequately tell us what legitimacy really amounts to.  For one thing, it is 
not clear from Nagel’s discussion whether the existence of the associative relation is 
necessary or sufficient for political legitimacy – perhaps it is neither.  It may not be 
sufficient if justice is necessary for political legitimacy, and so, despite the presence of 
the requisite associative relation, a state may not be legitimate if it continues to be 
unjust.
69
  Furthermore, the associative relation may also not be necessary because for 
all we know there may be other ways of establishing legitimacy.  For instance, it may 
be argued that the legitimacy of a political entity can be achieved through the actual 
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 This point is actually somewhat nuanced.  Whether the associative relation is sufficient to 
establish political legitimacy depends on how closely legitimacy is tied to justice.   As I will 
suggest below, one version of legitimacy essentially equates legitimacy to justice: a state is 
legitimate if it is also just.  This is the view that is present in Nagel’s earlier work on domestic 
conceptions of justice.   Under this conception, the associative relation  would clearly not be 
sufficient, since in addition to the relation the state has to apply a conception of justice to its 
basic structure.  However, on a different conception of legitimacy, one that does not equate 
legitimacy to justice, where the relation is present, the state may be legitimate even if it is still 
unjust.  Of course much will depend on the level of injustice present.  If there is too much 
injustice, it would not make much sense to say that the state is nevertheless legitimate.  But 
then it may be argued that a state that is that unjust surely cannot instantiate the requisite 
associative relation among fellow citizens because laws and institutions that are highly unjust 
cannot be said to be imposed in the name of individual citizens who are the victims of the 
state.  I will argue below that on this version of legitimacy there is a way to construe the 
associative relation as a sufficient condition for legitimacy.  What is important to note here is 
that Nagel does not make this clear, and it takes quite a bit of extrapolating from his original 
account in order to give a more concrete definition of legitimacy.  
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consent of its subjects.
70
  In what follows, I will try to expand on my earlier discussion 
of legitimacy. 
Legitimacy generally gets attributed to a state, and so it is a state that usually 
gets labeled legitimate or not.  There are several accounts of legitimacy of a state.  On 
one view, which some call the obligationist view, a state is legitimate if and only if its 
subjects are required – or more precisely, obligated – to obey it.71  On the obligationist 
view, the real challenge is to answer why citizens are obligated to obey the laws of 
their state.  Asserting that a state is legitimate does not explain much because we want 
to know what makes it legitimate in the first place.  One response is to say that persons 
have an obligation to obey the state – and its laws – because it provides them with 
public goods: national defense, clean water, electricity, a police force, etc.
72
  The 
obligation to obey is thus viewed as a way for private individuals to repay their state 
for the benefits conferred on them.  However, this way of grounding obligation has 
been heavily criticized.  Some have argued that it is wrong to demand obedience for 
benefits received without first giving a  person a chance to opt out from having to 
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receive them.
73
  We do not, for instance, think that it would be right for me to wash 
my neighbor’s car and then demand that she pay me for my services.  Instead, we 
think that such mundane transactions require that there be a mutual agreement for the 
benefits exchanged: the washing of the car followed by payment for said washing.  
But where public goods are involved, the argument goes, such an agreement becomes 
moot because both the benefit and the penalty are unilaterally imposed by the state.  In 
addition, the value of the public good may not be worth the price of obedience, and so 
reciprocity “would require less than obeying the law.”74   A more straightforward 
approach is to ground obligation in actual consent – either express or tacit.75  The 
obvious difficulty with this approach is that it would make most modern states 
politically illegitimate, since the vast majority of their citizens are never given an 
opportunity to consent to the authority of their state.
76
   
Nagel accepts that there is a moral requirement to obey the laws of a legitimate 
state, but unlike proponents of the obligationist view, he bases this requirement on 
hypothetical consent.  In Equality and Partiality, Nagel links legitimacy to 
justification: a political system is legitimate if it can be justified to everyone forced to 
live under it.
77
  Legitimacy, Nagel claims, is about achieving unanimity “about the 
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controlling framework within which more controversial decisions are made.”78  This 
unanimity, for Nagel, is hypothetical, but he insists that this does not diminish the 
normativity of the justification that is achieved.
79
   
By a “controlling framework” I understand Nagel to mean some set of rules 
that functions as a regulative ideal, an ideal that offers the means to resolve political 
conflicts and disagreements.  Given the kinds of systems we have in mind here, the 
rules are meant to regulate terms of cooperation, broadly construed.
80
  So in a 
hypothetical choice situation, what is consented to are regulative rules or, in other 
words, laws that comprise the controlling framework of a system of cooperation.
81
  
Unanimous convergence on these rules indicates that no legitimate reason can be 
adduced by any rational agent to reject them and they are ipso facto deemed 
justified.
82
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 The reason for this is that Nagel thinks that unanimity makes the choice the right one.  This 
is a version of pure proceduralism; for Nagel, the very fact that there was unanimous 
convergence makes the choice correct.  It is the unanimity that explains the rightness of a 
choice and not the other way round – the rightness expounding the unanimity. 
  
80
  These terms have to be broadly construed, including social, political, and economic 
interactions and transactions among fellow participants. 
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 It is important for me that Nagel’s discussion of justifying rules applies to all sorts of rules, 
including laws, which are a kind of  rule that is enforced through legal coercion.  Given that 
Nagel has domestic society in mind throughout Equality and Partiality, it is, I think, quite 
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Thus a legitimate political system, for Nagel, is one that applies a justified set 
of laws – laws that enjoy unanimous hypothetical consented.83  But it seems that Nagel 
wants to say more than this.  When we are dealing with a system that is legitimate or 
justified from the standpoint of hypothetical consent, Nagel insists, “no one is morally 
justified in withholding his cooperation from the functioning of the system, trying to 
subvert its results.”84  In other words, when a system is legitimate, its subjects are 
morally bound to obey its laws.  As I suggested above, this is a key feature of the 
traditional or obligationist conception of political legitimacy, except that on the 
obligationist view legitimacy is ascribed to states, not systems of cooperation. This 
distinction, however, does not amount to much, since political legitimacy, the way 
Nagel understands it, can be easily extended to states.  So on his view, a state is 
legitimate if it enforces legitimate or justified laws.
85
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 Now this additional claim, that subjects of a legitimate state are required to obey its laws, 
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New York: Basic, 1975, pp. 16-52.   Dworkin, who has been critical of hypothetical consent 
theories, has suggested that hypothetical consent may not be enough to ground the 
requirement to obey.  He points out that the fact that we would agree to a recommended 
solution consisting of a set of rules does not entail that these rules may be enforced against us 
if we have not agreed to them.  Nagel’s conception of political legitimacy links legitimacy of a 
system to the justification of its laws.  But this way of looking at legitimacy seems to fall prey 
to precisely the kind of objection that Dworkin raises against hypothetical consent.  It is one 
thing to say that a set of laws is justified because no (acceptable) reason can be given to reject 
it and quite another thing to say that there is now a moral requirement to obey these laws.   
 118 
 Let me just summarize what we have so far with respect to the first conception 
of political legitimacy.  A legitimate political system embodies a set of laws that are 
justified from the standpoint of hypothetical consent – that is, laws that have passed 
the “non-rejection test.”  Now, a state is politically legitimate in so far as it instantiates 
a political system that is itself politically legitimate because it embodies a justified set 
of laws.  This makes states legitimate in a derivative way: their legitimacy depends on 
the legitimacy of the political system they actualize, which in turn depends on the laws 
the system applies as its adjudicative framework.  This tells us what makes a state 
politically legitimate.  But we have yet to say what the powers of a legitimate state are.  
For our purposes the relevant attribute of a legitimate state is that it has the right to 
coercively impose its laws against its citizens.
86
  
In Equality and Partiality, Nagel directs his discussion at domestic systems of 
cooperation.
87
 In this context, Nagel holds that a justified set of laws has to be just 
because anything less than justice gives one a reason to reject it.  In other words, the 
                                                                                                                                            
     To avoid Dworkin’s objection, Nagel has to explain how the duty to obey is derived 
without simply invoking the assertion that the set of laws was hypothetically consented to.  I 
think that Nagel has a way to avoid Dworkin’s objection.  The way he does this is by 
separating justification from the moral requirement to obey.  See Nagel, Equality and 
Partiality, p. 35. This way he can reject the allegation that hypothetical consent to a set of 
laws is somehow meant to derive the requirement to obey.  Instead, the requirement to obey is 
itself an outcome of hypothetical consent.  That is, as rational agents, deliberating in a 
hypothetical choice situation, we cannot come up with any legitimate reasons for not obeying 
those laws to which we have already consented as specifying our terms of cooperation.  This is 
why Nagel insists that once our domestic society applies a justified set of laws, no one is 
“morally justified in withholding his cooperation from the functioning of the system.”  For a 
good discussion of this particular objection and how proponents of hypothetical consent can 
overcome it, see Cynthia A. Stark, “Hypothetical Consent and Justification,” Journal Of 
Philosophy, Vol. 97, No. 6, June 2000, pp.313-334. 
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 This is flipside of the duty to obey justified laws on the part of those who are governed. 
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 See Nagel, Equality and Partiality, especially pp. 33-40, pp. 230-40. 
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outcome of hypothetical consent has to be a just one.  As mentioned earlier, a 
politically legitimate state enforces a justified set of laws.  But this means that for a 
state to be legitimate it has to enforce laws that are just because anything less than 
justice would mean that the appropriate justification is not achieved. Political 
legitimacy, under this conception, requires that terms of cooperation be regulation by 
justice, and so for a state to be legitimate, it also has to be just.   
To come back to our earlier discussion, we reached the conclusion that 
coercive international regimes lack legitimacy.  For this reason, I suggested that those 
who are subject to these coercive regimes have a right or are entitled to demand that 
the regimes achieve legitimacy.  But under the conception of legitimacy offered by 
Nagel above, this is a substantial demand: this is because a coercive regime, in order 
to count as legitimate, has to apply just laws – or, to be more precise, a just 
constitution.  From the standpoint of hypothetical consent, it is presumed that only a 
just constitution would pass the non-rejection test.  Thus the demand for political 
legitimacy really amounts to a demand for justice.  However, this suggests that even at 
the international level those persons who participate in and are subject to the coercive 
practices of international regimes have a right to demand that these regimes be just.   
This presents an obvious problem for Nagel.  Nagel insists that the 
international sphere is not an appropriate site for justice.  Yet, under his more fully 
developed conception of legitimacy, a demand for legitimacy is equivalent to a 
demand for justice.  This assumes, of course, that where political legitimacy is absent 
in a coercive system, there is a right to demand that legitimacy be established, for 
otherwise there is only pure coercion.  Under this conception of legitimacy, there is no 
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way to have a legitimate system that is not yet just.  But this turns the international 
sphere into a suitable place for justice whenever political legitimacy is being 
established, which is something that Nagel clearly wants to reject. 
For Nagel’s argument to work, he has to rely on a different conception of 
legitimacy from the one offered in Partiality and Equality.   But, as I suggested 
earlier, what precisely Nagel means by legitimacy in his work on international 
relations isn’t at all clear.88  He insists that when it comes to domestic society, our 
agency is involved in coercing our fellow citizens – the coercion is imposed in our 
name, as he puts it.  Such coercion, of course, has to be justified, but, from the stand 
point of hypothetical consent, a just system of laws will seem justified because 
citizens, qua rational agents, would endorse it.  But this way of implicating ourselves 
in the coercion of our fellow citizens leads to the strong version of legitimacy that 
equates legitimacy with justice, which Nagel cannot, in the end, endorse if he is to 
insist that the international sphere is an inappropriate place for the application of a 
conception of justice.  The involvement of individual agency thus has to be explained 
in another way.   
A different approach, I think, is to define legitimacy as involving some form of 
political representation.
89
  On this view, a democratic state is legitimate because its 
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 See Nagel, “The Problem with Global Justice,” pp.138-140 for the remarks he makes about 
political legitimacy. 
 
89 Nagel himself hints that perhaps legitimacy should be construed along the lines of 
democratic representation.  At one point he refers to the kind of legitimacy that he has in mind 
as democratic legitimacy.  Thus, Nagel’s “The Problem with Global Justice” may be read as 
somehow implicitly invoking a weaker conception of political legitimacy.  The difficulty here 
is that Nagel does not even attempt to expound this conception, except to refer to it in certain 
select passages as “democratic legitimacy” and so we left with filling in most of the gaps in 
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citizens have a say in what the state does.  Ordinary citizens, at a very basic level, can 
express their political views by voting for or against their current government; where 
there is a critical mass of dissatisfied voters, existing governments may be toppled or 
their makeup significantly restructured.
90
  In a democracy, people, in principle, have 
the power to elect a government that they think will represent and advance some of 
their interests.  In this way, representational democracies are said to be “by the 
people” and “for the people”.   
This is no doubt a rudimentary and a simplistic sketch of how democracies 
operate.  Modern democracies function in very complicated ways.  Who  really is in 
control of government is, I think, an apt question.  We are well aware that powerful 
special interest groups exert enormous influence on the American political system that 
is quite disproportionate to the actual number of members these groups seem to 
possess.  Monies that flow to the coffers of the two major political parties as well as to 
individual members of Congress and those running for office give special groups and 
coalitions access to important decision makers.  This often translates into the crafting 
and passage of policies that are particularly favorable to these political benefactors.  
Such practices corrupt the representational character of our democracy.  A 
democratically elected government, in principle, ought to advance the will of the 
                                                                                                                                            
order to have a workable model.  The danger of course is that the gap filling is my 
extrapolation of Nagel’s few cryptic remarks.  Still, I think there is something interesting 
about construing legitimacy along the lines of democratic representation, and what I try to do 
is offer a very rough sketch of what such a view of legitimacy might amount to.   For these 
hints of democratic legitimacy, see Nagel “The Problem of Global Justice,” pp. 145-47. 
   
90 Here I am thinking of coalition governments in a parliamentary system. In a parliamentary 
system, national elections can alter the composition of a government by, for instance, 
necessitating power sharing and the formation of coalitions without throwing a political party 
entirely out of power.  
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people – which is generally equated with what the majority would favor – while at the 
same time guaranteeing that the civil and political rights of vulnerable minority groups 
are not sacrificed in the process.  In actuality, we do not have anything like this, and it 
is I think important for someone like Nagel to map out where we are, more or less, 
along this continuum of representation.  With too little representation and the ensuing 
alienation from the polity, it may be difficult for us to say that we “own” this political 
system and are, therefore, responsible for its results.  But for now let us put this 
difficulty aside; I will simply assume that in a representational democracy like our 
own there is enough political representation in what the government – and 
correlatively, the state – does to maintain populist political ownership and ensure that 
the social and political framework is in our name.  For my purpose of outlining 
legitimacy along the lines of collective representation, this rather superficial sketch of 
democratic representation should be sufficient. 
If we take political legitimacy as something that is defined by a democratic 
form of governance, we can make some sense of Nagel’s point about citizens being 
authors of one another’s coercion.  We can see this happening along two dimensions.   
First, as citizens of a democratic state, we have some control or say over what 
becomes law.  One basic way we express our political aspirations is through the ballot 
box: we cast our vote for a candidate for political office we think will represent our 
interests in the legislative arena.  At other times, we participate in a more collective 
manner, through action groups, political organizations, social movements, and so on, 
which then advocate, thorough their own proxies, for laws and policies that we believe 
are particularly important. But whatever we do and no matter how active and 
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influential we may be, either acting on our own or through groups, what we in the end 
manage to shape pales in comparison to the total body of laws to which we are subject 
throughout our lifetime.  So viewed as quasi-lawmakers in this direct way and with 
regard to individual laws and policies, our influence is quite negligible; it would be a 
stretch to call ourselves authors of coercion when at best we can affect a small fraction 
of the corpus juris.   
However, as citizens of a democratic state, we affect the laws of our state in 
another way, which I think is much more far-reaching than our contribution to the 
passage of individual laws: we also endorse the basic procedure that transforms norms 
into laws.  Built into the very conception of democratic citizenship is the idea that it is 
the people who decide what becomes law; it is the imprimatur that is handed by the 
body politic that ultimately endows a rule with the status of being law.  As citizens this 
is something that we implicitly operate with: as individuals, we do not approve all the 
laws that come out of the democratic procedure, but nevertheless at some level we 
accept that this process of lawmaking is a fundamental aspect of our society.  Our role 
as authors of coercion I think is best expressed in our endorsement of the democratic 
procedure, which is the mechanism that generates the corpus juris.  
In a recent paper on Nagel’s position on global justice, A.J. Julius suggests that 
for Nagel a state can be politically legitimate in one of two ways.  First, the state can 
be legitimate if “people regard its terms as having a moral force” and “believe that 
they should conform to [these terms] because of their role in regulating” the 
interactions that take placed among fellow citizens.
91
  But as Julius rightly points out, 
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 A. Julius, “Nagel’s Atlas,” Philosophy & Public Affairs, Vol. 34, No. 2, 2006, pp. 176-192. 
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the problem with this way of understanding legitimacy is that it commits Nagel to an 
empirically false sociology of political membership.  There are plenty of people who 
happen to obey laws because they simply do not want to get caught, not because they 
believe that the law has any moral force behind it.  This makes it difficult to say that 
any state is politically legitimate.  Second, a state can be legitimate if it imposes terms 
of cooperation that are “independent of anyone’s belief that [they] are to be accepted” 
but are justified nonetheless.
92
    The problem for Nagel with the second version of 
legitimacy is that there is no reason to think, given the presence of coercion 
internationally, that international regimes can’t be made legitimate once the requisite 
justification is made.
93
  This puts Nagel in a difficult position: either he is committed 
to a sociologically false view or he can makes sense of a political relation among 
persons that entails duties of justice but this relation transcends the boundaries of 
individual states.     
I think that democratic proceduralism can help Nagel vis-à-vis Julius’s 
objection that Nagel cannot plausibly restrict and particularize distributive justice to 
individual states.  Democratic proceduralism does not require that people believe laws 
have a moral force to them - in the words of Julius, it does not presuppose “a false 
sociology.”  Democratic proceduralism stands for the proposition that what becomes 
law ultimately depends on the people, and the way this dependence is expressed is by 
giving individual citizens the right to participate in the legislative process.  (There are, 
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of course, intermediaries, and proxies but their legislative actions are kept in check  by 
the power of the public’s vote.)   
What implicates us as coercers is not that we believe that everyone should 
obey the laws of the state because this is the morally right thing to do.  Instead, we are 
implicated because we accept the procedure for making laws.  We accept this 
procedure by playing our part as good citizens of a democratic state.  Implicit in the 
very conception of democratic citizenship is the idea that citizens participate in the 
legislative process is a certain way, and that given this conception the procedure for 
participation has to be structured in a particular manner – it has to be structured to 
reflect the political equality of individual citizens.  This is of course an ideal of sorts, 
but in so far as an individual performs her role as citizen of a democratic society and 
approximates the ideal conception in her political life and activities, she is committed 
to democratic proceduralism.  Moreover, there is no attribution of belief here: 
commitment is implicit in the very notion of citizenship.   
Of course, as citizens we can also accept democratic proceduralism more 
directly, by actually thinking that this is a good way to make laws.  As a norm, this is 
something that is widely accepted by people living in democratic states.  There may be 
outlier citizens of course who do not buy into the democratic ideal and reject 
democratic proceduralism, but these outliers are likely to be so few that the 
generalization that citizens of democratic states embrace democratic proceduralism is 
still accurate enough not to be sociologically false.
94
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 What is more is that the attraction and exuberance to the democratic ideal is felt in other 
parts of the world where democracies have still not gotten a foothold.  So the norm of 
democratic proceduralism is something that is widely accepted throughout the world.   
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Now in so far as we endorse the manner in which laws are made, laws which 
subject our fellow citizens to coercion, we in some sense can also be said to participate 
in their coercion.   Our engagement as good citizens of a democratic state and in 
particular our involvement in the political process is enough to establish our 
commitment to democratic proceduralism, which in turn is sufficient to implicated us 
as authors of coercion. 
By connecting legitimacy to democratic proceduralism, we can make sense of 
the assertion that, as citizens, we are authors of one another’s coercion.  In a 
democratic society, we stand in precisely that kind of relation – we might argue on 
behalf of Nagel – that generates the requirement to justify coercive enforcement, 
which can only be done by invoking principles of justice.  That’s because in a 
democracy, at least in theory, we accept the procedure for how laws are made, laws 
that the state then goes on to enforce.  On this view of legitimacy, a state is legitimate 
if it instantiates a political system that is a representative democracy of some form.  
But notice that on this view a legitimate state is not automatically or necessarily a just 
one; for instance, for all we know the corpus juris may consist of unjust laws.  This 
has the nice result, for Nagel, in that a call for legitimacy is not equivalent to a call for 
justice.  More importantly, on this conception of legitimacy, Nagel can still insist that 
the international sphere is not the appropriate site for justice – because the regimes 
that comprise it lack legitimacy.  And any demand to bring legitimacy to the 
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international sphere is just that, a demand for legitimacy, and nothing more, such as, 
for instance, a demand for justice.
95
 
The reliance on democratic governance, and specifically on democratic 
proceduralism, as a way of demarcating between legitimate and illegitimate states 
offers Nagel a way to reestablish the legitimate state as the appropriate site for 
distribution justice: only democratic states – they are the ones that are legitimate – 
instantiate the special relation because their citizens are authors of one another’s 
coercion.  The international trade system is not legitimate because it does not embrace 
democratic proceduralism.   
This maneuver may save Nagel from making a sociologically false claim.  But 
it does not make his account immune from a different sort of problem put forward by 
Julius.  Julius contends that Nagel’s account implies that there is no way for him to say 
that an illegitimate state is unjust.  Julius asks us to imagine a tyranny: in a state run by 
a tyrant, the people do what the tyrant tells them to do because they want to avoid 
being killed.
96
   The state therefore is not in any way legitimate.  But it is hard to 
argue, according to Julius, that there would be nothing unjust about the tyrant building 
his pleasure palaces as his people suffer from hunger.
97
  The problem with Nagel’s 
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representation does not generate this result, and justice does not enter at the stage where the 
aim of political transformation is to achieve political legitimacy. 
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theory, says Julius, is not that it rules out the possibility of justice “but that the theory 
cannot find injustice in their situation.”98    
Julius I think is right about this but only if injustice is understood more 
narrowly as injustice with regard to the distribution of (economic) entitlements.  Nagel 
does say after all that there is a general humanitarian duty of justice, and this certainly 
would apply to tyrants: so if the hypothetical tyrant in Julius’s example does nothing 
to prevent his people from dying of hunger or kills or imprisons political dissenters, 
that would be unjust under the humanitarian conception of justice.  But the threshold 
here is quite minimal, and so if we imagine a less awful regime, one where citizens are 
not starving but where there is, for instance, great economic disparity and economic 
exploitation, Nagel’s theory again cannot find the injustice in this situation.  But this is 
surely implausible because even if we grant, for the sake of argument, that genuine 
economic egalitarianism may be controversial in this context, it seems that at the very 
least we should be able to say that the economic exploitation of a large underclass by a 
coterie of powerful individuals is unjust.  We should be able to say that much, which 
we cannot do on the basis of Nagel’s theory, for the requirement to justify the 
prevailing pattern of economic entitlements just does not come up in an illegitimate 
state where citizens are not properly linked to one another via the special relation and 
the basic demands of humanitarian justice have been met.  But surely we want to say 
that those who economically privilege themselves – because they have the power to do 
so – clearly owe a justification to their fellow compatriots for the kind economic 
standing they possess.  This requirement seems to be just as important, if not more, in 
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the context of an illegitimate state, where the social framework is not in the name of 
the people, as it is for a legitimate state.  And it seems to me that we think this because 
the distributive injustice of an oligarchy is worse than the injustice that exists in a 
liberal democracy like the US or Canada, and where there is injustice we think there 
must be accountability, which the demand for justification makes evident.  
Whatever the demands of justice may be in an illegitimate state, they are not 
non-existent or negligible: the people who are being economically exploited have a 
legitimate complaint against their exploiters and are right to demand that such 
exploitation end.   Moreover, I do not see the logic in Nagel’s proposal of first 
establishing a legitimate society and only later making it just.
99
  The quest to end 
current injustice is as pressing as the need to establish legitimacy, and can be pursued 
simultaneously: in fact ending injustice and establishing legitimacy may be seen as 
part of a much broader project of enhancing justice, the last stage of which is the 
application of an egalitarian conception of justice.      
So Nagel’s theory can account for the injustices committed by a state that 
disregards basic rights and the injustices of a liberal democratic state, because it is not, 
say, sufficiently egalitarian, but the theory cannot do the same for that vast political 
space that is between these two points.  At the very least, Nagel has to explain why the 
possibility of injustice skips this political space, which unfortunately he fails to do.             
Julius I think is quite right to insist contra Nagel that we want a theory of 
justice that is capable of denouncing all kinds of states, be they legitimate or not, as 
unjust and of explaining wherein lies their injustice.  Even within illegitimate states, 
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the distribution of entitlements follows a certain pattern which is coercively imposed, 
and that pattern, it may be argued, has to be justified to those subjects of the state who 
are burdened by it, for otherwise we end up with pure coercion.
100
  Of course, the 
division of entitlements that incorporates significant economic exploitation by the few 
is clearly not going to garner hypothetical consent: those subjects who are being 
exploited have reason to reject it.  By using the device of hypothetical consent, we can 
illustrate the injustice of this particular pattern.   
Of course, it may be argued that the use of hypothetical consent is 
inappropriate at this stage because it will result in an egalitarian conception of justice, 
which Nagel would contend is premature for an illegitimate state.  The objection, 
however, seems to presuppose that hypothetical consent as a device can only be used 
for working out a conception of justice.  However, I do not think that is the case: 
hypothetical consent can also be used to show why something is unjust.
101
  Moreover, 
there are other ways of explaining why extreme forms of economic exploitation are 
unjust.  The point is, a theory of justice worth taking seriously has to explain why 
seemingly unjust states are unjust, and this cannot be simply reserved for politically 
legitimate democratic states.  There are presumably far worse regimes out there that a 
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 When we consider states that are not politically legitimate because they lack democratic 
governance, people who live in them and suffer from injustice have legitimate grounds for 
complaint.  Here complaints against injustice may not be lodged against fellow citizens: the 
majority of the citizenry of such states find themselves at the receiving end of an unfair 
distribution of entitlements – they in other words find themselves being forced to accept such 
a pattern without being its authors.  They should instead be directed at those who sustain the 
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101
 More generally, hypothetical consent can be used to explain why a certain rule is morally 
wrong.  But in a context where what is being evaluated are rules that are meant to regulate 
terms of cooperation, the moral wrongness of such rules just is the fact that they are unjust.   
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theory of justice has to be in a position to condemn.  They may be condemned from 
the standpoint of a egalitarian conception of justice that is appropriate for a legitimate 
democratic state.  But the fact that we regard the circumstances as unjust suggests that 
citizens of these states deserve something better.  What they are entitled to is at the 
very least the removal of certain forms of injustice that we find especially troubling – 
viz. extreme economic exploitation – and this is the sort of judgment that hypothetical 
consent is capable of delivering without the need of a fully developed conception of 
justice.  In the alternative, what citizens of an illegitimate state are entitled to may also 
be delineated by a conception of justice, perhaps one that is weaker than a full blown 
egalitarian conception.  What is important to note here is that hypothetical consent 
may be used as an instrument to shed light on existing injustice and point to a better 
social and    political arrangement, which at the very least is an arrangement that lacks 
these particular injustices.
102
    
Thus, it seems quite reasonable to say that people who suffer under an 
illegitimate regime that mistreats them in significant ways – which yet does not 
amount to outrages that trigger humanitarian principles – deserve a more just regime, 
and that, moreover, deserve to be rid of exploitation.  But they are also entitled to a 
more equitable distribution of political power – if indeed they are so inclined to have 
some say in the governance of their state.  This last claim amounts to the assertion that 
the citizens of an illegitimate state have a right to challenge precisely those things 
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 Certain terms of cooperation may be reasonably rejected because there is a special relation 
among citizens.  But this does not imply that what is reasonable to reject always somehow 
implicates this relation.  That I should not grossly exploit my fellow compatriots has nothing 
to do with there being a special relation between me and them because the prohibition against 
exploitation applies in other political contexts as well.  I should not for instance exploit 
Mexicans even though there is no special relation between us.    
 132 
about their state that make it illegitimate.  That is to say, they have a right to demand 
the kind of distribution of entitlements that would make their state legitimate.  This 
may or may not be enough, but it does suggest that citizens that live in illegitimate 
states, where the special relation is missing, are not in a place of political limbo and do 
indeed have a right to demand greater justice from those who hold the reins of political 
power and are responsible for the existing allocation of entitlements.   
What is interesting about legitimacy based on representation is that 
establishing such legitimacy goes some way toward creating a just regime as well.  
The reason for this is that representational legitimacy requires some form of 
democratic governance, and democratic governance presupposes that individual 
citizens possess certain political and civil rights, such as the right to vote, to run for 
political office, to free association, to free speech – rights to political participation, in 
other words.  But genuine democratic governance requires many more guarantees than 
simply the rights to political participation.  Where political rivalries exist, there is 
always the danger that those in power will try to prevent, through repressive means, 
their opposition from mounting a serious challenge.  Thus basic protections have to be 
set up to shield the opposition from various forms of political repression.
103
 When too 
many people are kept out of the political process, it becomes hard to point the finger at 
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them and say that they are responsible for the coercive practices of their state.
104
  It 
seems right to say that those kept out should simply deflect such responsibility, since 
they have no way to exert any meaningful control over what their state does.  Thus 
these additional protections are essential for the kind of legitimacy we have in mind 
here, one that is predicated on the collective ownership of a political system.   
However, I think that political rights are still not enough to ensure that people 
are plugged into the political process.  It may be argued that substantial resources have 
to be allocated to enable ordinary citizens to participate on the basis of fairness.
105
  
This means that in addition to political rights, distribution of economic entitlements 
has to come in at this point: to be an informed voter, for example, one has to have 
access to certain basic capabilities, such as a secondary education, decent wage, an 
adequate healthcare, enough leisure to make a reflective political choice, and so on.  
And these capabilities are generally funded by some type of a progressive taxation 
scheme.  What is more, without the provisions that are necessary for meaningful 
political participation, there will be the temptation to gainsay any responsibility for 
what happens to one’s fellow citizens.  This will vitiate the notion that we are the 
coauthors of one another’s coercion.  Thus legitimacy once again requires the 
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value for society where collective ownership by the citizenry is a goal. 
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application of justice, and may even require the administration and implementation of 
distributive justice so that fair access to meaningful political participation is provided. 
Let me summarize what I have tried to establish so far.  On the strong version 
of legitimacy advocated by Nagel in his earlier work – where a legitimate state 
amounts to a just one – a demand for legitimacy entails a demand for justice.  On this 
conception, it is appropriate to transform international regimes so that their terms of 
cooperation conform to principles of justice from the very the start, provided there is a 
genuine entitlement that these regimes be legitimate.  On the weaker conception, a 
demand for legitimacy requires that a regime institute democratic governance.  But I 
suggest such governance has to be of a certain type: it has to be substantial enough to 
generate ownership of the political system and authorship for the coercive activities of 
the state.  Otherwise, the conditions for the associative relation among fellow citizens 
simply do not exist.  I also suggest that democratic governance of this form has to 
provide not only basic political rights of political participation, but also a fair access to 
or opportunity for meaningful political participation.  A regime that instantiates this 
form of democratic governance goes a considerable way toward realizing justice, 
including distributive justice.  So even on this view of legitimacy, Nagel is simply not 
right to contend that the international sphere is not an appropriate site for justice – 
especially distributive justice – because a transition toward legitimacy, even under the 
weaker conception, involves the application of some amount of justice. 
There is a further conceptual difficulty with Nagel’s position that makes his 
apparent separation of legitimacy from justice quite beside the point.  Recall that 
legitimacy is important for Nagel because it triggers the relevant associative relation – 
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which then necessitates that terms of cooperation be regulated by justice.  This means 
that before a regime has attained legitimacy, those subject to the coercive enforcement 
of its laws do not yet have a right to demand that the regime be just: the associative 
bond is not yet in place.  But the demand becomes ripe the moment there is 
legitimacy.  So there are two distinct steps involved: first a transition toward 
legitimacy; then a transition toward justice.   
It seems to me, however, that such a discrete progression hardly makes a 
difference in the end.  At any point where there is coercion, one is in a position to 
demand that, at least, there be legitimacy – and once there is legitimacy, one can then 
demand that one’s state apply an egalitarian conception of justice.  The result seems to 
be the same: a coercive system of cooperation in the end has to be regulated by 
principles of justice.  A status quo where there is illegitimacy is never justified – at 
least, so I claim – and so it becomes morally incumbent to support a move toward 
legitimacy.  But this has enough momentum to ultimately generate the duty to 
establish a just regime.   
Now if this is the case, why not aim at justice from the very start?  We can 
suppose that Nagel is right that at the pre-legitimacy stage there is not yet right to 
demand justice.  Yet from a practical standpoint, this hardly matters.  At this earlier 
stage, Nagel’s relevant associative relation may not exist, but this does not present a 
problem for asking that there be justice; that is because asking for justice does not 
require that there be an associative relation.  Thus, a shift toward justice, from the 
start, is something that is consistent even with Nagel’s account as long as the 
trajectory first goes through legitimacy.  Since, as I suggest, legitimacy can be 
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achieved by, at the very least, establishing some form of democratic governance, it 
seems all too natural that a transition toward justice should first engender a regime that 
is democratic.   
What does this say about international regimes?  My contention here is that 
with international regimes we can at least begin to move toward greater democratic 
accountability and governance.  What this will look like internationally may be 
considerably different from what happens at the level of states.  The ongoing 
international politicization of several important issues has generated the mobilization 
of many diverse actors, each claiming to have an authority to influence decision-
making and policy design over these “transnational” concerns.  This has made the 
international sphere politically - and also organizationally - much more messy.  The 
really hard problem, from the standpoint of governance, is how to make these actors 
more accountable and responsive to ordinary persons who are affected by policies, 
formed in faraway places by nameless, faceless bureaucrats.  There have been many 
attempts at answering precisely this question.  Some have expressed a good deal of 
optimism that indeed some form of democratic governance can be injected into the 
global arena.
106
   My point here is simply that it is possible to move in the direction of 
greater democratic governance and this transition can begin now.   
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My criticism of Nagel thus far has granted that his introduction of the special 
relation into the discussion on justice has been an important contribution to our 
understanding of how distributive justice and coercion are conceptually connected.  
Moreover, I have presented Nagel in a way that suggests that his position is a 
Rawlsian one in spirit but also an advance over Rawls’s original work in that it 
presents a more nuanced connection between distributive justice and coercion – and I 
do not think that Nagel himself would disagree with this assessment.   However, I 
think that in the end Nagel gets Rawls wrong in an important way, one which makes 
his account less plausible than the one offered by Rawls.  Below I turn to this final 
objection of Nagel.   
Nagel claims that there has to be a special relation before we can attribute 
duties of justice.  But this seems to add an additional component that Rawls himself 
does not do.  In the Rawlsian version, we assume at the very start that persons are 
coerced and ask ourselves what would it take to justify the exercise of coercion.  And 
it turns out that only a liberal conception, like the special conception, provides the 
requisite justification.
107
  So far we have not mentioned how citizens are related to one 
another; all that matters is that they find themselves in a coercive scheme.  A coercive 
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scheme makes an absolute demand for justification that can only be delivered in a very 
precise form.  If we are to live under a coercive regime and if that regime is to be a 
just one, there is only one basic way to have this.  Indeed it does not matter where we 
are coming from, whether we currently live in a coercive system that is autocratic or 
democratic.  If we want to justify coercion, we have to have a liberal conception apply 
to our basic structure.  Of course we are farther away from realizing this ideal if we 
live in an autocratic state.   
For Rawls duties of justice do not seem to be conceptually prior to the 
establishment of a just society.  Indeed, the question for him is not whether we have a 
duty of justice; rather, the question is, what would a just society look like – what is it 
for society to be ideally just, in other words?  It turns out that when we assume the role 
of rational and reasonable deliberators in the original position, we would regard 
society regulated by the special conception as ideally just.  And, as members of an 
ideally just society we have a duty to support and uphold its laws and institutions, and 
the state, as the enforcement arm of society, can justifiably punish us if we fail to live 
up to our end of the bargain.  This means that, for Rawls, when we choose a 
conception of justice, we also commit ourselves to do our part to uphold a just 
regime.
108
  The basis of our duties of justice is thus implicit in the hypothetical 
contract itself: our very conception in the original position is such that we would want 
to live under terms of cooperation that are defined by the operative conception of 
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justice.  What is more is that for Rawls there is no pre-condition that has to be satisfied 
before we can legitimately entertain the idea of a just society.  There is never the issue 
of whether we are morally entitled to live in a just society – because of how we are 
currently politically situated with respect to one another – standing in the way.109  We 
deliberate about justice because we wish to live in a just society.  Rawls takes this as a 
given and instead focuses his attention on how we should think about justice and what 
it would take for society to be ideally just. 
On Nagel’s view, there is an additional step.  First, there has to be a special 
relation, which then entails that we owe duties of justice to our fellow citizens.  This 
means that, for Nagel, the duties of justice have a basis that is separate from the 
hypothetical choice of an ideally just society.  For Rawls, there simply is no question 
whether we deserve to live in a just society, and so he begins his enquiry at a point that 
is conceptually different from Nagel’s.  All that is required is that we think about 
justice in the way that Rawls claims that we should and at the end, he argues, we will 
arrive at his version of an ideally just society.
110
  Of course, what we get is an ahistoric 
projection of what it is for society to be just.   It is ahistoric because, as hypothetical 
deliberators, where we are now in history – our historical situatedness – and how we 
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arrived there are not facts that are ultimately relevant to the ideal of justice that we end 
up subscribing to.
111
   
The same cannot be said for Nagel because certain historical facts do seem to 
matter to him, for they influence what gets recognized as ideally just.  It matters to 
him whether individual citizens stand in a special political relation to one another, and 
this special relation is a product of a series of historical interactions by the polity, as 
citizens try to establish a political system that is legitimate in their eyes.  The existence 
of this relation entails that distributive justice is the only way to justify the exercise of 
coercion.  But it is also the case that the absence of the relation entails that justification 
can be achieved without including distributive justice.  Thus Nagel’s denial that the 
special relation is present within coercive systems that are international in nature 
means that distributive justice is not required to make these systems just.  In other 
words, these systems can be ideally just without being just in the distributive sense.  
There is room for justice internationally, of course.  Indeed, Nagel thinks that we owe 
duties of humanitarian assistance to citizens of other states when the need arises 
internationally.  But once these principles of basic justice are applied internationally, 
the international sphere is justice – in fact, it is ideally just because there would be 
                                                 
111
 There is one important caveat here that must be mentioned.  As Rawls makes clear in 
Political Liberalism, a liberal conception of justice, like the special conception, is really meant 
to apply to liberal, democratic societies.  Thus which ideal we subscribe to depends whether as 
deliberators we are located in a liberal, democratic society.  Deliberators who reside in a non-
liberal society may embrace a different sort of ideal.  Rawls talks about such non-liberal 
societies in his The Law of Peoples.   See Rawls, The Law of Peoples, pp. 59-78.  Still as long 
as we assume that the deliberators hale from a liberal society, how that society became what it 
is now and how they are currently related to one another does not make a difference to what 
would be an ideally just society to them. 
   
 141 
nothing further to do.
112
  Now the same can be said about a state where individual 
citizens are not linked to one another by the special relation.  In such a state, there may 
be duties of justice of some sort, but no requirement to make the worst-off as well off 
as possible, for instance, in accordance with the difference principle.  The clear 
implication here is that without the special relation a state can be ideally just despite 
the presence of vast economic inequalities that are present inside it.   
As I argued earlier, this is an odd result in general, but I also think it is counter-
intuitive to the way we deliberate about the subject of justice.  If called to make a 
comparative judgment, I would not hesitate in asserting that a state where the special 
conception applies is more just than one where only principles of humanitarian justice 
operate because the special relation among citizens is missing.  The reason for this is 
that we think that it is better to have a state that is democratic than one that is not; that 
it is better to have a state where citizens enjoy a wide range of fundamental rights than 
one where these rights are under threat; that it is better to have a state where wide 
economic disparities are a thing of the past and citizens can enjoy a standard of living 
that is compatible with their self-respect.  These are of course commonplace 
convictions that most of us who live in liberal democracies hold and are not 
particularly deep.  But they do seem to point to the following.  Once we accept the fact 
that we have to live in a state – that the state is an ineliminable political unit that 
influences profoundly the choices we have and the life that we end up living – we 
want to know what would be the best state to have.  Much of this will, no doubt, center 
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on the political system that the state should exemplify.  In other words, once we take 
for granted that our terms of cooperation are going to be regulated by the state – 
because that is the only way we can have a stable or enduring system of cooperation – 
we want to maximize the virtues of the state that has authority over us.  It seems to me 
that it is natural for us to think about the ideal conception of the state – and of 
domestic society, for these are interlinked – because ultimately as citizens this is 
where we want to end up.  To think that in certain cases the ideal state is one where we 
are called to end only the most dire forms of economic deprivation because, as 
occupants of a common political landscape, we are nevertheless still not related to one 
another in quite in the right way, seems to misconceive the very important project in 
political philosophy of figuring out what would be the best way to organize life in our 
own society.  (And thinking about international justice should not be all that different.  
We work out what would be the ideal conception: what kind of a world do we want to 
live in?  The ideal conception would then guide our thinking about what we need to do 
now so that an ideally just world can one day be a reality.)  We do not work our way 
up to thinking about the ideal in stages; we think about the ideal from the very start.  
How we get there is a different and an important question, but in answering it, we take 
the ideal as the North Star of our advance toward greater justice.  Rawls’s theory of 
justice is the very expression of thinking about justice in this way.  On the other hand, 
Nagel’s insistence on the special relation as a factor of constraint on what we as 
citizens owe one another as well as to others frustrates such thinking because we are 
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prevented in some sense from imagining what would truly be ideal and instead are 
saddled with an inferior version that is masquerading itself as ideal justice.
113
 
If Rawls is right and that his special conception would make society ideally 
just, there is still the problem of transition that remains: how do we transition from a 
society that in many respects is very unjust to one that is ideally just?  This very 
important problem falls within the province of non-ideal theory, for Rawls.
114
  There is 
I think a normative aspect to the problem of transition, and so the question should be, 
what should we do in the here and now to achieve a just society?  Our present 
condition is not one of moral stasis, where we recognize that our society is unjust but 
we are not in any way morally required to do anything about it, and those who do are 
engaged in supererogation.  This does not seem right, for we are required to do 
something about the injustices that affect our fellow citizens.  The reason for this is 
that we are to some extent complicit in the injustice.  This is something that I hold and 
which serves as the basis of the moral requirement to fight against injustice.  The 
extent of our complicity varies, of course, and under certain conditions vanishes 
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entirely, but the default position is one of being morally required or bound by duty to 
support, through one’s political choices and actions, a transition toward greater (social 
and economic) justice.  The substance of the requirement will depend on the political 
circumstances.   In a democracy we may be required to contribute toward transition 
through robust participation in the political process and only as last resort to civil 
disobedience.   In an autocratic state, civil disobedience may be one of very few things 
that one can do.  Yet, whether one would be morally bound to engage in such action 
would depend on several factors: the repercussions from being civilly disobedient, 
one’s social and political standing within society – members of the political elite who 
control the state are more responsible for the harms done by the state and so 
correspondingly should bear more of the burden of correcting these injustices. 
The notion of non-ideal theory brings to light both an important insight as well 
as an error made by Nagel.  The sorts of political connections that citizens have with 
one another may have a place in a theory of justice, including international justice, but 
as an issue or topic within non-ideal theory.  I think that political relations may matter 
in determining both the kind and the extent of responsibility that individual citizens 
may have for the injustices that exist within their state and society as well as the nature 
of their obligations in eliminating these injustices.  So for example, if I am a citizen of 
a particular state and also a member of an ethnic minority that is persecuted by the 
majority population, my obligation to my fellow citizens who are economically least-
advantaged may be tempered by the fact of my persecution.  This seems especially to 
be the case when I am kept out of the political process at all levels of decision-making 
and am denied the kinds of equal protection and due process guarantees that are 
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routinely given to the majority, which implies both that many of my basic rights 
simply go unrecognized and that I am particularly vulnerable to being unjustly treated 
by the state if it decides to prosecute me for whatever reason.  The obligation for 
removing vast economic inequalities should instead fall on those individual citizens 
who both contribute to a legal and political framework, that is responsible for these 
inequalities, in a way that is more substantial than my contribution – because, for 
example, they are not kept out of the political process in the way that I am – and can 
oppose these injustices in a manner that I cannot – because, for example, I may be 
punished for my opposition but they won’t.  What this means is that some citizens 
have a greater obligation than others in eliminating existing injustices and bringing 
both the state and society closer to being ideally just.  And this difference in the extent 
of obligation largely depends on how the political and legal framework relates citizens 
to one another: I  owe less because I play a much smaller role in the imposition of 
economic injustices on my least-advantaged fellow citizens.  In this sense, Nagel I 
think is right to say that how we are connected to one another matters.  But it matters 
not in a way that Nagel thinks it does.  How we are politically related to one another as 
citizens does not change what we conceive to be as ideally just.  An ideally just 
society is still one that is reasonably egalitarian.   With this ideal in mind, there is still 
the problem of what should be done in the here and now to make the state and society 
realize ideal justice in the way that we imagine it to be.  It is at this conceptual 
junction that our political relation to one another gains moral significance.  Because of 
such political relatedness some will bear a greater obligation than others in 
effectuating the transition toward the ideally just.    
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Rawls’s theory of justice is I think perfectly consistent with holding the ideally 
just fixed but varying our remedial obligations on the basis of our complicity in the 
genesis of injustice.  Rawls himself does not mention complicity or responsibility as 
part of his non-ideal theory.  In fact, his work on non-ideal theory with respect to 
domestic society is quite sparse.  Instead, his major contribution is in the area of ideal 
theory.  But the legacy he left for non-ideal theory is his conception of an ideally just 
society.  In other words, Rawls gave us a blueprint of ideal justice and it is up to non-
ideal theory to figure out how the ideal may be achieved.  And it is precisely Rawls’s 
commitment to the ideal as fixed that makes his view of justice more appealing and 
convincing than Nagel’s.  In the next section, I turn my attention to Blake’s account of 
coercion and offer some criticisms. 
 
 
III. Blake on Coercion 
 Blake defends what he calls the liberal principle of autonomy.
115
  The principle 
of autonomy stands for the following proposition: all persons are entitled to live an 
autonomous life and, therefore, have a right “to those circumstances and conditions 
under which this is possible.”116  According to Blake, this principle is universal: it 
does not differentiate between citizens and foreigners, and “respects equally the 
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autonomy of all individuals.”117 The principle of autonomy, Blake claims, embraces 
the commitment to individual autonomy as a fundamental political value and extends 
an impartial recognition of the moral importance of everyone’s agency.118   
 Blake’s conception of autonomy embraces “a pluralistic picture of human 
agency” and construes human beings as agents capable of developing “specific plans, 
attachments and interests.”119  On this picture of autonomy, individual choices should 
reflect the values and ideals that persons endorse. For this to happen, Blake insists, the 
mere exercise of practical reason is not sufficient; the principle of autonomy 
additionally requires that the options available to persons “provide adequate materials 
within which to construct a plan of life that can be understood” as one’s own and not 
imposed from without.
120
  Moreover, concern for autonomy, on Blake’s view, does not 
demand that the set of options be maximized.   In fact, Blake maintains, beyond a 
baseline of adequacy in choice, autonomy does not “depend on the sheer number of 
options available.”121  Once adequacy is achieved, even a limited set of options, Blake 
contends, does not stand in the way of living an autonomous life; beyond a certain 
point, what matters more, from the standpoint of autonomy, is how a person comes to 
make her choices.  For Blake, to be an autonomous agent, it is essential to choose for 
oneself: to “live [one’s] own life from the inside, and to create value for [oneself] in 
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the world.”122  He maintains that when a person is forced to make a choice – even one 
that leads to a fulfilling life – her autonomy is, nevertheless, violated:  her will is 
“vitiated by another’s deliberate agency,” and, more importantly, she is denied the 
ability to construct a life that reflects her values.
123
 
 According to Blake, coercion is precisely the type of action that seeks to 
“replace the chosen option with the choice of another.”124  Coercion, for Blake, 
“expresses a relationship of domination” and violates the autonomy of the person 
coerced by replacing her agency “with the agency of another.”125  For this reason, he 
notes, coercive acts are “prima facie prohibited by the liberal principle of 
autonomy.”126  Blake, however, does not think that coercion in all forms is always 
morally prohibited because it contravenes individual autonomy.  Blake maintains that 
sometimes coercion is clearly morally justified: for instance, when a person is 
incarcerated for murder, we generally think that the murderer deserves to lose her 
freedom in this substantial way – and Blake does not disagree with this conviction.127  
But he notes that coercion gives rise to the problem of justification.  Because coercion 
“is necessarily an affront to autonomy,” whenever it is exercised, coercion has to be 
appropriately justified, for “otherwise [an] impermissible invasion of autonomy might 
                                                 
122
 Ibid., p. 270. 
 
123
 Ibid. 
 
124
 Ibid., p. 272. 
 
125
 Ibid. 
 
126
 Ibid. 
 
127
 Ibid. 
 
 149 
be legitimated.”128  Blake thus accepts that some forms of coercion are morally 
acceptable.  The basic issue for him is what would justify these seeming violations of 
autonomy?   
 Blake points to two areas of law where coercion has a ubiquitous presence: 
criminal law and private civil law.  Criminal law is something that straightforwardly 
requires a justification because it is so clearly and directly an affront to individual 
autonomy.  But, Blake notes, civil law is no less in need of such justification because 
it too involves coercion that is backed up by the full power and authority of the state.  
In the next section, I examine Blake’s discussion of the need to justify criminal and 
civil law, and pay special attention to the justification of civil law, since it is with 
respect to civil law that relative deprivations become relevant.  
Criminal law, Blake notes, clearly involves coercion.
129
  Individuals who 
committed a serious felony often end up going to prison for a very long time where 
their freedom is severely curtailed.  For Blake, imprisonment, as a form of punishment 
inflicted by the state, is a prima facie violation of the liberal principle of autonomy: 
the person incarcerated cannot lead an autonomous life because she is locked up in a 
prison.
130
  Blake argues that because state punishment is a violation of the principle of 
autonomy, it stands in need of a justification, and contends that the demand for such 
justification can be met through hypothetical consent.
131
  Hypothetical consent is a 
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method by which we can formulate possible ways of justifying state coercion, and so, 
according to Blake, when we ask whether imprisonment for murder is justified, we 
request “not what is consented to, at present, but what would be consented to, ex ante, 
under some appropriate method of modeling rational consent.”132  Blake, like Nagel, 
employs Scanlon’s rejection test as a way to characterize how deliberation about state 
coercion might proceed in a hypothetical choice situation.
133
  In seeking to justify 
punishment, we look to forms of punishment for criminal acts from which we cannot 
reasonably withhold our consent.
134
  Forms of punishment that are simply too 
abhorrent or disproportionate to the criminal act are rejected as unreasonable.  Once 
the right amount of punishment is found, consent is guaranteed because there is no 
longer any reason not to consent, and the punishment is ipso facto deemed justified.  
In the case of criminal law, the justification for punishment is directed at the person 
who is being punished.  Our collective response to the offender is that we are justified 
in punishing her because she herself, under the appropriate hypothetical 
circumstances, would have willed it this way.
135
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Blake’s approach to the justification of civil law also involves hypothetical 
consent.  He asserts that civil law stands in need of justification because it too – no 
less than criminal law – generates coercion.  Blake notes that property law, for 
instance, can trigger the use of force “against certain persons should they attempt to 
exercise control over certain goods” in a manner that is not legally sanctioned, and tax 
law involves the use of coercive threats if taxes are not paid when they are due.
136
  
According to Blake, what is common to these areas of the law is that a transfer of legal 
rights, from one party to another issued by the courts, is “ultimately enforced by 
coercive measures,” and if the defeated party refuses to conform to the judicial 
decision, she “risk[s]imprisonment for contempt.”137  We are, in other words, given 
the choice between surrendering our goods or our freedom, and for this reason, Blake 
claims, private civil law “stands in as much need of justification as the practice of 
punishment.”138 
Now, the justification of civil law appears to be different from that of criminal 
law.  As mentioned earlier, Blake thinks that justifying the punishment of person for 
violating a particular criminal law is about finding punishment that is commensurate 
with the seriousness of the criminal offense.  Civil law, however, has a different focus 
in that it is “directed at the protection of private entitlements.”139  Blake maintains that 
the system of laws that comprise civil law creates a pattern of entitlements: it says 
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what counts as property, which economic activities generate legitimate holdings and 
which do not.
140
  The significance of this is that in justifying the coercion involved in 
enforcing civil law, it is the pattern of holdings that has to be agreed to from the 
standpoint of hypothetical consent.   
Blake insists that since our aim is to justify a legal system, such justification 
has to be directed at and require the consent of “those who live lives the dimensions of 
which are defined within that system.”141 In other words, it is the citizens of a 
particular state who have to consent to the legal system and the pattern of entitlements 
that it creates.    But such consent will not be forthcoming, according to Blake, unless 
deliberation within the hypothetical choice situation reflects equal concern for the 
autonomy of all citizens.
142
  For there to be equal concern, considerations that seem to 
be arbitrary or not morally relevant have to be ruled out ex ante, since a choice that is 
based on them “could obviously be reasonably rejected by those [who are] 
disfavored.”143 Thus, for example, reasons that favor one’s own economic standing 
have to be ruled out as illegitimate.  Blake suggests that the way to model the 
hypothetical choice situation such that unanimous hypothetical consent is achieved is 
to use Rawls’s original position because the original position is precisely the kind of 
device that “abstracts away from morally arbitrary aspects of the individuals 
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considered.”144  Now, Blake contends that in justifying our system of civil laws, our 
ultimate aim is to develop principles, grounding our legal system, that no rational 
citizen could reasonably reject.  By employing Rawls’s device of the original position, 
we condition deliberation in such a way that the principles of justice that eventually 
emerge cannot be reasonably rejected and hence command unanimous consent.
145
   
Blake asserts that the fact that a system of civil laws has to be justified to 
citizens of a state brings up the issue of relative deprivations.
146
  Because the legal 
system has to be justified to all those who are subject to it, those citizens who fare 
worse than others on account of their economic holdings may have a reason to reject 
this particular system for an alternative one under which they would be better off 
economically.  To avoid this result, Blake insists, we have to offer reasons for 
accepting principles, underpinning the legal system, that the least advantaged could 
not reasonably reject.  This would involve demonstrating to the least advantaged that 
there is no other alternative remaining that would make them better off – if there were 
this would give them a reason to reject the current arrangement.  Blake argues that this 
process of deliberation will result in “material egalitarianism of the form expressed in 
the difference principle,” since under the difference principle there is no other more 
egalitarian arrangement that would make them better off. 
147
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The reason that relative deprivations are at issue is that differences in private 
holdings and entitlements have to be justified to the least advantaged who happen to 
be our compatriots.   As mentioned above, it is the least advantaged who have a reason 
to reject the legal system – and the division of economic goods that result from it – if 
there an alternative arrangement under which they are better off.  This means that the 
material egalitarianism that results from the deliberation process is in relation to the 
least advantaged of one’s own state, since they are the ones who have the power to 
veto the differences in economic holdings that cannot be reasonably justified to them.  
The poor who are not citizens of our state are not owed any justification because they 
not subject to our legal system; they have no right to veto the distribution of economic 
goods that is the product of our legal system, since our legal system plays no role in 
determining the bundle of economic goods that the global poor end up with.  But the 
case with our own citizens who are the least advantaged is different: their economic 
standing is determined by our legal system.  And so the egalitarianism that is called 
for by the principles that emerge from the original position is made necessary by the 
kinds of reasons that individual citizens can marshal against a regime that engages in 
prima facie violates of their autonomy.    
Blake may be right that citizens of a foreign state are not owed a justification 
from us because they are not subject to our legal system, and vice versa.  They are 
subject to the legal system of their own state, and are thus owed a justification for the 
material effects produced by that system.  The moral lesson to be drawn, for Blake, is 
that justification for the economic effects of coercion should be directed at citizens of 
a particular state because that is where this type of coercion appears to prevail.   
 155 
It may still be argued, however, that Blake has only covered coercion that is 
generated by the state.  But what about coercion that exists internationally?  Might not 
international coercion also create a need for justification that would require a more 
egalitarian distribution of economic goods?  Blake acknowledges that some coercion 
does go on internationally.
148
  But he claims that such coercion is quite different from 
what occurs within states.   Coercion that occurs internationally, Blake insists, is not 
something that can be “justified through an appeal to distributive shares.”149  He 
adduces several reasons for this.  First, “international legal institutions do not engage 
in coercive practices against individual human agents” – in other words, persons are 
not directly coerced.
150
  Furthermore, Blake adds, coercion that is generated by 
international institutions is not necessary for persons to lead autonomous lives.  People 
can go about their lives and engage in projects that are meaningful to them without in 
any way depending on the presence of coercion that occurs globally.  But Blake claims 
that state coercion functions differently.  The state coerces persons directly: if a person 
violates a legal norm, she may well face the prospect of losing her freedom.  
Moreover, coercion that is generated by the state is absolutely essential for individual 
autonomy: without it “the very ability to autonomously pursue our projects and plans 
seems impossible.”151 
                                                 
148
 Ibid., p. 280. 
 
149
 Ibid. 
 
150
 Ibid. 
 
151
 Ibid. 
 156 
For Blake, the two features of international coercion that distinguish it from 
state coercion are meant to show that justifying international coercion cannot be done 
by appealing to distributive shares.  However, it is not clear why this should be the 
case.  Why does it matter that persons can be autonomous without the presence of 
coercion internationally?  Blake is quite right that without state coercion, there would 
be too much social disorder and lawlessness for people to lead a life that is capable of 
supporting even a minimum level of autonomy.  Yet, this merely points out the fact 
that we need some amount of coercion to engender stability that is sufficient for us to 
live a normal life, and this amount is supplied by the state.  But what exactly does this 
say about international coercion other than the fact that, as autonomous agents, we can 
live without it?  Blake does not appear to have an answer to this question.  In fact, the 
claim that international coercion is not necessary for persons to be autonomous agents 
seems rather tangential to Blake’s account of coercion.  Recall that one of the basic 
claims he makes is that coercion is a prima facie violation of the liberal principle of 
autonomy and thus acts of coercion have to be justified to those agents who are being 
coerced.  Now, if Blake does acknowledge that there is international coercion, he also 
has to maintain that such coercion is a prima facie violation of the principle of 
autonomy and hence has to be justified.  But Blake says nothing positive about what 
such justification should look like; he simply suggests that whatever it is, it is not 
going to include any appeal to distributive shares.  But why not?  The fact that we do 
not, in principle, require international coercion to be autonomous agents does not 
appear to shed any light on why justifying international coercion, if it is to be justified 
 157 
at all, should not include distributive principles.  So what then is Blake’s argument 
against principles of redistribution that apply to the international arena?   
Blake does not appear to dispute that there is coercion internationally; he just 
thinks that it is unlike the coercion that is practiced by states.  In other words, for 
Blake, international coercion is somehow different from domestic coercion.   But so 
far this does not say anything interesting about international coercion: yes, it is 
different, but what are we to make of this difference? What makes Blake’s view of 
international coercion more problematic is that he does not do a good job in 
indentifying types of  behavior on the international stage that could be described as 
being coercive; Blake simply says that sometimes states act in coercive ways toward 
one another and often such actions have to be condemned outright rather than be given 
a justification.  But what exactly do states do to each other that can be regarded as 
being coercive?  Well, they wage wars, threaten economic sanctions to force 
concessions, confiscate the other’s property and other assets, etc.  Yet, this is not the 
kind of coercion that we have in mind when we discuss international coercion: these 
examples illustrate coercive acts that, for the most part, we think should be 
condemned.
152
  But focusing on this aspect of international coercion would give us an 
incomplete and, for this reason, a very inaccurate picture of the world.  There is plenty 
of coercion that occurs in the world, and we think that much of this should continue 
provided that such coercion is viewed as being acceptable or justified.  And it seems to 
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me that hypothetical consent can be a useful tool here as well as a way to examine 
whether in fact certain forms of international coercion can in principle be justified.  
The important thing to note here is that we have to look at the right forms of 
international coercion. 
Blake I think fails at this task of identifying examples of international coercion 
that seem genuinely worthy of our scrutiny because  – especially for relevant from the 
standpoint of justice.  He offers an example of two fictional states in order to illustrate 
why he thinks distributive principles have no place internationally.  The example goes 
as follows.  Borduria and Syldavia are states that are situated next to each other, but 
there is no contact of any sort between them.
153
  Borduria has terrific soil and develops 
“advanced techniques of farming.”   In Syldavia, on the other hand, the conditions for 
growing crops are not as good and its expertise in the agricultural sciences is not as 
advanced as that of Borduria.  Through the years Borduria becomes much more 
wealthy than Syldavia, which although poor can feed all of its people.  Then one day a 
citizen of Syldavia goes across the border into Borduria and discovers just how well 
the people of Borduria are in relation to Syldavia.  When the news of Borduria’s 
wealth travels to Syldavia, some Syldavians propose that the worst-off representative 
citizens, whether they are from Borduria or Syldavia, be made as well off as possible, 
expecting a transfer of wealth from Borduria to Syldavia.  At this point, Blake has the 
following question in mind:  may the Bordurians justifiably reject this proposal?  His 
answer is that of course they may because Borduria and Syldavia do not share a 
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common legal system.
154
  Blake complicates the example somewhat by assuming that 
Borduria and Syldavia trade with each other.  The trade, however, does not bridge the 
economic gap between the two states, and so the same question arises, should the 
Bordurians worry about the worst-off in Syldavia.  Blake’s answer, once again, is that 
the Bordurians do not have to concern themselves with the relative deprivations in 
Syldavia.  The reason for this is that trade does not engender a shared coercive system.   
Both Borduria and Syldavia may choose not to trade with the other at any time 
because neither is forced to participate in trade.
155
         
The problem with the thought-experiment is that it cannot be extrapolated to 
apply to the international sphere.  It is conceivable that trade between two independent 
states can take place without coercion, as Blake describes it.  However, it would be a 
serious mistake to think that this is how international trade in fact functions.  In 
Blake’s example, trade between Borduria and Syldavia is not unlike individuals 
exchanging goods on the open market.  In such simple exchanges, person A makes an 
offer to sell her wine to B, and B can either accept, reject, or make a counter-offer to 
A. B is clearly not forced to respond in any particular way and is free to exercise any 
of the options that are open to her.  Blake’s example in its simplicity appears to mimic 
such basic interactions.  The drawback to this approach is that international trade 
cannot be reduced to such simple transactions.  Blake’s example on its own thus does 
not prove that there is no coercion involved in international trade because the analogy 
to international trade fails.  (Blake might have fared better by directly describing 
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international trade and then arguing that it is not coercive or coercive in the way that 
states are, but he does not do this.)     
   Thus the example does not work to show that there is no coercion in 
international trade.  Blake, nevertheless, appears to distinguish coercion that is 
exercised by international institutions from coercion that is exercised by states.  If he 
is right that these differences imply that international coercion cannot be justified in 
terms of distributive principles, then it does not matter in the end whether he 
misconceives the coercive nature of international trade; even if we presume that 
international trade engenders coercion and therefore should be subject to a 
justification, such justification would still not involve redistribution because the 
coercion involved is practiced by international agents, not states.        
The problem with Blake’s position is that the distinction between international 
and domestic coercion does not amount to an argument against an appeal to 
distributive principles in justifying international coercion.  The fact that international 
coercion is indirect and something that is not necessary for our individual autonomy 
does not yet tell us why we should eschew distributive principles.  If there is an 
argument, a big piece still seems to be missing in Blake’s analysis of international 
coercion.   
Perhaps what Blake is trying to say is that international coercion does not 
affect the distribution of economic holdings that individuals have - in other words, it 
does not shape the pattern of individual entitlements.  It does not do this because it 
directly affects states, not persons, and so whatever effect international coercion has, 
this is kept at the level of states.  Moreover, as Blake insists, we seem capable of 
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carrying on as autonomous agents without the help of international coercion.  That we 
can carry on in this way suggests that we already have the entitlements that make it 
possible for us to function as autonomous agents, and these entitlements are delivered 
to us by our state’s legal system – primarily by its system of civil laws, as Blake 
maintains.   
Thus one can argue that Blake’s distinction between domestic and international 
coercion has two basic implications: (1) the effects of international coercion are 
directed only at states (and so individual citizens are not in any way affected), and (2) 
the state via its legal system is capable of providing entitlements to its citizens that are 
sufficient to render them autonomous.  The question before us is: do these 
propositions, either alone or together, amount to an argument against an appeal to 
distributive principles in justifying international coercion?  
 Now if Blake is right that what happens internationally affects only states and 
so does not trickle down to the level of individual citizens, then this would offer us a 
powerful reason for thinking that an appeal to distributive principles is misplaced: if 
international coercion does not affect individuals in any way, then a fortiori it does not 
affect the division of their entitlements.  The problem with this assertion, however, is 
that it is not empirically sound, as I will argue.  To suppose that international coercion 
is something that takes place only among states is to misconceive the complexity of 
the international sphere: even if at times coercion is directed at states, they are by no 
means the only agents that are affected; when states are forced to do something, this 
often involves a corresponding change to their laws and institutions, and this, of 
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course, means that individual citizens will be affected as well.  International coercion 
cannot be contained in the way that Blake thinks that it can.
156
 
The significance of the proposition about the sufficiency of state generated 
entitlements is even less clear.  Blake is right that we can be autonomous without the 
presence of coercion internationally.  But how is this morally relevant?  Perhaps the 
idea is that it is the state that supplies us with the bulk of the economic goods that we 
possess.  In other words, our socioeconomic standing is primarily the result of the 
pattern of entitlements that is generated through the legal enforcement of our domestic 
system of civil laws.
157
   Whether we are rich or poor is thus the product of the 
coercive conduct of our state.  What is implied here is that international coercion does 
not appear to contribute in a substantial way to our overall economic standing.  If this 
is in fact the case, as is being suggested by this line of thinking, then it would not 
make sense to justify international coercive by appealing to distributive shares.  
Fiddling around about what would be an appropriate share would seem misguided 
because international coercion just does not generate entitlements that are allocated to 
individual citizens.  (An analogy to justifying criminal law might be apt here.  In the 
case of criminal law, what justifies putting a person into prison for a lengthy period is 
that she herself would have consented to such punishment when deliberating under the 
right sorts of conditions.  It would be silly to bring in distributive shares because the 
objective is to find punishment that is commensurate to the crime; if the punishment is 
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unjust because it is too harsh, for example, making the offender economically better 
off will not make the punishment just.  Similarly, international coercion does not 
affect individual entitlements and thus appealing to distributive shares would commit 
one to a categorical mistake in the way that it does in the case of justifying criminal 
laws.)      
The line of reasoning suggested above seems to assume that international 
coercion has little or no effect on or bears no significant relation to our economic 
standing.  But this assumption conceals a certain ambiguity.  There are two ways in 
which international coercion might not affect our individual economic standing.  One 
explanation might be that such coercion is not involved in generating any kind of 
economic output.  This is not to suggest that transnational activities are not 
economically productive – this would be false.  Rather, the suggestion is simply that 
coercion does not figure into these transnational economic activities.  A different 
explanation might be that international coercion does not create a system of 
entitlements that distributes economic goods to persons.  Here there is no need to deny 
that international coercion plays a role in generating economic goods; what is being 
claimed instead is that such coercion does not determine how such economic goods 
are distributed – that may be the function of a domestic system of civil laws.   
If the first explanation is right, then it follows trivially that it makes no sense to 
appeal to distributive shares in justifying international coercion: it is futile to appeal to 
distributive shares because international coercion is not in any way connected to the 
production of economic goods that are then subject to a pattern of division – in other 
words, there is nothing to divide and thus no particular way to divide in a manner that 
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seems more rather than less fair.  On the other hand, if the second explanation is right, 
then the reason for eschewing distributive shares is not because there is nothing to 
distribute.  Rather, the mechanism for division is something other than the coercive 
international system – for instance, it may be a state enforced system that determines 
the division.  And so if we think the division of these economic goods should be 
justified, the target of the justification has to be the state system, not the international 
system, which has nothing to do with how economic goods are distributed in the first 
place. 
The assumptions that underlie the first explanation cannot be supported 
empirically.  The international trade regime is clearly responsible for generating an 
economic output that is significant.  But this system is also coercive, and so it would 
be a mistake to deny that coercion at the international level is entirely divorced from 
the economic activities that are conducted by international regimes.
158
 
The assumptions involved in the second explanation are also incorrect.  The 
basic thrust of these assumptions is that coercion that exists internationally does not 
give rise to a pattern of entitlements that affects individual citizens.  However, as I will 
argue below, this is just not the case.  Coercive international regimes do indeed set up 
patterns of entitlement.  In certain cases, depending on which international regime is at 
issue, individuals are directly affected by the way in which economic entitlements are 
divided.  But in most cases, this effect is more indirect.  To see how persons are 
affected by coercive international regimes, it is essential to understand how 
international coercion works in conjunction with domestic coercion.  I suggest it is not 
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right to think that international coercion gives rise to one set of entitlements and state-
based coercion creates another, entirely separate, set of entitlements.  Instead, what I 
think happens in certain cases is that international and domestic coercion work in 
concert to set up a scheme of entitlements that affects both states and individual 
citizens.  And if we think that this pattern has to be justified, then international and 
domestic coercion have to be examined together from the standpoint of hypothetical 
consent.   
In the next section, I briefly illustrate how international coercion works in 
tandem with domestic coercion to create a pattern of entitlements, one that affects 
individual citizens in a rather profound way.        
There are numerous international regimes and cooperative ventures, and they 
exhibit great differences in their organization, administration, and the objectives they 
pursue.  Discussing all these regimes and systematizing them so that a single 
comprehensive picture emerges is an impossible task.  Instead, I focus on a specific 
regime, which would allow me to make the argument that international coercion does 
give rise to considerations of distributive justice.  The regime I have in mind is the 
system of international intellectual property and in particular the Trade-Related 
Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (or TRIPS) Agreement that is part of the World 
Trade Organization (or WTO). 
The purpose behind the TRIPS agreement, as stated by the WTO
159
, is to 
provide a set of minimum standards that globalize a system of intellectual property 
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rights so that owners of intellectual property are given protections in all WTO member 
states – which amounts to most of the world, since as of now the WTO consists of 153 
members out of 193 internationally recognized countries.
160
  TRIPS came into 
enforcement in 1995, at the end of WTO’s Uruguay Round of Ministerial negotiations.  
The history of the Uruguay Round and how the TRIPS agreement came into existence 
is quite complicated and I cannot go into its details here.
161
  What I want to do here is 
to briefly discuss just how coercive the TRIPS agreement is and mention one of the 
outcomes of its enforcement, which I suggest affects individual entitlements of 
ordinary citizens from the member states.   
One important result of TRIPS is that all pharmaceutical products receive 
protection under its patent system.  What is significant about this is that several major 
developing countries, including India, Brazil, South Africa, as well as others, 
historically did not extend patent protection to medicines.
162
  Once TRIPS came into 
force, to remain members in good standing, these countries had to change their 
national laws on pharmaceutical products in order to bring them in compliance with 
the minimum standards established by the agreement.  TRIPS allowed developing 
countries a certain period of time – called a transitional period – for bringing their 
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laws into compliance, and only at the end of this transitional period would they be 
legally bound to provide protection for all pharmaceutical products that have been 
granted a patent locally.
163
  
One effect of bringing medicines into the fold of patent protection is an 
increase in the price of certain essential drugs.
164
  The reason for this is that the owner 
of the patent for the drug has an exclusive right, for up to twenty years, to manufacture 
and distribute its product, which allows it to charge a monopoly price.
165
   As the price 
of essential drugs goes up in developing countries, they become less accessible to the 
general public, but, it is the poor in these countries who are the hardest hit as essential 
drugs become virtually out of reach for them.  Prior to TRIPS affordability was less of 
an issue in many developing countries.  India and Brazil, in particular, had fledgling 
pharmaceutical industries that had gotten very good in reverse engineering and were 
able to produce generic versions of patented drugs at affordable prices.
166
  These 
generic versions of patented drugs were also exported to other poor and developing 
countries that did not have the manufacturing capacity to produce generic drugs 
locally.   
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TRIPS put an end to the freewheeling days of the past when companies in 
India and Brazil could freely mass produce patented drugs and sell them both 
domestically and abroad without incurring legal repercussions.  As of January 1, 2006, 
when India’s patent laws with respect to medicines became effective, India became 
legally obligated to review patent applications for pharmaceutical products and grant a 
patent if the product met the requirements for patentability.
167
  If India were to fail to 
bring its patent laws up to par with the standards contained in TRIPS, it would likely 
have faced legal action, within the WTO, from any member state that thought that 
India was not living up to its legal obligations under the Agreement.
168
  The WTO has 
set up an elaborate dispute settlement mechanism to allow member states to overcome 
their differences of opinion with regard to matters that are trade related.   This dispute 
settlement mechanism uses a procedure for resolving disputes that proceeds in stages.  
When a complaint is lodged by one member against another, the disputing parties are 
initially required to try to reach an agreement or come to some sort of a settlement on 
their own.
169
  If after a certain period of time they fail to reach an agreement, the 
dispute then enters a quasi-judicial phase: a WTO Panel is formed, which hears 
arguments from both sides and delivers a written opinion whether there was a 
violation of any of the WTO rules.
170
  Once the Panel has issued its report, the parties 
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to the dispute may accept the Panel’s findings, at which point the matter is considered 
settled.  However, if one of the members disagrees with the Panel’s decision, it may 
request that the Panel’s rulings be reviewed by an Appellate Body to examine whether 
legal errors were made by the Panel.
171
  When a request is made for a judicial review, 
the Appellate Body issues its own report, which may either fully affirm or reverse, or 
partially affirm and reverse the Panel’s decision.  The Appellate Body’s decision is 
final and binding on the disputing parties.  If there is a finding that a violation was 
made, the non-complying party has to make all the necessary changes to its national 
laws to bring them into compliance.  If the member state found to be in violation fails 
to remove it after a certain period, the WTO may permit the member state that has 
been wronged to take retaliatory action against the violator – and this can last as long 
as the state remains non-compliant.
172
 
To come  back to our example of India, if India’s patent regime were to fail to 
recognize the patentability of medicines, there would be a legal challenge to this 
coming probably from the U.S. or the European Community, since the majority of 
pharmaceutical products under a patent originate in these places.  If India were to defy 
the final decision of the Appellate Body – assuming the decision finds India in 
violation of TRIPS – India would then face sanctions as a consequence of its non-
compliance.  In actuality, India has brought its patent regime pretty much in line with 
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the standards in TRIPS.
173
  What this means is that ordinary Indians are subject to 
Indian patent laws, which if they were to violate them would make them liable to 
criminal prosecution.  But more importantly, in my mind, these laws will raise the 
price of patented medicines, including those deemed to be essential, to point that will 
make it very difficult for the poor in India, which after all still make up the majority of 
the population, to afford these medicines.  Even if we assume that the state will try to 
subsidize the poor through a national health care system, India still does not have the 
resources to absorb these price differences in their entirety, and so there will be certain 
medicines that will either not be subsidized or be subsidized insufficiently thereby 
inevitably increasing the economic burden on the poor.  And I think the same can be 
said for the other developing member states in the WTO.   
Notice that this decrease in accessibility to essential drugs is a product of 
domestic coercion: it is the national laws of a state that mandate the patentability of 
pharmaceutical products.  Furthermore, this added burden on the poor illustrates the 
fact that the coercive enforcement of the patent regime of the sort that we have been 
considering will affect the bundle of economic goods that a citizen gets to have.  A 
poor farmer in India or a miner in Brazil may have to spend a lot more of her already 
meager income to obtain a patented drug, or face an early death or a life that is riddled 
with chronic pain and discomfort.   
Now it is indeed the case that this is a product of domestic law – of India’s 
patent regime, for example.  And this might suggest that Blake’s claim that 
international coercion does not affect the individual has not been shown to be wrong.  
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But to suggest that my example of TRIPS does not challenge the view that 
international coercion is something that only affects states is to betray a certain kind of 
shortsightedness.  India, and other developing members states, were essentially made 
to comply with TRIPS; they had no choice but to do this.  Without making their 
national laws conform, these states would face retaliatory action in the form of trade 
sanctions or be booted out of the WTO completely.  Leaving the WTO is in principle 
possible, but it is not a viable option for developing states that are interested in 
nurturing the export-led sectors of their  economies, a policy goal that is essential for 
long-term economic growth.  Outside the WTO, exports coming from the developing 
world can be effectively kept out from the markets of industrialized and developed 
countries by the imposition of very high tariffs at the border.  What I think this shows 
is that to understand how it is that certain essential medicines are becoming less 
accessible to the poor in India and Brazil we cannot simply look at the national laws of 
India or Brazil because these laws themselves are a product of coercion, one that takes 
place at the level of the WTO.  We have to recognize that less access is the result of 
national laws in conjunction with states being forced to comply with the standards 
announced in TRIPS.  In other words, less access to essential medicines is a result of 
both international and domestic coercion.  What this implies, which I think should be 
clear by now, is that both types of coercion have to be justified to those individuals 
who are subject to them, and such justification may have to involve principles of 
distributive justice, since the economic prospects of individual citizens seem to be 
affected in quite a  profound way. 
 172 
The TRIPS example I think illustrates that the assertions made by Blake about 
the nature of international coercion are not entirely right.  Contra Blake, international 
coercion does seem to  generate outcomes that reach down to the level of individual 
citizens and alter their economic wellbeing in a pretty significant way.  And this fact 
about international coercion also compels the need to justify it for the sake of having a 
just trade regime.  I have not said what such a justification would look like.  My point 
here is simply that there has to be a justification and it has to involve distributive 
justice as a consequence of the way persons are affected by the global trade regime.
174
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 In another paper, I offer a much more detailed discussion of the TRIPS Agreement, suggest 
a way to deal with the problem of access to essential medicines, and argue that we are 
obligated to make the international trade regime more just and one to do this is to ensure that 
the global poor have access to the medicines they need without  being unreasonably burdened.   
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CHAPTER 4 
 
International Intellectual Property, Coercion, and the Need for a Conception of Global 
Justice 
 
 
Introduction 
The World Trade Organization (WTO), though still relatively young, has 
created an impressive international trade regime that is rule-based and which 
implements a multilateral mechanism for legally enforcing trade obligations.  Member 
states that refuse to satisfy their membership obligations are usually sanctioned and 
incur heavy penalties if they persist in remaining noncompliant.  It is generally 
acknowledged that to enforce its rules the WTO engages in coercion.  Domestic legal 
coercion has received a great deal of attention in the philosophical literature in recent 
years.  Influenced by John Rawls’s work on conceptions of justice for domestic 
society, some writers have proposed a line of argument that maintains that the very 
purpose of a liberal conception of justice is to justify domestic legal coercion to those 
who are subject to it.
1
  But when it comes to the international sphere, there is some 
reluctance on the part of these same writers to view coercion that exists internationally 
in the same light.  Somehow international coercion is different and thus does not merit 
the kind of justification that is called for its domestic counterpart.   
                                                 
1 The most prominent I take to be the following.  See Thomas Nagel, “The Problem of Global 
Justice,” Philosophy and Public Affairs, 33, no. 2 (2005): pp. 113-147; Michael Blake, 
“Distributive Justice, State Coercion, and Autonomy,” Philosophy and Public Affairs, 30, no. 
3 (2002), pp. 257-296; Richard. W. Miller, “Cosmopolitan Respect and Patriotic Concern,” 
Philosophy and Public Affairs, Summer 1998, 27(3),  pp. 202-224; David Miller, “Against 
Global Egalitarianism,” Journal of Ethics,  (2005) 9: pp. 55-79. 
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I think that this view is mistaken and maintain that there is much coercion in 
the international realm that is in need of being justified.  I argue for this position by 
examining how the WTO administers the international intellectual property regime 
through the Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights 
(TRIPS).  I suggest that if we look carefully enough at the intellectual property 
regime, we will find that compliance on the part of individual member states with the 
standards of protection announced in the Agreement has important implications for the 
kind of access to essential medicines that individual citizens of these states appear to 
have.  In light of these implications, I maintain that the appropriate response to the 
WTO administered intellectual property regime is to apply a conception of justice, 
albeit an attenuated one, that attempts to justify these effects on individual wellbeing.  
I suggest that such a justification may involve some form of economic redistribution.  
Furthermore, I propose that the content of the justification does not vary with respect 
to how individual participants within the WTO – i.e. actual citizens from member 
countries – are politically situated with respect to one another.  Thus, I disagree with 
Thomas Nagel, who thinks that what we owe one another as participants of a coercive 
enterprise, depends on how we are politically connected.
2
  Contra Nagel, I contend 
that the mere fact of coercion is sufficient to trigger the requirement for a justification 
that appeals to a conception of justice, irrespective of how we stand to one another, 
politically speaking.  Furthermore, as participants in a system of cooperation that also 
happens to be structurally unjust, we have an obligation to transform and rid the 
system of these injustices.  I defend the attribution of such an obligation by invoking 
                                                 
2 See Nagel, “The Problem of Global Justice.”  For a more extensive discussion of his view, 
see infra, pp. 42-52.  
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the notion of collective responsibility, though the magnitude or extent of such 
responsibility is sensitive to how individual members of a coercive enterprise are 
treated by their polity.  In certain cases, individuals may be entirely exempt from 
collective responsibility. 
The paper is divided into three major parts.  In the first, I give some historical 
background to the international intellectual property system and explain some of the 
basic provisions of the TRIPS Agreement.  Next, I discuss what individual member 
countries have to do to bring their national laws into compliance with TRIPS, and 
argue how this leads to increasingly higher prices of patented essential medicines.  In 
the second part, I put forward a partial justification of the international intellectual 
system – it is partial because I only address the effect that the TRIPS Agreement has 
on access to essential medicines.  Next, I discuss possible objections that may be 
adduced against my view and respond to them.  I then offer a detailed discussion of 
collective responsibility and rely on David Miller’s substantial contributions to this 
topic as my starting point.  I propose how collective responsibility can encumber us 
with the obligation to remedy injustice, and then relate my discussion of collective 
responsibility to the subject of access to essential medicines.  I also examine several 
ways that persons may be exempt from collective responsibility.  I apply these 
exemptions to the problem of access and draw certain conclusions about what may be 
owed by WTO participants – those who are not exempt – to ease some of the burden, 
falling on the most vulnerable citizens of member states, that stems from 
implementing the TRIPS Agreement.  In the third part, I briefly discuss the WTO’s 
requirement that members states move to liberalize their domestic trade policies, and 
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contend that the requirement may rest on rather dubious empirical claims.  I propose 
that the WTO should be much more cautious when it comes to pushing states toward 
greater liberalization, and embrace a more balanced approach to trade, one that is in 
line with new insights, from economic growth theory, that emphasize the importance 
of good institutions for sustainable economic development.    
 
A. The Intellectual Property Regime 
The Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights – or 
TRIPS, as it is more commonly known – is one of three major trade agreements that 
are administered by the World Trade Organization (WTO).
3
  The WTO has been the 
centerpiece of the current trade system when it came into existence in 1995, but the 
international trade regime dates back to an earlier period.  Since 1948, the General 
Agreement on Trade and Tariffs (or GATT) provided many of the rules for the 
international trade regime, and quickly became the unofficial, or de facto, forum for 
members states to resolve their trade disputes.
4
  
 GATT established a multilateral trade system that gradually liberalized trade 
through the ministerial rounds of trade negotiations.  Originally, GATT was meant to 
                                                 
3 The other two major trade agreement s are the General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs, or 
GATT 1994, and the General Agreement on Trade and Services, or GATS.  The Dispute 
Settlement Understanding is also part of the WTO, but the DSU does not deal with substantive 
trade issues; instead it offers a comprehensive procedure for settling trade disputes between 
member states.  All members of the WTO are required to ratify the three basic trade-related 
agreements and the DSU.  The WTO also contains plurilateral trade agreements, but their 
ratification is optional. 
 
4
 At the time, states could only bring up their disputes with respect to trade in goods, since the 
only agreement available until 1995 was GATT, which deals only with trade in goods. 
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be administered by the International Trade Organization  (ITO), which was intended to 
be the third and final “Bretton Woods” institution, overseeing the regulation of 
international economic cooperation.
5
  Yet, the ITO’s mandate was very ambitious, 
extending well beyond issues related to international trade and commerce.   The U.S. 
Congress, wary of the ITO’s mandate, for it threatened to assume responsibility over 
areas that were traditionally within the Congress’s purview, defeated any attempt to 
create the organization by refusing to pass the necessary domestic legislation.
6
  GATT, 
however, was signed in 1947 by twenty-three countries, and was to be provisionally 
applied until the ITO came into existence.  But since the ITO never did, GATT 
assumed the ITO’s role of regulating international trade, which lasted until the 
emergence of the WTO.  For the next forty-seven years, GATT, as the de facto 
organization, presided over international trade liberalization.  Over the years, GATT 
underwent several transformations during the ministerial rounds of negotiations – of 
which the Uruguay Round was the most important.  But it was becoming increasingly 
clear by the 1980’s that GATT, both procedurally and substantively, was ineffective in 
dealing with many of the challenges posed by international trade.
7
  It was by then a 
foregone conclusion that a significant transformation of the entire trade system had to 
take place.
8
  The Uruguay Round was launched as a way to achieve this radical 
                                                 
5 Daniel Gervais, The TRIPS Agreement: Drafting History and Analysis, London: Sweet & 
Maxwell, 2003. 
 
6 Ibid, p. 38. 
 
7 Ibid. 
 
8 Ibid. 
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transformation in order to make the trade system more capable of solving the 
complexities of transnational economic cooperation.    
The Uruguay Round was considered the most ambitious ministerial round to 
date.  The Round began in 1986 and ended only in 1994, and managed to bring about 
some of the most important changes in the history of the modern trade system.
9
  At the 
end of the Uruguay Round, the WTO was unrolled as the official forum for members 
states to deal with their trade disputes – and the promise of a permanent international 
trade organization was finally fulfilled.
10
  In addition, the Dispute Settlement 
Understanding (DSU) was incorporated into the WTO, addressing the need to have 
binding and enforceable decisions resolving trade disagreements.  Finally, three major 
agreements were made part of the WTO: GATT, with some important revisions to the 
original agreement; the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS), thus 
extending the scope of WTO jurisdiction over trade in services; and TRIPS.
11
   
For the purposes of this paper, TRIPS is the more relevant agreement because, 
as I will argue, its implementation affects access to essential medicines globally.  But 
before I expand on this particular topic, let me briefly describe how the TRIPS 
Agreement came about and explain some of its basic provisions so as to place the 
Agreement in a proper light. 
 
                                                 
9 John H. Jackson, The Jurisprudence of GATT and WTO, Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2000. 
 
10 Ibid. 
 
11 Ibid. 
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1. Negotiating the TRIPS Agreement     
When the TRIPS Agreement finally emerged out of the Uruguay Round and 
came into force in 1995,  it quickly became one of the most controversial aspects of 
the international trade system.
12
  But the furor over TRIPS came much earlier, when 
the participants of the Uruguay Round began to contemplate for the first time the 
inclusion of an intellectual property regime within the WTO.
13
  The TRIPS 
Agreement, as it currently stands, universalizes the protection of intellectual property 
rights.  It does this by setting forth minimum standards of protection for intellectual 
property that all members of the WTO have to eventually apply.
14
  Members are free 
to offer more stringent standards of protection domestically – by extending protection 
to areas of intellectual property not recognized by TRIPS – but they are required to 
adopt and enforce the minimum standards contained in the Agreement.
15
  But it was 
                                                 
12 Carlos Maria Correa, Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights: A Commentary 
on the TRIPS Agreement, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002. 
 
13 Carlos Maria Correa, Intellectual Property Rights, WTO, and Developing Countries, 
London: Zed Books, 1999. 
 
14 The TRIPS Agreement does not require that states have to implement  these standards at the 
same time.   Developed states had a year from the time the Agreement came into force to 
make the necessary changes to bring their national laws in compliance with these minimum 
standards.  Developing states could claim an additional ten years to ensure compliance.  Least 
developed states have until 2016 to comply with TRIPS.  I explain these transitional periods 
later in the paper.   
 
15
 The protection of intellectual property in TRIPS is not recognized, at least officially, as an 
end itself but as a means to further liberalize international trade.  As the Preamble to the 
agreement states, the new rules and principles (contained in TRIPS) are meant to “reduce 
distortions and impediments to international trade” by promoting both “effective and adequate 
protection of intellectual property rights” and by ensuring that “measures and procedures to 
enforce intellectual property rights do not themselves become barriers to legitimate trade.” 
The Preamble thus turns intellectual property into an issue of international trade.  Several 
developing countries, at the onset of the Uruguay Round, argued that intellectual property 
should be kept out of the ambit of the WTO precisely because it had little or no connection to 
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not always clear, especially at the beginning of the Uruguay Round, whether there was 
even going to be an agreement on intellectual property, and if there were to be such an 
agreement, what form it would take.
16
 
The Uruguay Round was initially scheduled to last only four years, beginning 
in 1986; instead, it took an additional three years to bring to a close.
17
  To some extent, 
this was to be expected, given the Round’s ambitious plan to tackle multiple problems 
that were lingering for years and with respect to which there was great divergence of 
opinion.  Intellectual property was one of these contentious issues over which people 
were divided from the very beginning of the Round.  When the negotiations 
commenced, prospects for an intellectual property agreement seemed dismal.
18
  
Between 1986 and 1989, there was little progress on even the basics of what it would 
mean for the WTO to involve itself in a global intellectual property regime.
19
  The 
“Group of Ten” developing countries, led by Brazil and India, resisted the inclusion of 
                                                                                                                                            
trade.  Indeed, for these developing countries any agreement on intellectual property was 
simply a way for developed North to extract income from the developing South – a form of 
regressive redistribution.  To justify the inclusion of an agreement on intellectual property, 
developing countries, in particular the US and the EC, had to make a case that international 
trade does indeed involve intellectual property .  And this point is made in explicit terms in the 
Preamble. 
   
16 Correa, Intellectual Property Rights, WTO, and Developing Countries, pp 101-36; Gervais, 
The TRIPS Agreement, pp. 45-60. 
 
17 Gail E. Evans, “Intellectual Property as a Trade Issue: The Making of the Agreement on 
Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights,” World Competition : Law and 
Economics Review 18(2) Dec. 1994 : pp. 137-180. 
 
18 Ibid., pp. 166-167. 
 
19 Ibid. 
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intellectual property in any trade agreement.
20
  These developing countries were 
skeptical of the notion that the protection of intellectual property was essential for or 
would lead to greater liberalization and openness in international trade.  They argued 
that, on the contrary, there was no direct connection between protection of intellectual 
property and international trade.
21
  India, for instance, claimed that the enforcement of 
intellectual property, by granting monopoly rights to the owners of the intellectual 
property, would create distortions and impediments to actual trade.
22
   
Developing countries also feared that intellectual property protection would 
hinder their economic development.  For them, minimum standards had the potential 
to diminish their sovereign power to pursue policies of economic development by 
limiting access to technology that they needed to modernize.
23
  They argued that to 
achieve their goals of economic development and technological modernization, they 
had to retain the ability to set their own standards, which where necessary would have 
to provide a much lower level of protection than that offered by the industrialized 
North.
24
  India, for instance, was worried that patent owners might misuse their right 
by not working their patent in a host country, and so insisted that there had to be a 
right to compulsory licensing to ensure that important technological innovations were 
                                                 
20 Ibid. 
 
21 Correa, Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, pp. 120-145. 
 
22 Byasdeb Dasgupta, WTO & TRIPS: Indian Perspective, Kolkata, West Bengal: University 
of Kalyani, 2003, pp. 60-88. 
 
23 Correa, Intellectual Property Rights, WTO, and Developing Countries, pp. 22-56. 
 
24 Ibid. 
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made available domestically.
25
  India also took the position that certain key exceptions 
be made under patent and trade-mark law: it wanted the provisions relating to patents 
to have the flexibility to exclude pharmaceuticals and chemicals from protection, 
shorten the term of protection, and grant licenses to companies to exploit patents for 
the domestic market.
26
   
The industrialized states, on the other hand, countered that trade in counterfeit 
and patent infringing products and outright commercial piracy of protected materials 
were interfering with international commerce in legitimate goods and eroding 
company profits.
27
  The developed countries presented this as an issue about fairness: 
those in developing countries who engaged in such conduct were free-riding on the 
enormous expenditures made by companies, as well as governments, in creating 
innovations that were enjoyed throughout the world.
28
  Thus, from the standpoint of 
the industrialized states, it seemed only fair that developing countries, with access to 
products from the North, should pay the “right” price and reward the innovators.  In 
addition, the developed world invoked the usual mantra that protection of intellectual 
property is good for developing countries as well: this way the needed technological 
products would continue to enter the South and eventually stimulate local innovation.  
But as some have argued, the leading industrialized countries were really interested in 
                                                 
25 Dasgupta, WTO & TRIPS: Indian Perspective, pp. 70-88. 
 
26 Evans, “Intellectual Property as a Trade Issue,” p. 167. 
 
27 Susan Sell, Private Power, Public Law: The Globalization of Intellectual Property Rights, 
Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2003, pp. 78-120. 
 
28 Ibid. 
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protecting the commercial interests of some of their largest and wealthiest companies 
– talk of local innovation in the South was just a pretext.29         
     Two years into the negotiations, when the Uruguay Round opened in 
Montreal in 1988, the debate between the developing and the industrialized countries 
continued unabated and threatened to derail any hope of achieving an agreement on 
intellectual property, until Norway, Sweden, Denmark, and Finland intervened to 
point out that most states participating in the Round remained committed to 
negotiating an agreement on intellectual property.
30
  By April 1989, the negotiations 
turned a corner.  Several developing states, including India, eased their resistance to 
negotiating an agreement within the framework of the Uruguay Round and accepted 
that GATT could have jurisdiction over intellectual property.
31
  This prompted the 
negotiations to enter a more intensive phase, and discussions began to be held on the 
standards of intellectual property.  A framework agreement was later introduced 
                                                 
29 US policy at the Round was heavily influenced by IPC, an organization with a lobbying arm 
that represented the interests of major US corporations.  The US – and the EC as well – was 
really looking after the bottom line of some of its largest corporation in pushing for a much 
more expansive intellectual property regime.  See Sell, Private Power, Public Law, pp. 101-
120. 
   
30 Evans, “Intellectual Property as a Trade Issue,” pp. 169-172. 
 
31 Recall that at this point, the WTO was still not in existence, and it was the GATT that 
functioned as the de facto organization for international trade.  So the debate over jurisdiction 
was really about whether an organization that was dealing with international trade should also 
regulate intellectual property.  Countries like Brazil and India felt that there already was an 
organization designed to handle intellectual property, and that was the World Intellectual 
Property Organization (WIPO).  In the end under pressure from the US and the EC, India and 
Brazil gave up on their insistence that WIPO be in charge of intellectual property protection.  
See Sell, Private Power, Public Law, pp. 45-80. 
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spelling out the minimum standards for the availability, scope, and use of intellectual 
property rights and the methods for their enforcement.
32
 
Having turned the corner, the GATT negotiating team was able for the first 
time to debate the details of the proposed new rules.
33
 Forty-nine proposals were 
submitted for review, including one by India, which was still worried about the abuse 
that might accompany the granting of monopoly rights.
34
  The EC tabled a proposal 
that accelerated dramatically the work toward the TRIPS Agreement.  Entitled “Draft 
Agreement on Trade-Related Aspect of Intellectual Property Rights,” the proposal 
covered all forms of intellectual property rights, their acquisition and enforcement, and 
the application of basic GATT principles, such as the most-favored nation status and 
national treatment, in treaty language.
35
  The U.S. offered its own draft proposal under 
the same title and similar in language to its European counterpart.
36
  The common 
structure put forward by both proposals served as the basis for the emerging 
agreement.  A group of twelve developing states, later joined by Pakistan and 
Zimbabwe, offered their own draft agreement.
37
   
By early 1990, the TRIPS negotiating group had examined all of the submitted 
proposals, registered many of the major concerns of the various participants, and 
                                                 
32 Evans, , “Intellectual Property as a Trade Issue,” pp. 169-172. 
 
33 Ibid., p. 171. 
34 Ibid. 
35 Ibid. 
36 Gervais, The TRIPS Agreement, 18-25. 
37 Ibid., p.18. 
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delineated some of the key differences that still remained, especially between the 
developed and developing countries.  Later in the year, Lars Arnell, who was the Chair 
of the TRIPS negotiating group, circulated a document, called the “Composite Draft 
Text,” presented the main proposals on the table, along with their differences, and 
placed the negotiations on a single path.
38
  The draft was later reduced to an official 
document that specified two basic approaches to the negotiations: the first, which was 
identified as approach A, consolidated the alternatives favored by the North, adopting 
the structure favored by the US and the EC and envisaging a single TRIPS agreement 
“encompassing all seven categories of intellectual property on which proposals have 
been made;” the second, called approach B and favored by the developing states, 
provided for two separate parts, one on trade in counterfeit and pirated goods and the 
“other on standards and principles concerning the availability, scope, and use of 
intellectual property rights.”39   
By the end of 1990, the negotiations intensified and progress was made on 
reaching consensus on the minimum standards of protection.
40
  In early December of 
1990, a draft of the TRIPS Agreement was already at a very advanced stage.
41
  The 
draft was submitted to the Ministers’ meeting in Brussels in the hope of bringing the 
Uruguay Round to an end.
42
  At that point, compromise on most of the outstanding 
                                                 
38 Ibid. 
39 Document MTN.GNG/NG11/W/76 (July 23, 1990). 
40 Evans, “Intellectual Property as a Trade Issue,” p. 171. 
41 Ibid. 
42 Ibid., 173. 
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issues was well within reach: flexibility was being shown on many of the key issues 
and a new draft was being prepared.
43
  But by December 7, 1990 the Uruguay Round 
negotiations collapsed in Brussels over a dispute on agricultural subsidies between the 
EC and other negotiating partners, and the new TRIPS text was never finalized.
44
  
After the Ministerial meeting in Brussels, the focus of the negotiations shifted to other 
sectors, and in particular to agriculture, where tensions over European subsidies were 
still running high.
45
   
The negotiations received a shot in the arm when the Director-General of the 
GATT, Arthur Dunkel, streamlined the negotiations by setting up seven different 
groups, including a TRIPS Group, with the goal of generating a text that could then be 
presented to individual governments for their signature early in 1992.
46
  Within the 
TRIPS Group, an informal working group was made up of ten developed and ten 
developing states.  The approach allowed a thorough examination of the Brussels 
Draft text with the aim of addressing each state’s remaining concerns and then 
reporting back to the formal TRIPS Group.
47
  Several specific proposals were 
discussed and a number of issues dividing the developed countries received significant 
                                                 
43 Gervais, The TRIPS Agreement, 35-42. 
44 Ibid. 
45 Michael Blakeney, Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights: A Concise Guide 
to the TRIPS Agreement, London: Swift & Maxwell, 1996, pp. 80-105. 
 
46 Ibid. 
47 Ibid. 
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attention at this time, but as the second deadline for Uruguay Round drew to a close, 
there was still no final agreement on intellectual property.
48
   
Determined to prevent the Round from failing to reach any results, Dunkel 
again came to the rescue.  He compiled all of the results that were achieved thus far 
into a comprehensive document that was then presented to all the participants.
49
  
Stripped of all options, this new version of the TRIPS Agreement garnered a positive 
reaction from most delegates.
50
   But it was decided that the text would be left aside to 
deal with the seemingly intractable difficulties concerning the trade in agriculture.  
The protracted negotiations on agriculture were once again leading to a deadlock.
51
  
Yet the overall mood on the part of the delegates was that the objectives that the 
Uruguay Round was meant to achieve were becoming increasingly vital for dealing 
with the world economy.  Rising fears of yet another cycle of protectionism and the 
continued increase of national debt spurred the delegates to bring the Round to a 
conclusion and bring into existence many of the much needed reforms to the 
international trade system.
52
  The US continued to remain unhappy with the Dunkel 
Draft: it pushed for amendments until the very end of the Round and threatened to take 
away favorable bilateral terms of trade from states that favored more permissive 
                                                 
48 Ibid. 
49 Evans, “Intellectual Property as a Trade Issue,” p. 174. 
50 Gervais, The TRIPS Agreement, pp. 58-78. 
51 Ibid. 
52 Evans, “Intellectual Property as a Trade Issue,” p. 174. 
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standards of intellectual property protection.
53
  And yet, the text of the Dunkel Draft 
was not significantly modified in the end and became the basis for the TRIPS 
Agreement that was finally adopted in Marrakesh on April 15, 1994.
54
   
 The TRIPS Agreement that emerged at the end of the Uruguay Round is quite 
complicated, and much can be said by way of interpreting each of the articles and their 
provisions.  I will not try to do this, since my aim here is to examine a particular result 
that the enforcement of TRIPS appears to have.  What I will try to do instead is 
highlight some of its basic provisions, and then focus on the standards of patent 
protection, since it is the international patent regime expressed in TRIPS that has the 
most direct connection to access to medicines.  
 
2. Minimum Standards    
Beyond the obligation to provide equal treatment, states are to accord to the 
nationals of other member states the minimum standards of protection that are 
enumerated in TRIPS.
55
  There are seven different areas that given protection under 
                                                 
53 Ibid. 
54 Blakeney, Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, p. 220. 
55
 The starting point in the TRIPS Agreement are the basic principles of non-discrimination (in 
the treatment of foreign rights holders).  The first is that of national treatment, which 
says/requires that domestic protections offered to one’s nationals must also be extended to 
those of a member state.  This principle of equality or equal treatment forbids states from 
discriminating on the basis of intellectual property protection between their nationals and 
those of another member state.  The second principle is that of the most-favored nation, which 
demands that any intellectual property protections given to another member state that are more 
extensive than the minimum standards required by TRIPS must also be extended to all the 
other member states.  This principle ensures that states do not reserve special treatment for 
each other by enacting hybrid legal regimes that run parallel to TRIPS but are beneficial to 
only a subset of all members states.  Together these principles of non-discrimination guarantee 
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these minimum standards: copyright and related rights, patents, trademarks, 
geographical indicators, industrial designs, layout designs of integrated circuits, and 
undisclosed information (trade secrets).  In delineating these minimum standards, the 
TRIPS agreement makes use of existing international law, established by several 
important conventions covering intellectual property.  The Agreement incorporates by 
reference the Paris Convention for the protection of industrial property, the Berne 
Convention for the protection of copyright, the Rome Convention for the protection of 
performers, producers of phonograms and broadcasting organizations, and the IPIC 
treaty for the protection of integrated circuits.
56
   
The patent regime in TRIPS is perhaps the most controversial aspect of the 
entire Agreement.  So let me turn my attention to the main provisions of this system. 
Article 27 stipulates that “patent shall be available for any inventions, whether 
products or processes, in all fields of technology” and without “discrimination as to 
the place of invention, the field of technology and whether products are imported or 
locally produced.”57 To be patentable, an invention must be “new, involve an 
inventive step, and [be] capable of industrial application.”58  Once granted, patents 
                                                                                                                                            
that domestic law does not single out any rights holder for any special or preferential treatment 
and there is no cause for any states to engage in retaliatory protectionist conduct. 
 
56
The TRIPS Agreement, however, does not just incorporate these Conventions, but in many 
cases modifies their provisions.  Article 9 incorporates Articles 1 through 21 of the Berne 
Convention, which provides copyright protection to literary and artistic works.  The TRIPS 
Agreement also supplements some of the Convention’s provisions.  Computer programs are 
also protected by copyright as literary works and the term of protection is changed to fifty 
years from the end of the year of an authorized publication or end of the year of the making of 
the work.  See also Articles 2, 10, 14, 22 on how TRIPS incorporates other conventions. 
  
57 The TRIPS Agreement, Article 27.1. 
58 Ibid. 
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confer exclusive rights.  The holder of a product patent has the exclusive right to 
make, use, sell, and import the product to another country where is may be used or 
sold.
59
  The holder of a process patent has the  exclusive right over the use of the 
process as well as the products that are generated directly by that process.
60
 Moreover, 
patent owners have a right to assign or transfer their patents and to enter into 
agreements to license their products or processes to other parties.
61
  The period of 
protection given to patent owner is twenty years from the date of filing.
62
  
The scope of patentability under TRIPS is quite broad, but several exceptions 
exist that give member states the power to exclude certain products and processes 
from patentability.  Members have a right to exclude inventions that are contrary to 
common standards of morality.
63
  Members may also exclude from patentability 
“diagnostic, therapeutic and surgical methods for the treatment of humans or 
animals.”64  Furthermore, plant and animal varieties, with the exception of 
microorganisms, may be kept from being patented, provided that states that invoke 
this exception offer some other system of protection.
65
 
                                                 
59 Article 28.1(a). 
60 Article 28.1(b). 
61 Article 28.2. 
62 Article 33. 
63 Article 27.2.  To use this exception the commercial exploitation of the invention must also 
be an affront to public morality.  Also such exploitation cannot be allowed to happen even 
when the invention fails to receive a patent.    
 
64 Article 27.3. 
 
65 Article 27.3.  Processes that generate plant or animal varieties that are biological in nature 
may also be excluded.  But not so with processes that produce microorganisms.   
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Despite these exceptions, the patent system under TRIPS extends patent 
protection to inventions in all fields of technology.  This was a major coup for the 
developed countries because they wanted pharmaceutical products and processes to 
qualify for patent protection.
66
  Several developing states, such as Brazil and India, 
stood in the way of this during the early phase of the Uruguay Round, but under 
pressure from the US and EC to impose bilateral trade agreements with much harsher 
terms of trade, they eventually relented.
67
  The developing countries, nevertheless, did 
get some things that they wanted.  One of these was the right to have a transitional 
period to bring the member state’s national laws into compliance.       
The changes introduced to the international intellectual property regime by the 
TRIPS Agreement were significant for many WTO member states.  They had to 
extend patent protection to areas that were not covered by their domestic laws and 
establish an effective enforcement mechanism against infringements.  It was generally 
agreed at the negotiations stage that TRIPS should allow a transition period beyond its 
entry into force so that states can bring their domestic laws into compliance with their 
obligations under TRIPS.
68
  Thus the Agreement contains a one-year transitional 
period for all member states and an additional four-year period for developing member 
states and member states in the process changing from a centrally planned economy to 
                                                                                                                                            
 
66 Sell, Private Power, Public Law, pp. 50-67. 
 
67 Ibid. 
 
68 Blakeney, Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, pp. 85-100. 
 194 
one that is based on the free market.
69
 The Agreement contains two additional 
transitional periods.  Under Article 65, any developing member state that had not 
historically granted protection in an area of technology may ask for an additional five 
years to bring its domestic laws into compliance.  Least-developed countries are given 
an even longer period, and have until 2016 to achieve full compliance.
70
   
As mentioned earlier, the provisions contained in the TRIPS Agreement 
constitute minimum standards of protection to be embodied by the domestic laws of a 
member state.  Let me offer an example of how one country has dealt with 
transitioning its domestic patent laws toward full compliance with TRIPS. 
 
 3. India’s Transition   
As one of the more active participants in the Uruguay Round, India was an 
early opponent to a comprehensive intellectual property agreement (under the aegis of 
GATT).
71
  India eventually softened its position, signed the Uruguay Round 
Agreements, including TRIPS, and became a member of the WTO as of January 1, 
1995.
72
  Because of its membership in the WTO, India became obligated to bring its 
domestic laws into compliance.  At the time of its accession to the WTO, India was 
one of the countries that had not granted patent protection to pharmaceutical products.  
This had to change, since TRIPS mandates patent protection for pharmaceutical 
                                                 
69 Article 65, sections 1-3. 
70 Article 65.4 and Article 66. 
71 Dasgupta, WTO & TRIPS: Indian Perspective, pp. 30-35. 
72 Ibid. 
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product and processes.  As a developing country, India qualified for a lengthy 
transitional period and was given until January 1, 2005 to make its domestic 
intellectual property regime TRIPS compliant. 
India undertook to transform its patent laws in three distinct stages.
73
  First, 
India created a procedure for receiving pharmaceutical product patent applications that 
were filed during its transitional period – from January 1, 1995 through January 1, 
2005.  This so-called “mailbox facility” was enacted into law by the passage of the 
Patents Act, 1999.
74
  Second, the Patents Act, 1970 was amended by the Patents Act, 
2002, to extend the term of protection for patents to twenty-years, as required by 
TRIPS.
75
  Finally, India brought patent protection for pharmaceutical products into full 
effect with its Patent Act, 2005.
76
 
India’s Patents Act, 2005 (The Patent Act), repealed the statutory prohibition 
against the patenting of inventions of substances “intended for use, or capable of being 
used, as food or as medicine or drug” or “prepared or produced by chemical 
                                                 
73 Janice Mueller, “The Tiger Awakens: The Tumultuous Transformation of India’s Patent 
System and the Rise of Indian Pharmaceutical Innovation, 68 University Of Pittsburgh L. Rev. 
491 (2007), pp. 491-641. 
 
74 Even though TRIPS recognizes transitional arrangements, it also requires that a procedure 
be set up during these transitional periods so that “applications for patents for such inventions 
can be filed.” See Article 70.8. 
 
75 Prior to this amendment,  Indian patent law recognized a much shorter period of protection. 
Where the intention is a process for the manufacture of a substance that may be used as food, 
medicine, or drug the term is “five years from the date of sealing of the patent, or seven years 
from the date of the patent whichever period is shorter.” The term of all other types of patents 
was fourteen years.  See Patent Act, No. 39. of 1970 (amended 2005). 
 
76 Mueller, “Tiger Awakens,” p. 519. 
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processes.”77 This meant that as of January 1, 2005, the Indian Patent Office had to 
start examining patent applications for pharmaceutical products for domestic patent 
protection. Under India’s new patent laws, the first pharmaceutical product patent was 
granted to Hoffman-La Roche for its therapy to treat Hepatitis C.
78
   
The Patents Act, however, includes several important restrictions on the 
patentability of pharmaceutical products.  The Act contains a provision that makes the 
ever-greening of pharmaceutical patents more difficult to achieve than in other parts of 
the world.
79
  The Patent Act does not recognize the discovery of a new form of a 
known substance, i.e. the derivative of the known substance, as an invention if the new 
form “does not result in the enhancement of the known efficacy of the [original] 
substance.”80  Moreover, it stipulates that a new use of a known substance is not an 
invention; a new method, however, for preparing an already known substance, may 
qualify for patentability.
81
   
                                                 
77 Patent Act, No. 39 of 1970 (amended 2005). 
 
78 Holger Hestermeyer, Human Rights in the WTO : The Case of TRIPS and Access to 
Medication, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007, p. 28. 
 
79 Ever-greening is a way for pharmaceutical companies to extend the life of a patent of an 
already known  
substance by attempting to obtain a new patent for a new use or a new form of that substance.  
Ever-greening is quite common in the US, especially with respect to new therapeutic uses of a 
known substance that was previously used to treat a different ailment or condition.  See 
Mueller, “Tiger Awakens,” pp 546-566.     
 
80 The Patents Act, No. 39 of 1970 (amended 2005), section 3(d).  
 
81 The Patents Act, No. 39 of 1970(amended 2005).  Large multinational pharmaceutical 
companies are generally quite unhappy about limitation on ever-greening.  Companies will 
often spend additional capital on researching new and novel uses for an existing drug.  This is 
a strategically rational move on their part because it allows them to extend the monopoly 
rights over the same product for another twenty years without having to make the kinds of 
expenditures that are required when developing an entirely new drug.  However, there is 
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The Patent Act also excludes from patentability “plants and animals in whole 
or any part thereof other than micro-organisms.”82  TRIPS permits the exclusion from 
patentability of “plants and animals other than micro-organisms…and biological 
processes for the production of plants or animals other than non-biological and micro-
biological processes.”83  India has chosen to codify this option of excluding plants and 
animals from patentability, as well as varieties of seed.  The Act, however, recognizes 
the patentability of microorganism, as is required by TRIPS, though there is some 
indication that India may interpret what it is to be a microorganism more narrowly.
84
 
As mentioned earlier, TRIPS places three basic requirements that any 
invention, whether a product or a process, must  satisfy before it can qualify for a 
patent.  According to Article 27, “patents shall be given for any inventions…provided 
they are new, involve an inventive step, and are capable of industrial application.”85  
India has embraces the language in TRIPS by defining an invention as a “new product 
                                                                                                                                            
nothing in TRIPS to suggest that India’s new patent laws are not in compliance.  Article 27, 
for instance, stipulates that inventions that are either products or processes may qualify for 
protection, but it says nothing about new uses of already known substances.  In fact, under the 
same article, states have a right to exclude “diagnostic, therapeutic and surgical methods for 
the treatment of humans or animals” from patentability.  A new use of an already patented 
drug, directed at a different medical condition, could be viewed as a therapeutic method, 
which as Article 27 makes clear, need not receive any patent protection.  States are thus free to 
except new uses from protection.  India has taken this route, and there is nothing in TRIPS 
that contravenes member states from passing laws that place certain limitations on the process 
of ever-greening. 
 
82 Patent Act, No. 39, 1970.  
 
83 TRIPS Agreement, Article 27.3(b). 
 
84 A commission has be drawn up recently that is charged with examining whether certain 
organisms can be excluded from being patented because they may be microorganisms in the 
relevant sense.  See Mueller, “Tiger Awakens,” p. 559. 
 
85 Article 27.1 
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or process involving an inventive step and capable of industrial application.”86  In the 
Agreement, the requirements of novelty, inventive step, and industrial application are 
given a formal definition, thus giving member states the flexibility to offer their own 
interpretations of these terms.  The Indian Patent Act has taken advantage of the 
flexibility, and defines the inventive step requirement in a rather novel way: an 
inventive step is a “feature of an invention that involves technical advance as 
compared to the existing knowledge or having economic significance or both and that 
makes the invention not obvious to a person skilled in the art.”87  Thus under Indian 
law, for an invention to involve an inventive step two conditions have to be met.  The 
inventive step requirement in TRIPS is generally taken to be synonymous with an 
invention being non-obvious when compared to prior art.  U.S. patent law makes non-
obviousness of an invention a condition of patentability, and other states have 
followed suit in equating inventive step with non-obviousness.
88
  India includes non-
obviousness as a condition on there being an inventive step, but then attaches an 
additional demand, that there also be a technical advance or an economic benefit to the 
invention.  This implies that under Indian law, at least in principle, it is more difficult 
to confer a patent to an invention than under U.S. law, which merely requires that 
there be non-obviousness to a person of ordinary skill in the art.  Whether this will 
result in a significant difference in the practice of granting patents between India and 
                                                 
86 The Patents Act, No. 39 of 1970 (amended 2005). 
87 Ibid. 
88 35 U.S.C. § 102. 
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the U.S. – specifically with respect to pharmaceutical products – remains  to be seen.  
But TRIPS appears to be capable of tolerating such differences. 
In addition to involving an inventive step, an invention must also be new or 
novel.  The Patent Act defines an invention as new if it “has not been anticipated by 
publication in any document or used on the country or elsewhere in the world before 
the date of filing of the patent application.”89  This definition of novelty incorporates 
any prior art that has been published or used anywhere in the world.  This provision of 
the Act is entirely consistent with TRIPS, and reproduces the standard of novelty 
given in the European Patent Convention.
90
 
Perhaps the most controversial aspect of India’s patent regime has to do with 
compulsory licensing.  Compulsory licensing allows a third party to manufacture and 
sell a patented product without the consent of the patentee, provided a reasonable fee, 
i.e. a licensing fee, is paid to the patent holder.  TRIPS recognizes the importance of 
compulsory licensing and gives individual states some latitude in developing a patent 
regime that employs this flexibility, but also places certain restrictions on how such 
licensing may be used.
91
      
                                                 
89 India Patents Act, No. 39 of 1970, (amended 2005). 
 
90 See European Patent Convention, Article 54.  For further discussion, see Mueller, “Tiger 
Awakens,” pp. 563-566. 
 
91
 The unauthorized use of a patent, by the government or a third party, may be permitted if 
prior to such use, efforts were made “to obtain authorization from the right holder on 
reasonable commercial terms,” but such efforts were not “successful within a reasonable 
period of time.”  The requirement to attempt in good faith to obtain an authorization may be 
disregarded, however, in cases of national emergency, extreme urgency, or when use is of a 
public, non-commercial nature.  Moreover, the unauthorized use of a patent cannot exceed the 
purpose for which it was granted and must terminate when the circumstances that led to the 
use have ceased to exist.  The patent holder is entitled to “adequate remuneration and to 
judicial review” both with respect to the “decision relating to the authorization of such use” 
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India has taken advantage of this flexibility in TRIPS, and has been quite 
generous in permitting compulsory licensing.  The new Patent Act lists several 
grounds for compulsory licensing.  One such ground concerns national health 
emergencies.  Under the Patent Act, the central government may apply for a 
compulsory license, at any time after a patent has been granted, after publicly stating 
that “circumstance of national emergency” or “extreme urgency” make such a license 
necessary.
92
   Licenses are available for all medicines, and no prior negotiations with 
the patentee are required.
93
  Moreover, when a national emergency or a case of 
extreme urgency has been declared, the Patent Act abrogates the right, on the part of 
the patent holder, to have the opportunity to be heard and oppose the grant of the 
license.
94
    
The Patent Act also creates an additional way to acquire a compulsory license.  
A compulsory license may be granted to meet the public health concerns of another 
country.  Section 92A of the Act, permits an Indian drug company to acquire a 
compulsory license and then manufacture and export a patented pharmaceutical to 
                                                                                                                                            
and to the “remuneration provided.”  A significant restriction on the use of compulsory 
licensing is that it must be directed predominantly “for the supply of the domestic market.”  
The reason for this is partly historical, since compulsory licensing was generally used to 
punish a patent holder for not placing her invention in the domestic market of the country that 
granted her the patent.  Compulsory licensing was thus a way ensure that someone else was 
able to put the product in the stream of commerce when the patent holder was unwilling or 
unable to do so herself.  One consequence of the requirement that compulsory licensing be 
exploited for domestic markets is that a country issuing the license cannot then export the 
product, under the license, to another country.  See Article 31 for additional details. 
 
92 The Patent Act, No. 39 of 1970, section 92 (amended 2005). 
 
93 Ibid. 
 
94 Ibid. 
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other countries that have neither the wealth to import the drug directly from the 
pharmaceutical company holding the patent nor the capacity to manufacture it 
themselves.
95
   
The kinds of changes that India has made to bring its patent regime in 
compliance with  TRIPS have been typical for a developing country.  By far the most 
important of these changes has been to extend patent protection to pharmaceutical 
products.  But countries like Brazil, Thailand, South Africa, Argentina, etc., have had 
to do the same, since traditionally their laws excluded pharmaceutical products from 
                                                 
95 Ibid. This appears to conflict with Article 31(f) of TRIPS, which as mentioned above, 
stipulates that when granted, a compulsory license has to be authorized for the supply of the 
domestic market.  Now although Section 92A permits the exportation to a foreign market, it 
does not conflict with the TRIPS Agreement as it currently stands.  Shortly after the passage 
of TRIPS, several least-developed countries complained that the right to produce essential 
medicines in response to a health emergency under a compulsory license would not benefit 
them, since they have no way to manufacture these drugs themselves and Article 31(f) forbids 
other states from granting a compulsory license solely for the purpose of exporting medicines 
to countries without a manufacturing capacity.  Concerned that TRIPS was insufficiently 
sensitive to the plight of least-developed countries, the WTO in 2001 issued a Ministerial 
Declaration on TRIPS and Public Health at the Fourth WTO Ministerial Conference held in 
Doha, Qatar.  In paragraph six of the Declaration, the WTO acknowledged that member states 
with little or no manufacturing capacities in the pharmaceutical sector “could face difficulties 
in making effective use of compulsory licensing under the TRIPS Agreement” and requested 
that a solution be found.  In 2003, the WTO’s General Council proposed a solution to waive 
the restriction in 31(f), provided that certain conditions are met.  Section 92(A) of the Patent 
Act may be viewed as codifying the waiver to Article 31(f).  The waiver, however, was 
designed to be applied in limited circumstances and could be invoked if several conditions 
were satisfied: the importing country has to notify the WTO that it lacks a manufacturing 
capacity and that it intends to grant a compulsory license the patented drug being imported; 
the exporting country has to notify the WTO that it is granting a compulsory license to the 
drug being exported and limit its manufacture of the drug to as much as is needed in the 
importing country.  Section 92(A), on the other hand, has much broader scope because there is 
no requirement that the importing country must also grant the compulsory license, nor is the 
licensee obligated to specify the amount it will produce.  Whether the compulsory scheme is 
consistent with the TRIPS will depend on how India will use compulsory licensing for 
exporting patented drugs to other countries.  India may be challenged if it goes beyond what is 
strictly permitted by the waiver.   
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patent protection.
96
  It is still an open question whether India has made its patent 
regime fully compliant.  So far, India has faced few challenges over its patent laws.  
One reason for this is that it has not yet begun to use widely its powerful compulsory 
licenses scheme.  Once it does, as some have suggested, disputes are likely to arise 
between India, on the one hand, and U.S. and the EC, on the other.
97
  What I want to 
do next is examine what it means for a state to violate the TRIPS Agreement.  
Specifically, I want to discuss the coercion that a state faces when it is not in 
compliance.  To do this I have to explore another aspect of the WTO, and that is its 
dispute settlement system. 
 
4. WTO’s Dispute Settlement System 
Within the WTO, dispute settlement is regulated by the Dispute Settlement 
Understanding.
98
  There are four basic stages of dispute settlement under this system: 
consultations, panel process, review by the appellate body, and implementation.  The 
preferred way to resolve disputes within the WTO is to have the parties themselves 
settle their disagreement, without having to rely on litigation.  At the first formal stage 
of dispute settlement, the parties to the dispute are thus required to enter into bilateral 
                                                 
96 For further discussion see Correa, Intellectual Property Rights, WTO, and Developing 
Countries.  
 
97 Amy Kapczynski, “Harmonization and Its Discontents: A Case Study of TRIPS 
Implementation in India’s Pharmaceutical Sector,” California Law Review, Vol. 97, 2009, 
pp.1607-1610. 
 
98 For a good discussion, see David Palmeter and Petros Mavoidis,  Dispute Settlement in the 
WTO: Practice and Procedure, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004. 
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consultations and encouraged to work out a mutually acceptable solution.
99
  If, 
however, the parties to the dispute fail to resolve their disagreement at the 
consultations stage, the complaining party may request that a panel be established to 
adjudicate the dispute.
100
  A panel is a judicial tribunal that functions much like a trial 
court and has the authority to render a legal decision.  After the parties have been 
given a chance to present their arguments, the panel, in a written report, delivers its 
opinion as to whether the respondent has failed to live up to its obligations under the 
WTO, as claimed by the complaining party.
101
  If the panel finds that there has been a 
violation, it also offers a recommendation that the respondent bring its domestic laws 
into compliance with WTO requirements.
102
   
The WTO dispute settlement system also includes judicial review by an 
appellate body.  After the panel submits its final report, the losing side may appeal the 
panel’s decision.103 When the notice of appeal is filed, the party seeking the appeal, 
the appellant, has to submit a legal brief, adducing the legal errors that were 
committed by the panel and the determinations that should have been made.
104
  The 
other party to the dispute, the appellee, may submit a written response to the 
                                                 
99 Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU), Article 4. 
 
100DSU, Article 4.3.  The complainant may also proceed to the adjudicative stage if the 
respondent fails to reply to the request for consultations.    
  
101DSU, Article 12. 
 
102 Ibid. 
 
103DSU, Article 17.  If neither side request an appeal, the panel’s decision may then be adopted 
by the Dispute Settlement Body, becomes binding on both parties, and proceeds to the 
implementation stage.  
 
104 Ibid. 
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allegations of legal error made by the appellant.
105
  The Appellate Body that is 
assigned to review the panel report holds a hearing during which time the parties are 
given the chance to present their arguments.
106
   The Appellate Body then deliberates 
and drafts its own report; in it, the Appellate Body may either affirm, reverse, or 
uphold only in part the findings of the panel with respect to those issues that are under 
appeal.
107
  The parties to the dispute must unconditionally accept the conclusions of 
the Appellate Body, and once the report is adopted by the Dispute Settlement Body, 
the Appellate Body’s determinations become binding.108  If the Appellate Body finds 
that a party is in violation of a WTO obligation, the losing party has to bring itself into 
compliance with WTO law, within a reasonable period of time.
109
 
If the losing party fails to achieve full compliance, it may be sanctioned by the 
Dispute Settlement Body in a number of ways.  If appropriate, the party may be 
required to compensate the other side.
110
  Such compensation does not have to be 
monetary; a benefit conferred on the other party in the form of tariff reduction on 
certain goods may be sufficient.
111
  In most cases, compensation does not take place 
                                                 
105 Ibid. 
 
106 Ibid. Generally, this happens about 30 to 45 days after the notice of appeal is submitted.  
  
107 Ibid. 
 
108DSU, Article 19. 
 
109 Once the Appellate Body’s report becomes adopted, the Dispute Settlement Body will 
make recommendations to the losing party  on how to achieve such compliance.  See DSU, 
Article 20.  
 
110DSU, Article 22. 
 
111DSU, Article 22.  The most-favored-nation provision, however, will mandate that such 
preferential treatment shown to one member – in this case, this would be the complaining 
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because the parties to the dispute do not agree on what counts as fair compensation.
112
  
And without such agreement, the prevailing party may then resort to retaliatory trade 
sanctions against the offending party.  The prevailing party, in these circumstances, 
may suspend its WTO obligations with respect to the noncompliant party.
113
  In other 
words, the prevailing party may erect its own trade barriers against the offending 
party.  In general, the complainant will retaliate by employing countermeasures within 
the same sector.  So for examples, if Sri Lanka imposes a huge tariff on American 
high tech goods, the US may retaliate by increasing tariffs on certain Sri Lankan 
goods.  If, however, the US does not import many goods from Sri Lanka such that its 
countermeasure is not likely to force Sri Lanka into compliance, the WTO allows the 
US to retaliate against a different sector – services, for instance – or suspend its 
obligations under a different agreement – e.g. under GATS or TRIPS.114  This 
flexibility in choosing which countermeasures are likely to do most damage gives 
developed countries a powerful weapon against developing countries, who are already 
quite vulnerable to trade barriers erected against goods and services they produce for 
                                                                                                                                            
party – would have to be extended to the other members as well.  This substantially magnifies 
the “compensation” that a member has to pay.  Compensation is particularly problematic to 
developing states since they are given the option to gradually reduce their tariffs.     
  
112 Marco C. E. J. Bronckers and Naboth Van den Broek, “Financial Compensation in the 
WTO: Improving the Remedies of WTO Dispute Settlement,”  Journal of International 
Economic Law, Vol. 8, Issue 1, 2005, pp. 101-126; Busch and Reinhardt, “Developing 
Countries and GATT/WTO Dispute Settlement,” Journal of World Trade, 37(4), 2003, pp. 
719-35. 
 
113 DSU, Article 22. 
 
114 Bronckers and Van den Broek, “Financial Compensation in the WTO,” pp. 105-10. 
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outside consumption.
115
  This is particularly relevant to our discussion of intellectual 
property and the TRIPS Agreement.  If a developing country is deemed to be 
noncompliant with respect to TRIPS, the complaining party, which is likely to be 
either the US, the EC, or Japan, may sidestep TRIPS altogether and instead suspend its 
obligations under either GATT or GATS.  This can have a devastating effect on 
developing countries, since they depend so much on their export-led industries to 
generate domestic economic growth.  In addition to instituting retaliatory measures, 
developed countries may also exert other, more subtle, forms of pressure on 
developing states deemed noncompliant.  The US and the EC, in several cases for 
instance, have threatened to cut off foreign aid to induce compliance.
116
  This is a 
particularly effective way to force least developed countries to comply, since they rely 
to a great extent on foreign assistance to meet their domestic needs.  It is no surprise, 
therefore, that the dispute settlement system has been very successful in resolving 
disputes.  By 2008, there have been only fifteen authorized suspension of concessions 
and three cases of compensation, only one of which was monetary.
117
  Moreover, there 
have been very few cases of noncompliance, mostly on the part of the US and the 
                                                 
115 Ibid. 
 
116 Ibid. 
 
117 For a goods discussion of the data, see Kara Leitner and Simon Lester, “WTO Dispute 
Settlement 1995-2008: A Statistical Analysis,” Journal of International Economic Law, 12(1), 
2009, pp 195-208; Joseph Pelzman and Amir Shoham, “WTO Enforcement Issues,” Global 
Economy Journal, Vol. 7, Issue 1, 2007, pp. 1-25. 
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EC.
118
  With respect to the TRIPS Agreement, there is only one case of 
noncompliance, and the noncompliant party was the US.
119
      
 
5. The Implications of Being TRIPS Compliant 
As I mentioned above, many developing countries that are now WTO members 
did not recognize pharmaceutical products as patentable subject matter.  TRIPS has 
changed this, and as a result member countries, depending on the transitional period 
given to them, have already brought or will soon have to bring patent protection to 
pharmaceutical products.  If they fail to do so, they will face severe repercussions 
either by having to compensate the complaining party or by incurring WTO 
sanctioned trade retaliations.   
The presence of the TRIPS Agreement in the WTO has made these countries 
modify their domestic laws in a significant way.  But what are the ramifications of 
these changes in the domestic laws of a state?  One important result of the patent 
regime in TRIPS is that the price of medicines has gone up.
120
  Once a patent is 
granted, the patent holder has the exclusive right to sell its patented drug for a period 
of twenty years.  To recoup its research and development expenditures made in the 
                                                 
118 Bronckers and Van den Broek, “Financial Compensation in the WTO,” pp. 110-115. 
 
119 US-Copyright, WT/DS160/R.  The EC argued that Section 110(5) of the US Copyright Act 
was inconsistent with the Berne Convention and therefore in violation of Article 9(1) of 
TRIPS.  The US has still not make its copyright laws consistent with the Berne Convention, 
but it has agreed to pay the EC in monetary compensation for the nullification or impairment 
of EC benefits.  
   
120 A. Cameron et al, “Medicine Prices, Availability and Affordability in 36 Developing and 
Middle Income Countries: A Secondary Analysis,” Lancet Vol. 373, Issue 9659, 2009, pp. 
240-49.   
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course of developing a drug, a pharmaceutical company charges a monopoly price, 
which is well above the marginal cost of production.  It is the high cost of patented 
drugs, set at monopoly prices, that makes these drugs out of reach for much of the 
poor in developing and least-developed countries.  This was an important concern 
during the negotiations at the Uruguay Round: India and Brazil, in particular, wanted 
pharmaceutical products to be excluded from patentability as their own domestic laws 
had done.   These arguments, of course, did not carry the day, and medicines were 
included within scope of patent protection.  Yet, the worry about the accessibility of 
medicines still remained on the minds of many of the participants, and a compromise 
was eventually worked out that carved out certain exceptions and placed limitations on 
the rights given to patent holders.  The most important of these exceptions is the right 
to issue a compulsory license, which has been viewed as a lifeline for developing 
countries in their effort to bring affordable medicines to their citizens.  The TRIPS 
Agreement, in its all important Article 31, permits the use of compulsory licenses, 
albeit with certain restrictions.  The question is, can a compulsory license scheme 
counteract the increase in prices of patented drugs?  
Compulsory licenses have been used throughout the world for many decades, 
in many cases by highly industrialized countries.
121
  The U.S. for instance has done so 
with respect to clean air technology and atomic energy.
122
  But the tradition of 
permitting licensing, especially with respect to patented medicines, has fallen into 
                                                 
121 Both Britain and Canada used to grant compulsory licenses on pharmaceuticals quite 
regularly. See F.K. Beier, “Exclusive Rights, Statutory Licenses and Compulsory Licenses in 
Patent and Utility Model Law,” 30 IIC, p. 251. 
 
122 Ibid. 
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disfavor in many developed countries as they became net exporters of technology to 
the rest of the world, and licensing began to look like free-riding on costly innovations 
developed by domestic industries, innovations that in many cases were the product of 
government funded basic research.  For the developing world, on the other, hand, the 
perception is that compulsory licenses are still an indispensable instrument for putting 
pressure on the big pharmaceutical companies to reduce their prices.
123
   Article 31 of 
TRIPS tries to strike a balance between these competing views by allowing 
compulsory licenses.
124
  So how do compulsory licenses work under this Article? 
Under Article 31, the application of compulsory licensing is sweeping: there is 
nothing in the Article that limits the scope of inventions that may be subject to 
licensing.  This means that any inventions is fair game for compulsory licensing, not 
just pharmaceutical products.
125
  Yet, it should come as no surprise that most 
compulsory licenses that have been issued overwhelmingly target patented medicines.  
Although there are no restrictions on the subject matter, Article 31 puts in place 
certain procedural requirements before a license can be granted.  First, the proposed 
user has to make an attempt to secure an authorization from the patent holder on 
                                                 
123 Frederick Abbott and Jerome Reichman, “The Doha Round's Public Health Legacy: 
Strategies for the Production and Diffusion of Patented Medicines Under the Amended TRIPS 
Provisions,” Journal of International Economic Law, Vol. 10, 2007, pp. 921-87. 
 
124 Ibid. 
 
125 An earlier draft of the Article adduced a list of allowed subject matter, but this was later 
removed in subsequent drafts.  This suggests that indeed any subject matter could be subject to 
compulsory licenses and it was up to individual states to decide how far their domestic laws 
would  go. 
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“reasonable commercial terms,” which turned out to have been unsuccessful.126  This 
requirement, however, is waived in “situations of national emergency or other 
circumstances of extreme urgency,” and in cases of public non-commercial use.127  
Second, the rights holder is entitled to “adequate remuneration,” and the decision as to 
the authorization of a compulsory license as well as the decision as to the adequacy of 
the remuneration are subject to judicial review.
128
  Furthermore, the authorization of a 
license has to be decided on the “individual merits” of  such a license.129  When a 
license is granted, it must be used for the purpose for which it was authorized.
130
  The 
requirement that the scope, and also duration, of the license be limited to its authorized 
purpose is designed to prevent the license from being abused and misused.  In 
addition, if circumstances have changed such that the original purpose that 
necessitated the license no longer prevails, the party granted the license has to cease 
using it.   
The procedural safeguards that require that there be adequate remuneration and 
judicial oversight, that the scope be limited to the authorizes purpose, and that the 
                                                 
126 TRIPS, Article 31(b).  This provision forces the user of the license to seek a license directly 
from the patent holder, who clearly has a right to issue a license to her invention to any third 
party for any reason. 
 
127 Ibid. 
 
128 Article 31(g)-(j).  
 
129 Article 31(a).  This forces the license to be directed at a  particular drug, not at a class of 
drugs, so that the reasons for  authorizing a license for a particular drug can be evaluated 
separately.  This ensures that a license is granted per patented invention and the decision is 
based strictly on the reasons for granting a license for that particular drug. 
 
130 Thus, for example, if a license is issued for Efavirenz, an antiretroviral patented by Merck, 
for 500,000 tablets, the production of a million tablets would go beyond the authorized scope 
of the license and violate Article 31. 
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authorization of a license be considered on its “individual merits” have not generated 
much controversy.  But there are two important weaknesses in the Agreement’s 
compulsory licensing scheme, which have sparked a great deal of debate that 
continues to this day.  One of these weaknesses has been more or less solved, but the 
other has not.  
Under the compulsory license system of Article 31, the use of such licenses is 
“predominantly for the supply of the domestic market of the member authorizing such 
use.”131   This specific requirement for issuing a compulsory license was not an 
obstacle for India and Brazil, which already possessed a significant generic 
pharmaceutical sector.  The problem with Article 31 is that not all developing states, 
and in particular those that are least developing, have the capacity to produce low-cost 
generic drugs.  Moreover, as it is stated Article 31 does not permit the importation of 
generic drugs by member countries without a manufacturing capacity from member 
countries that do.
132
  Thus, Article 31 essentially places compulsory licensing out of 
reach of many countries that are in desperate need of low-cost generic medicines.   
 Mindful of the fact that some of the poorest countries in the world simply 
cannot take advantage of the most powerful flexibility built into TRIPS, the WTO 
Ministerial Conference in Doha adopted the Doha Declaration on the TRIPS 
Agreement and Public Health in November 2001.
133
   The Declaration issued a 
                                                 
131 Article 31(f). 
 
132 Ibid. 
 
133 Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health (14 November 2001), Doc. 
WT/MIN(01)/DEC/2 (20 November 2001) (Doha Declaration).  
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mandate to broaden existing flexibilities in TRIPS so that member countries that do 
not have the ability to produce generic drugs domestically are allowed to import them 
from countries like India, Brazil, or China that have a generic pharmaceutical 
industry.
134
  The legal language that permits such importation is contained in a waiver 
known as the August 2003 Decision.
135
  This permission would be rendered permanent 
in a proposed Amendment to Article 31, known as Article 31bis, the ratification of 
which is currently being considered by a number of countries.
136
  The Amendment 
does not limit importation of medicines under a compulsory license to specific 
diseases and uses a definition of pharmaceutical product that is broad enough to 
include vaccines, active ingredients, and diagnostic kits.
137
  Under the regime 
announced in the Amendment, the importing country (excluding LDCs) must notify 
the TRIPS Council of its intention to use the system as an importing country; the 
importing country (excluding LDCs) must also issue a compulsory license 
domestically for the medicine that it seeks to import.
138
  The exporting country must 
                                                 
134 The Doha Declaration. 
 
135 Implementation of paragraph 6 of the Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and 
Public Health (30 August 2003), Doc. WT/L/540 (1 September 2003) (Waiver Decision).  
 
136 WTO General Council Decision of 6 December 2005, Amendment of the TRIPS 
Agreement WT/L/641, 8 December 2005, with attachment “Protocol Amending the TRIPS 
Agreement” (with Annex setting out Article 31bis) (Protocol Amendment).   
 
137 Protocol Amendment.  The US was quire unhappy about this at the time and wanted the 
importation be restricted to only those medicines that targeted AIDS/HIV, malaria, 
tuberculosis, and a few other highly infectious diseases.  The EC was concerned that there 
would be extensive importation of all sorts of medicines and thus wanted the regime under the 
Waiver and the Amendment to permit importation only when the public is threatened with 
grave public health problems.  See Abbott and Reichman, “The Doha Round’s Public Health 
Legacy,” p. 934.  
 
138 Protocol Amendment. 
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also notify the Council of its intention to use the system and issue a compulsory 
license for the patented product that it intends to produce for export.
139
   
 The problem with the Amendment, as well as with the original Article 31, is 
not that they are administratively onerous, as some have suggested, but that they 
restrict the application of compulsory licenses to three types of cases: national 
emergency, extreme urgency and public non-commercial use.
140
  The US and the EC 
are inclined to interpret national emergency and extreme urgency as exceptional 
circumstances.
141
  Thus it is generally accepted by now that the spread of HIV/AIDS 
in sub-Saharan Africa constitutes a national emergency for the countries that are 
affected by this epidemic.  There is also widespread consensus that malaria, 
tuberculosis, and other infectious diseases that affect the global poor may also be 
considered an emergency, provided the number of people affected in a given country 
is not trivial.
142
  The appearance of avian flu, on the other hand, is more likely to be 
seen as an extreme urgency in light of its potential lethality, though it may also 
perceived as a national emergency.  What is much more controversial is whether other 
health problems may constitute either a national emergency or an extreme urgency.  
May heart disease or common types of cancer be considered national emergencies?   
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141 Abbott and Reichman, “The Doha Round’s Public Health Legacy,” p. 954. 
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In 2007, Thailand issued a compulsory license for Plavix, which is used to treat 
coronary disease and is patented by Sanofi-Aventis.
143
   After negotiations between the 
representatives of Sanofi-Aventis and the Thai government broke down, the 
pharmaceutical giant threatened to sue the Indian company that was awarded the 
contract by the Thai Ministry of Public Health to produce the generic version of the 
drug.
144
  That year the US government, from the pressure exerted by the 
pharmaceutical industry, placed Thailand on its Special 301 “Priority Watch” list, 
stating its growing concern over the erosion of respect for patent rights in the 
country.
145
  The EC was even more aggressive in condemning the Thai government 
for its use of the compulsory license regime.  In a letter to the Thai Minister of 
Commerce, the European Trade Commissioner, Peter Mandelson, insisted that 
“neither the TRIPS Agreement nor the Doha Declaration appear to justify a systematic 
policy of applying compulsory licenses whenever medicines exceed certain prices.”146  
The European Commission took a strong position against Thailand because 
“something like heart disease does not meet the criteria” of an urgent public health 
issue.
147
  Fearing economic retaliation from the US and the EC, Thailand has been 
quite sparing in expanding the list of medicines – other than those that target 
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145 Ibid., p.955. 
 
146 David Cronin, “EU Split Arises over Thai Effort to Obtain Cheaper Patented Drugs,” IP–
Watch, September 2007. 
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HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis, etc. – that may be issued a compulsory license.148  Other 
developing countries have also been very cautious in pushing for a broader 
interpretation of what constitutes a national health emergency.  But even if certain 
cancer drugs or drugs for heart disease are made available through compulsory 
licensing there is no reason to think that all patented medicines that may be used by 
the poor in the developing world to ameliorate their suffering or stave off a premature 
death will fall within the scope of a domestic compulsory license regime.   There is 
already substantial pushback from the developed world as it is, and so a more 
comprehensive approach of providing generic versions of essential drugs that are 
presently under a patent is simply not likely to happen.   
  The existence of various flexibilities within the TRIPS Agreement has been an 
important source for mitigating some of the effects of raising the standards of 
intellectual property protection worldwide.  However, these flexibilities, the most 
important of which been compulsory licensing, are not enough to bring affordable 
medicines to the poor in developing and least developed countries.  There have been 
many promising proposals made to make essential medicines affordable without 
relying on TRIPS in any way.
149
  But so far these proposals have not been translated 
into an actual system that turns out affordable medicines, and so the TRIPS 
flexibilities are the only available method we currently have to bring down the price of 
                                                 
148 Recently , the Thai government has issued compulsory licenses for three anti-cancer drugs.   
But the government has also engaged in negotiations with the pharmaceutical companies that 
hold the patents to decrease the price of their drugs.  See Cronin, “EU Split Arises over Thai 
Effort to Obtain Cheaper Patented Drugs.” 
 
149 For a good discussion of alternative ways to provide essential medicines, see Michael 
Abramowitz, “Perfecting Prizes,” Vanderbilt Law Review, Vol. 56, 2003, pp. 114-236. 
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essential medicines.  Unfortunately, however, their impact on the price of essential 
medicines is not substantial enough to the solve the problem of access.   Thus, the 
question remains, what is to do be done about this problem?  In the rest of the paper, I 
examine whether there is a moral obligation, which is transnational in nature, that 
directs us to address this special problem. 
 
B. Justice and the Access to Essential Medicines 
What I have been suggesting is that the presence of TRIPS has made it more 
difficult for states to provide affordable medicines to their citizens.  All members of 
the WTO have to bring their intellectual property laws in compliance. For most states, 
their transition periods have already run out – only LCDs have until 2016.  
Compliance requires at least the following: states have to recognize the patentability 
of pharmaceuticals.  But this is not a trivial move for states to make; the change in 
patent laws has had an impact on public health by making the provision of cheap 
generic drugs in the developing world the exception rather than the rule.  As members 
of the WTO, states are legally obligated to conform, and if they refuse to bring their 
laws into compliance, they will face stiff penalties and sanctions for their 
noncompliance.   I contend that this impact on public health is a product of 
international legal coercion.  First, because states are coerced into changing their laws, 
in particular their patent laws.  The changed laws are, of course, domestic laws, which 
thus may be legally enforced against individual citizens.  If persons in the US or 
Mexico violate the patent laws of their country, they will be prosecuted – and in many 
cases criminally prosecuted – for their actions.  
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On a broadly Rawlsian view, which I endorse here, coercion has to be justified 
to those who are subject to it.  The content of such a justification is a liberal 
conception of justice in which principles of redistribution form a prominent part.
150
  I 
claim that international coercion that affects the kind of healthcare that people are able 
to receive is precisely the sort of coercion that has to be justified if it is to have any 
moral legitimacy at all.  Furthermore, the justification may require the employment of 
distributive principles, which target the basic structure of the international trade 
system.  This conclusion is quite controversial, and several important objections may 
be adduced against my view.  In this section, I put forward some of these objections, 
examine their individual merits and suggest ways to overcome the difficulties the 
objections seem to point to.   
 
1. Objections 
Someone like Michael Blake might argue that the coercion that affects a 
person’s access to essential medicines is domestic in nature, and so the justification 
that is due should surely come by way of a domestic conception of justice.
151
  The 
coercion that is done to states at the level of the WTO may require a justification, but 
                                                 
150 This is a view that is endorsed by a number of people.  See, e.g., Thomas Nagel, “The 
Problem of Global Justice,” pp. 113-147; Michael Blake, “Distributive Justice, State Coercion, 
and Autonomy,” pp. 257-296; Richard. W. Miller, “Cosmopolitan Respect and Patriotic 
Concern,” pp. 202-224.  Nagel, Blake, and Miller understand Rawls himself to be concerned 
with domestic coercion, and take their own accounts as elaborations of Rawls’s view of justice 
in a global context.     
   
151 Blake, “Distributive Justice, State Coercion, and Autonomy.”  Blake seems to think that 
there is international coercion, but it is of the following sort.  First, international coercion does 
not directly affects persons – instead, it affects states.  Second, international coercion 
ultimately does not alter the distribution of individual economic entitlements.  My example of 
TRIPS and its effect on access to essential medicine is meant to cast doubt on Blake’s 
conception of international coercion. 
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because it involves states and not persons, a conception of justice with distributive 
principles would not seem to be the appropriate response: the coercion of states does 
not affect the division of economic goods of individual citizens – because these 
bundles of goods are affected by the enforcement of only domestic laws.  Of course, 
domestic laws are also affected by international coercion, since they have to be at least 
consistent with the international standards under TRIPS.  These laws in turn affect the 
livelihood of individual citizens, which means that once again we have to ask 
ourselves whether these laws are justified.  This requirement of justification cannot be 
eschewed, but the focus still remains on domestic laws.  So whatever justification is 
offered for national intellectual property laws, such a  justification would have to be 
reflected in a domestic conception of justice.  In other words, a just society, one where 
distributive principles apply, would take care of accessibility of essential drugs to 
those who can no longer afford them: much more redistribution might be called for to 
offset the increase in the price of patented drugs.  The basic point of this objection as I 
see it is that the impact of the new patent regime can be dealt with by a conception of 
justice for domestic society, and thus there is no need to internationalize or globalize 
principles of distributive justice.   
There are several responses that can be made to this objection.  First, although 
the WTO itself does not stand behind the enforcement of domestic laws, it makes its 
member states do precisely this, albeit with respect to only some of their laws.  The 
WTO plays a fundamental role in the genesis of certain domestic laws, and although it 
does not directly enforce them against individual citizens, this in no way suggests that 
the WTO is not responsible for their coercion.  Indeed, the WTO and individual states 
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work in tandem to implement a global intellectual property regime: even though 
individual states engage in the actual coercion, they do so on behalf of a legal regime 
that has been authored by the WTO.  In other words, member states are basically the 
enforcement arm of the WTO’s system of intellectual property.  The distinction 
between direct and indirect coercion does not appear to have much moral force to it: 
both the WTO and individual states are responsible for coercing individual citizens, 
but they are responsible by doing different tasks that lead to this result.   
It might be argued, at this point, that individual states willingly enter the WTO.  
If that is indeed the case, one might then contend that member states, for this very 
reason, are not subject to any coercion.  They consent to becoming members of the 
WTO, and by consenting to membership, they also consent to all of the obligations 
that accompany it.   The fact of consent thus would remove any and all danger of 
member states being coerced by the WTO. 
This objection clearly presents a difficulty for my view.  But its proper 
discussion would require a lengthy exposition of the concepts of coercive threats and 
coercive offers, the differences between them, and an argument defending coercive 
offers as capable of generating coercion, which I think would take us too far afield 
from the main line of argument of this paper.  However, a more succinct response to 
this objection is, I believe, possible and may be enough for my purposes here.   
I think that if any coercion is involved in making certain member states join 
the WTO, it cannot be by way of applying coercive threats.  That is because states are 
not threatened with a circumstance that would make them worse off than they would 
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be, relative to the baseline of non-membership, if they were to refuse to join.
152
  On 
the contrary, membership would make states better off than they would be if they were 
to do it alone.  Still, in my opinion, despite a net gain over the baseline of non-
membership, many states – specifically, certain developing and least developed states 
– are coerced into joining the WTO.  They are coerced because they are given a 
coercive offer – and not a threat – which I suggest is nevertheless a type of coercion.  
Why coercive offers are in fact coercive is quite complicated and has generated a great 
deal of discussion.
153
  However, a basic explanation of why they are coercive can be 
given, and it has to do with how such offers are used by a putative coercer.  Coercive 
offers are generally made to an offeree who finds herself in dire circumstances – e.g. 
she is threatened with imminent death or serious physical injury, is forced to live a life 
that is degrading to her, etc.
154
  All offers including the coercive ones promise to 
rescue the offeree from her current circumstances.  But what makes coercive offers 
coercive is that they come with certain conditions, which if accepted exact a heavy 
moral, and often psychological, toll on the offeree, usually, by subjecting the offeree 
to degradation or humiliation – to conditions, in other words, that cannot be accepted 
from a position of moral self-respect.  The coercive offer forces the offeree to accept a 
new circumstance, even though it comes with conditions that are degrading and 
                                                 
152 For an extensive discussion of coercive threats and coercive offers, see Alan Wertheimer, 
Coercion (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1987); Robert Nozick, “Coercion,”  in 
Philosophy, Science, and Method: Essays in Honor of Ernest Nagel, ed. Sidney 
Morgenbesser, Patrick Suppes and Morton White, New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1969. 
 
153 For a good discussion of the various strands of thought for and against coercive offers 
being coercive, see Wertheimer, Coercion. 
 
154 These examples are more thoroughly developed in Wertheimer. 
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humiliating, because the offeree has no real choice but to accept them – the alternative 
is even worse than the degradation and humiliating implicit in the offer.  The offeror 
exploits this vulnerability to her advantage by extracting a concession out of the 
offeree, a concession that the offeree would not have self-respectfully made were she 
not facing a desperate situation.   
     Let me suggest the following definition of coercive offers: S makes a 
coercive offer to T if and only if: (1) T finds herself in circumstances that are 
intolerable (generally, because her autonomy is severely restricted); (2) T is powerless 
to escape her current circumstances on her own; (3) S communicates to T that if T 
were to do A, S will make T better off than T currently is (generally, by bringing about 
circumstances C where T’s autonomy is less restricted); (4) S intends T to understand 
that S is making an offer and that S will make T better off  only if T complies; (5) T 
understands that S is making an offer; (6) T believes that S is capable of making her 
better off; (7) T does A; (8) T would not have done A if her current circumstances 
weren’t so intolerable; (9) T’s reasons for doing A are in part to escape her current 
circumstances.
155
  I contend that many developing countries enter the WTO because 
they see membership as a step in the right direction toward escaping from economic 
deprivation.  These poor developing countries agree to their obligations because they 
have no choice but to accept them, since they are not in a position to do it alone and 
need the WTO.  But from a position of greater strength, their choices might have been 
different.  Thus membership for these countries seems to resemble coercive offers in 
                                                 
155 In defining coercive offers, I take as my starting point Joseph Raz’s definition of this 
concept.  See Joseph Raz, The Morality of Freedom, New York: Oxford University Press 
1986, pp. 148-57.  I offer a more elaborate definition that tries to overcome certain 
counterexamples to which Raz’s definition is susceptible.    
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the way that I have defined them.
156
  They face a dire situation at home, namely, 
severe deprivation and poverty of their citizens, out of which they cannot emerge on 
their own.  But WTO membership comes with a price, and this is the lack access to 
affordable medicines for their most vulnerable citizens, an outcome that is coercively 
imposed, since those affected would not accept it from a position of self-respect.
157
  
The lack of affordable essential medicines for the poor in developing member states is 
precisely the type of condition that is analogous to degrading conditions that 
accompany coercive offers directed at individuals.   
 But even if I am wrong that certain states are coerced into joining the WTO, I 
think that in the end this might not matter.  The reason for this is that once a state has 
made such a fateful step, it is very hard to make it out, in part because one’s policies 
have already been shaped by one’s obligations under the WTO.  But for a state to 
remain a member means that it will now be subject to coercion that forces both the 
state and its citizens to be compliant.  And when it comes to individual citizens of 
                                                 
156 My definition of coercive offers involves persons, not states.  Although I think that it can be 
extended to states, a more detailed discussion has to be given, one that offers an argument for 
why my account of coercive offers can be used to explain the coercion of states.  This I hope 
to do in another paper, which would be exclusively on coercive offers. 
    
157 The above definition is meant for offerees who are individuals, not states.  But I think that 
the definition with certain changes can be extended to states.  Of course, we cannot talk about 
the autonomy of a state as conceptually relevant, but we can still talk about the autonomy, or 
lack thereof, of individual citizens and that when this is widespread, because of extreme 
poverty and deprivation, we can say that this is a dire circumstance for the state.  In addition, it 
also does not make sense to say that WTO membership degrades the developing country,  but 
I think we can still hold that lack of access is an affront to individual dignity and is something 
that a citizens cannot self-respectfully consent to.  Of course, for coercion to take place it 
matters whether the leadership of the state actually cares about the plight of their economically 
disadvantaged citizens.  There is evidence, given the involvement of many local NGOs that 
representatives from several developing countries such as India, Brazil, Thailand were 
concerned about the plight of their citizens when negotiating the TRIPS Agreement.  See    
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member states, they certainly become subject to legal coercion, which then has to be 
justified. 
Let me now leave aside the issue of whether certain states are coerced into 
joining the WTO, and focus on other objections that can be made against my view that 
the problem of access requires WTO-wide economic redistribution.   
One line of argument against me might contend that individual states are in a 
better position to remedy the problem of access.  It may be suggested, along these 
lines, that there is after all a net benefit accruing to a state from its membership within 
the WTO.  Why not then have the state use some of its economic gains from 
integrating within the international trade system to deal with some of the costs of such 
integration?   For instance, why not expect the state to provide something like a 
subsidy to its public so that essential medicines are once again affordable despite their 
increase in price?  The point of the argument is to spur individual states to pick up the 
slack so that the downside to economic integration is quickly remedied.   
This particular objection, which seems to favor a shift in responsibility toward 
member states, is problematic in several ways.   First, it is quite unrealistic about what 
states, in particular developing and least developed states, are capable of doing.  Most 
of the states we have in mind here are still quite poor, have a bad record of governance 
and inadequate institutions, and continue to generate budgets that are too meager to 
address the basic needs of their people.  Again many of these states are reeling from 
other injustices and so cannot address them all at once.  And indeed there may be a 
need to prioritize their domestic problems, which could mean that access to essential 
medicines may not be realized right away, or even at all, if left entirely to the state to 
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deal with.  What can we expect from Sierra Leone when it is still desperately poor, 
socially fragile, and very far from realizing anything like a basic structure that 
conforms to a conception of justice?
158
    
There is I think another worry about the above objection.  Even if countries 
like India and Brazil can overcome the problem of access through increased 
redistribution (of income and wealth), this does not mean that what we have is a 
morally adequate justification for a coercively imposed patent system.  I think that one 
way in which the justification, involving only the state in addressing the problems of 
access, is woefully inadequate is that it lets the WTO off the hook.  As I have tried to 
suggest, this is a mistake because the WTO and its member states play a crucial role in 
making individual states adopt a particular patent regime.
159
  They thus have to be held 
accountable, and the justification of the patent regime should reflect this.  One result 
of holding the WTO accountable is that those Brazilians and Indians, who are 
suffering as a result of the changes in the patent laws of their countries, may direct 
their complaints not just against their fellow compatriots but also against other 
member states of the WTO and their citizens.  The WTO’s involvement in the 
coercive imposition of a patent regime in India and Brazil expands the domain of 
actors who are complicit in the imposition of national patent regimes.  The 
justification that is sought has to satisfy in some appropriate way those who are 
                                                 
158 Note that by a conception of justice I do not have a particular conception in mind, like, for 
instance, Rawls’s special conception.  Any species within a family of liberal conceptions of 
justice would do. 
    
159 The WTO’s Dispute Settlement Body can, for instance, sanction a member for a violation 
once the Appellate Body has determined that the member is not living up to its obligations 
under TRIPS.  See supra for a more detailed discussion of the WTO’s Dispute Settlement 
System, pp.  26-30. 
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subject to the patent system.  To see whether domestic redistribution alone is sufficient 
to justify the effect on global access to essential drugs, we have to examine whether 
this is something that cannot be reasonably rejected by those who are affected by such 
an arrangement.  Which arrangement cannot be reasonably rejected is something that 
concerns not only citizens of India or Brazil, but in fact should be directed at all 
participants within the international trade regime.  So the question is, is a purely 
internal or domestic proposal to solve the problem of access to essential drugs 
something that cannot be reasonably rejected in light of the expanded domain of 
actors? 
One example of such a domestic arrangement would be to have the well-off in 
Brazil contribute to a tax-financed subsidy that goes to their worst-off fellow citizens 
in order to assist them in purchasing essential drugs.  Under this arrangement, the 
worst-off in Brazil appear not to  have any legitimate reasons to reject it, which would 
make the arrangement at least in their eyes seem justified.  The well-off do not have 
any legitimate reasons to complain against this arrangement when those complaints 
are directed at the worst-off, and the reason for this is that the burden of having to go 
without essential medicines is much more serious than what the well-off would have 
to give up in the form of tax contributions that fund these subsidies.  However, this 
does not imply that the well-off in Brazil have no grounds for complaint.  Brazil is 
significantly poorer than the US and the EC and the well-off there are on average 
poorer than their counterparts in the US and the EC.  Any state-wide redistribution 
from the well-off in Brazil would leave them worse off than they would be under an 
arrangement that looks to the other member states for additional economic assistance.  
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This implies that the well-off in Brazil have legitimate reasons to reject the purely 
state-wide arrangement because there is an alternative, more global, arrangement 
under which their burden is less and yet there is still adequate access to essential 
medicines.  Moreover, the well-off in developed countries cannot reasonably reject the 
more global arrangement, since their burden under this scheme is less than the burden 
on the well-off from developing countries under a purely domestic arrangement. From 
the standpoint of hypothetical consent, the arrangement that achieves equilibrium is 
likely to be more global, requiring that there be redistribution among WTO member 
states, and not within an individual state where the flow of economic assistance moves 
from the well-off to those who no longer can afford essential medicines under the new 
patent regime.   
There is, however, a much more serious objection that may be raised against 
my view.  I have been saying all along that member states contribute to the coercive 
imposition of a national intellectual property regime.  But it may be argued that what 
does not follow from this is that all citizens from these members states contribute to 
the coercive imposition of this regime in a way that makes them somehow responsible 
as agents of coercion.  For instance, there are citizens of member states who live under 
a political system that is not democratic and have no say in what the state does, be it 
domestically or internationally.  Would it be right to hold such citizens responsible for 
the effects engendered by the WTO regulated trade system even if their state is a 
member?   
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An argument of this sort may be discerned in Nagel’s writing on international 
justice.
160
  Nagel makes a case that citizens of one state do not owe a duty of 
distributive justice to citizens of another. Nagel argues that the obligations of 
distributive justice are the result of a special political relation that exists among fellow 
citizens.
161
  Citizens are in a sense unique and deserve special attention because they 
are subject to a shared set of laws and institutions that are coercively imposed.  But, 
Nagel adds, for the special relation to be capable of supporting duties of justice, there 
must also be that “special involvement of agency or the will that is inseparable from 
membership in a political society.”162    This special involvement of agency is present 
when citizens participate in state-based coercion of their fellow citizens and endow 
their state with the authority to engage in such coercion.  Citizens participate in the 
coercion of their fellow citizens when they assume their respective roles in the 
collective life of society, and, by doing their part, make it possible for the state to be 
an effective enforcer of its laws.  Citizens grant the state the authority to coerce by 
affirming that the state has the right to enforce its laws.  Thus the special relation, 
grounded in the special involvement of citizen agency, makes citizens, according to 
Nagel, complicit in one another’s coercion.163  It is in light of this special relation that 
citizens may demand from one another that there be justice, and, in particular, 
economic equality.  The reason for this is that the only way that citizens can justify the 
                                                 
160 Thomas Nagel, “The Problem of Global Justice.”  
 
161 Ibid. 
162 Ibid.  
163 Ibid. 
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laws and institutions of their state to one another – laws and institutions that have a 
profound effect on individual life prospects – is to have them exemplify a conception 
of justice that embraces some form of economic equality.
164
       
But what happens when the special relation is missing?  Nagel contends that in 
such a context there simply are no duties of distributive justice; the most there can be 
are duties of humanitarian aid.
165
  This presents an obvious problem for my view.  It 
might be argued that the WTO regulated international trade regime simply does not 
exhibit anything like the special relation among the collective citizenry, i.e. those 
citizens who hail from the member states of the WTO.  But if that is the case, there is 
no room for duties of distributive justice within the international trade regime. 
                                                 
164Ibid.  
165 Ibid.  It might be suggested that the provision of essential medicines to the global poor is 
humanitarian in nature and so would be entailed by duties of humanitarian aid.  I think that 
this may be the case in very extreme situations.  For instance, humanitarian aid may be 
extended  to people who are facing death or the prospects of a life of pain or substantial 
disability because of their medical condition, but who simply cannot afford the necessary 
medication – and if they managed to gather enough money, would face starvation, severe 
malnutrition, or something else that is equally dire.  But if getting the necessary medication 
means borrowing money at exorbitant interest rates and then having to live a life of toil to pay 
off the debt, then Nagel’s humanitarian duties of aid won’t be triggered – that is because these 
duties are triggered when there is a humanitarian crisis that is rather extreme: starvation, 
genocide, ethnic cleansing, natural disasters, etc. The key issue with access to essential 
medicines has do with the kind of burden that we think is acceptable to impose on the global 
poor.  From the standpoint of  Nagel’s humanitarian aid, duties of aid appear to tolerate 
burdens on the poor that can be quite significant.  This is why we need duties of distributive 
justice, for duties of justice entail a much less burdensome and, therefore, also a less harsh 
system of access.  What is more, humanitarian duties do not take into consideration how the 
particular humanitarian crisis came to be: as long as it is there, we have a duty to its victims.  
But what I am suggesting here is that those of us who have a duty to makes essential 
medicines more accessible to the poor are encumbered in this way because we are complicit in 
creating this problem, and consequently may be required to do a lot more than the sort of 
assistance that is entailed by humanitarian aid. 
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I  think that Nagel’s argument is a challenge to me on the following front.  It 
may well be that the international trade system is coercive in more or less the way that 
I suggest that it is.  Moreover, it may also be the case that such coercion affects the 
economic wellbeing of some citizens – because essential medicines become much less 
affordable.  Nevertheless this is not enough to establish that there are duties of 
distributive justice within the international trade system because the citizenry of the 
WTO are not related to one another in a way that would entail such duties.
166
       
I think there are two ways to respond to this challenge.  One way is to say that 
the citizenry of the WTO do stand in the right sort of relation to one another so that 
there are duties of distributive justice that are specific to the international trade system.  
Another way is to suggest that the special relation is not really a requirement of 
distributive justice.  The second of these responses is more promising, and later in this 
section I explain why this is so.   But let me first try to develop an argument along the 
lines of the first response.   
It might be argued that there is already something like the special relation 
within the international trade regime.   After all, the special relation is premised on the 
special involvement of individual agency.  And this is present when individuals 
participate in the making of the laws and institutions and in enabling their coercive 
imposition by an agent with the authority to do so.  Of course, when it comes to the 
                                                 
166 Note that this is a different challenge from that coming from Blake.  The Blakian challenge, 
if we can call it that, was that international coercion was just not the sort of thing that could 
affect the economic wellbeing of individual citizens.  For Blake international coercion is 
something that takes place just between states and its effects do not trickle down to the level of 
individual citizens.  The TRIPS example is meant to challenge the accuracy of Blake’s 
assertions about international coercion.  But as yet the example does not address Nagel’s 
requirement that there be a special relation.    
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WTO, the various multilateral agreements that specify the rules to which member 
states are bound have been designed and agreed to by individual states.  Moreover, 
when there is a dispute about compliance, it is once again individual states that are 
authorized to raise this issue within the WTO.  So far individual citizens do not seem 
to be involved in any way.  But this is not entirely accurate.  During the early phase of 
the Uruguay Round when it was still unclear what form the TRIPS Agreement would 
ultimate take – and indeed whether there was even going to be an agreement on 
intellectual property – numerous local NGOs in India, for instance, lobbied the 
national government quite vigorously in an effort to prevent any agreement from 
extending patent protection to pharmaceutical products.
167
  These NGOs ultimately 
ended up on the losing side, as India eventually succumbed to the pressure coming 
from the US and the European Union.  But this effort nonetheless did represent an 
attempt on the part of some Indians to try to influence the substantive provisions of the 
TRIPS Agreement.  Something similar may be said about the role that the US played 
during the Uruguay Round.  The US was pushing an agenda that was quite pro-
business and one that favored the protection of all forms of intellectual property that 
are recognized by its national laws.  Much of the substance of the policies that were 
advanced by the US was heavily influenced by the Intellectual Property Committee 
(IPC).
168
  There was thus an effort in the US as well, on the part of certain well-placed 
                                                 
167
 See Evans, “Intellectual Property as a Trade Issue,” pp. 171-74; Dasgupta, WTO & TRIPS: 
Indian Perspective. 
 
168 The IPC consists of some of the largest corporations in the US; its stated purpose is to 
improve intellectual property protections throughout the world.  See Susan Sell, Private 
Power, Public Law. 
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and powerful individuals and also their firms, to shape the rules that were to be 
incorporated into TRIPS.
169
   
The difficulty with this response is that it seems to work with states that are 
representative democracies to some extent.  India and the US are examples of this.  
But of course not all states that are members of the WTO are democracies or even 
functioning states.  Both the Democratic Republic of Congo and Niger, for example, 
are member states.  But could we say that the agency of citizens from two of the 
poorest and politically dysfunctional countries in the world have been somehow 
involved in the making and enforcement of the TRIPS Agreement?  I think that the 
reasonable answer is, of course not.  It may be suggested that citizens of democratic 
member states stand in a special relation to citizens of other democratic member 
states, and thus owe duties of justice to one another.  But this proposal has the result 
that the Americans may owe a duty of justice to the Indians but not to the Congolese, 
which seems quite implausible, since the Congolese are more vulnerable and more in 
need of economic assistance than the Indians.  
I think that the better response to Nagel is to say that the special relation is not 
necessary for distributive justice in the way that he thinks that it is.  What I will in fact 
argue is not only that the special relation is not necessary, but there is also something 
quite misguided about Nagel’s approach to thinking about distributive justice and 
about justice in general.   
                                                 
169
 The people involved of course were only a small cross-section of the American public.  But 
the American public at least in principle has a way to influence the policies, both foreign and 
domestic, that are carried out by its government: if unhappy, the American public can voice 
this unhappiness by voting against the government that is in power. 
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For Nagel, as mentioned above, there has to be a special relation before we can 
attribute duties of distributive justice to one another.  Where the special relation is 
present, as it does in a liberal democratic state, the state has to be quite egalitarian.  On 
the other hand, where the special relation is absent, the demands of distributive justice 
are non-existent, and so a state may have a basic structure that tolerates huge 
economic disparities without thereby becoming unjust.  This suggests that what is 
ideally just for a state really depends on whether or not its citizens exemplify the 
special relation.  In other words, the special relation is the all important variable whose 
presence affects what we consider to be ideally just.  For Nagel, what is ideally just 
has to be worked out in stages.   First, citizens have to fight for a political system that 
implicates their agency in a way that makes the system be in their name.  Only once 
individual agency is implicated in this way and the special relation binds citizens 
together, may what is viewed as ideally just move up a notch and embrace some 
version of social and economic equality.   
This I suggest is a very strange way to think about justice. When we think 
about what it would be like to have a just state or a just world, we are immediately 
drawn to what we perceive to be as ideally just.   We may of course disagree with 
what it is for a state to be ideally just.  (The debate between Rawls and Nozick  may 
be viewed in this way.)  But in every case what is on offer is a conception that 
embraces an ideal.  The reality of course is that we have no choice but to be subjects 
of one state or another, and for most of us this will be a specific state, as we remain 
nationals of a single country from birth to death.    Once we accept that it is our fate to 
live in a state, it seems natural to want to maximize its virtues.  In other words, as long 
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as the state is going to wield enormous power and control over our lives by regulating 
our terms of cooperation with one another, we would want to perfect the state as much 
as possible, and justice clearly ought to constitute the sine qua non of the virtuous 
state.  There will be differences of opinion about what is an ideally just state, but not 
in the way that Nagel’s account appears to imply.  Whether I happen to live in a 
totalitarian state that is in the iron grip of the military or party elite, or in a liberal 
democracy, what I imagine to be ideally just should not vary.  For instance, I would 
not hesitate to say that it is better to live in a state that is democratic than one that is 
not; that respects a wide range of human rights than one that respects only a few or 
none at all; that limits the extent of economic disparities among its citizens than one 
that pays no heed to the presence of economic inequality.   
Of course, I say these things because my considered convictions, which shape 
these judgments, reflect my immersion in a political culture where convictions of this 
sort are quite prominent.  Someone, on the other hand, who comes from a different 
cultural and political background might have a different ideal in mind.  She might 
claim that it is better to have a state that is theocratic, with laws and institutions that 
reflect a comprehensive conception of the good, steeped in centuries-old religious 
traditions of her people.  But what is important to notice here is that the person who 
embraces the religious ideal is not going to vary it on the basis of whether her agency 
is involved in a particular way.  Instead, she simply identifies an ideal, and if the state 
falls short of this ideal, then presumably she would want the state to come to realize it 
one day.  In this respect, the religious person and I are on the same page: we work out 
what we think would be an ideally just state and use it as a guide to inform us about 
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what is wrong with our state currently and what has to be done to correct this.  Nagel’s 
insistence on the special relation as a factor of constraint on what is ideally just 
frustrates this way of thinking because we are kept from imagining the truly ideal and, 
instead, are saddled with an inferior version. 
Rawls’s approach to developing a conception of justice, I think, avoids Nagel’s 
counterintuitive results.  On the Rawlsian picture, we have to justify the coercive laws 
and institutions of the state because they ultimately define the constellation of rights 
and the bundle of economic goods that citizens receive.  When we make the subjects 
of coercion the focus of a theory of justice, the question then becomes, what would 
justify the presence of such coercion to these subjects?
170
   But once we take the 
position of the coerced, there is one and only one way to justify the presence of 
coercion and that is by way of a conception of justice – for nothing less than ideal 
justice would be enough.  But when we attend to this fact of coercion, any mention of 
the special relation between fellow citizens essentially drops out.  That is because 
regardless of who is doing the coercing or how it gets generated, citizens are being 
coerced, and it is this fact about their political existence that has to be addressed.  And 
because this can be achieved by nothing less than ideal justice, it does not ultimately 
matter whether the state exercising the coercion is democratic, where the special 
                                                 
170 This is a key difference between Rawls and Nagel.  For Rawls, the fact of coercion is of 
central concern, which, prioritizes the position of the coerced and demands that we examine 
the adequacy of justifying coercion from their standpoint.  This makes the project of justifying 
coercion more straightforward because we only have to look at coercion from the standpoint 
of the coerced without having to include fellow citizens as middlemen mitigating the adequacy 
of justifying coercion.   
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relation is present, or nondemocratic, where it is not.
171
  In either case, coercion has 
the same result and that is to define the entitlements that citizens have access to.
172
   
But if the result is more or less the same in either case, then it stands to reason that the 
justification for coercion done by a democratic state and one for coercion done by a 
state that is not would also have to be more or less the same.
173
 
How we are connected to one another as citizens does not change what we 
think is ideally just, as I tried to argue above.  Our conception of ideal justice, in part, 
is meant to illuminate the various injustices that are present in our state.  But the fact 
that there are these injustices out there does not yet tell us what we are supposed to do 
about them.  Is it obvious that as citizens we have a duty to eliminate these injustices 
and bring our state closer to realizing our conception of ideal justice?  I do not think 
so.  Nor is it obvious that even if there is such a duty that the burdens of political 
transition should fall in equal parts on all citizens regardless of their status in society.   
This suggests that Nagel’s claim about the special relation may still be 
relevant, but in relation to the task of rectifying existing injustices.  Duties that attend 
a conception of justice are one thing – and here the special relation does not have any 
                                                 
171 This is not explicitly Nagel’s claim.  But in another paper, I contend that a good case can be 
made that nondemocratic states do not implicate individual citizens in the coercion of their 
fellows compatriots in a way that would make the state’s system of laws and institutions be in 
their names.    
 
172 This is not to suggest that the two generate the same entitlements, which would be false.  
What I mean here is that formally coercive laws and institutions both in democratic and 
nondemocratic states affect the bundles of rights and economic goods that citizens have access 
to.  Of course, the content of these bundles will be vastly different.  
 
173
 What is more, there is nothing unfair about having rather robust duties of justice that 
demand redistribution because that is what justice demands in circumstances where there is 
coercion.  If we have settled on the right conception of justice, then there is no room for 
complaint. 
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bearing on the substance of a conception of justice.  But what we are required to do in 
the here and now to make the state conform to ideal justice is a different, though a 
related, problem in a theory of justice – and here it may be argued that something akin 
to the special relation still matters.  Our task in the here and now is not the same as 
what we are called to do by a conception of justice.
174
  In other words, there are two 
distinct problems at issue: one of the problems has to do with transitioning toward 
ideal justice, and which falls squarely within the realm of non-ideal theory; the other 
has to do with working out a conception of justice, which when implemented by a 
state would make it ideally just.
175
      
My contention here is that we have a further problem in a theory of justice to 
deal with, which is not about what is owed to others as required by a particular 
conception of justice.  Indeed, as citizens of an ideally just state, we have duties of 
justice because the conception of justice that applies to the basic structure requires that 
we do.  These duties of justice are constitutive of an ideally just state: they are the very 
expression of a conception of justice, which when instantiated makes the state ideally 
just.  But this is only part of the story, for there may also be duties of justice that have 
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 Even if we think, for instance, that economic inequality in the US has to conform to the 
difference principle, there is no way that this can be done without politically preparing the 
American polity for such an endeavor.  The institutional groundwork has to be laid before 
anything like the special conception becomes a political reality.  Think of what it would take 
to implement the difference principle.  Our state in its current form may not have the 
institutional framework to put the difference principle into practice.  So laws would have to be 
changed and new institutions would have to be designed to support the massive redistribution 
that would begin to take place.   But the more difficult problem has to do with convincing the 
vast majority of the American people and the American government that the difference 
principle is the right principle.  At this point in time given the current political atmosphere this 
seems like an impossible task to pull off.  This suggests that a great deal has to be 
accomplished before anything like the special conception can be applied to the basic structure.  
  
175 This is a problem of course for ideal theory. 
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to do with transitioning a state from having a basic structure that is unjust to one that 
exemplifies a conception of justice.
176
  Nagel’s objection may be taken as challenging 
an account of justice that stipulates that citizens per se have duties of the latter sort.  It 
may well be the case that a just state is one where citizens have a duty to make their 
state reasonably egalitarian.  But what happens when the state falls short of realizing 
such ideal justice in its basic structure?  What obligations, if any, do citizens have to 
one another to make their state transition toward being ideally just?  Nagel’s original 
point about duties of justice requiring the special relation can be reformulated to apply 
to duties of transition instead: if citizens are to have duties of transition, then there has 
to be a something like the special relation.   
Viewed in this way the objection does have merit, for there is something right 
about examining the role the individual plays in her polity in delineating the duties 
that may be owed to rectifying injustice.
177
  An individual, for instance, may play only 
a de minimus role in the coercive imposition of unjust laws because of her social and 
political status within the state.  For example, if Jamila is a member of an oppressed 
minority who is kept out of the political process entirely, and who may be severely 
punished for any type of behavior that appears to challenge the laws and institutions of 
the state, then her obligation to her fellow citizens who are least-advantaged may be 
mitigated by the forced political disenfranchisement from the political process.  
                                                 
176 We can call them duties of transition because their purpose is to achieve ideal justice. 
 
177 However, I interpret this relation in a way that is somewhat different from what Nagel has 
in mind when he invokes the special involvement of individual agency.  I argue that the 
relation has to explained in terms of how the individual is being treated by the relevant 
political system of which she is a member and not in terms of the involvement of her agency. 
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Jamila’s connection to the least advantaged is more attenuated because she has no way 
to influence the laws and institutions to which they are subject.  Nor do the laws and 
institutions seem to favor people like her, since she is a member of a minority that has 
been targeted for ill-treatment.  Because of the way Jamila is treated, it may not be 
right to say that she is implicated in the coercion of her fellow compatriots in quite the 
same way as that of the majority whose access to the political system is much less 
hindered.  For this reason, it would be unfair to hold Jamila responsible for the plight 
of her fellow citizens to the same extent, or even at all, as members of the majority 
who play a more substantial role in generating injustice.
178
  Thus, even if we accept 
that our ideal includes distributive justice, what is demanded of us to achieve this ideal 
may depend on our standing within the state.  Furthermore, this applies not just to 
states, but to any coercive system of cooperation that falls short of ideal justice as 
specified by a conception of justice that is suited for it, including international systems 
like the international trade regime under the WTO.   
The difference between my position and Nagel’s may be explained by looking 
at where we locate the relevance of a person’s nexus to her polity.  Nagel thinks that it 
makes a difference to what we, as members of a coercive system of cooperation, owe 
one another under ideal justice.  I, on the other hand, maintain that coercion alone is 
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 What Nagel says about the special relation may be viewed as a way to make sense of our 
intuition that citizens are not all responsible in the same way for the harms suffered by their 
compatriots. But the reason for this, as I will explain, goes deeper than the way in which 
individual agency is implicated in state coercion.  As I suggest below responsibility hinges on 
how the individual is treated by her polity.  Nonetheless, when a person is poorly treated by 
the polity in the way that I suggest, it is also the case that her agency is not going to be 
involved in the coercion of her fellow citizens in the way that Nagel thinks is morally 
significant.     
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sufficient to trigger the requirement of justifying the exercise of coercion, which can 
only be achieved by invoking a liberal conception of justice.  But I also suggest that 
how a person is treated by her polity does make a difference to what she may be 
obligated to do to bring about a transition toward ideal justice.        
In the next section, I offer an account of why we have an obligation to bring a 
coercive system of cooperation of which we are members closer to justice.  But I also 
try to make sense of how some individual participants may have a lesser obligation or 
none at all to remedy injustice based on their role or involvement in such systems.  I 
suggest how this can be done with respect to states and their citizens, but more 
importantly, I maintain this can be extended to apply to the international trade regime 
as well.    
 
2. Collective Responsibility 
As citizens of a state – and correspondingly as members of society – we are 
responsible,  to some degree, for the injustices that are committed by our state.  The 
injustices I have in mind here are ones that have been at issue throughout the paper, 
namely, those that flow from a basic structure that happens not to instantiate some 
suitable version of a liberal conception of justice.  The issue of responsibility, of 
collective responsibility to be exact, ties in with our attempt to offer an account of 
what should be done when our state, and also society, fall short of ideal justice.  The 
notion of collective responsibility gives us a straightforward way of both specifying 
the content of a moral duty – or a moral imperative – and of identifying the agents on 
whom the duty falls.  If we are the ones responsible for these injustices in some way, 
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then it would only seem right to demand from us that we see to it that these injustices 
are rectified and things are set as they ought to be.  Indeed, this is the line I will pursue 
here as an answer to the question, what are we morally required to do to bring our 
state in compliance with a conception of justice and why we are expected to do so.  I 
call duties that apply to ordinary citizens at such a juncture duties of transition.  My 
answer roughly is that we are required to correct these structural injustices because we 
are collectively responsible for them and the only way this can be done is to have a 
conception of justice be applied to the basic structure.  The duties of transition, in 
other words, entail that in discharging our collective responsibility we are to ensure 
that the state implements a conception of justice.
179
 
Collective responsibility is, I think, a rich, albeit a controversial, basis for 
duties of justice, but, as I argue, it forms an important part of non-ideal theory.  In my 
discussion of collective responsibility, I rely on David Miller’s significant 
contributions to this subject.
180
  I accept his general thesis that responsibility may be 
assigned to individuals based on their group membership.  However, I disagree with 
some of the details of his position.  In particular, I reject Miller’s explanation for when 
and why individual members become exempt from collective responsibility.  Instead,  
I offer my own grounds for annulling responsibility, which cover a much broader set 
                                                 
179
 One thing that I do not want to do is to suggest that collective responsibility exhausts the 
source of these duties of transition.  It might well turn out, and I think that this is probably 
right, that the natural duty of justice may compel individual citizens to support an institutional 
shift toward greater justice as well, though it may not go far enough as what I think we are 
required to do as a result of our collective responsibility.  See Rawls, A Theory of Justice, p.  
 
180 David Miller, “Holding Nations Responsible,” Ethics, Vol. 114, Issue 2, January 2004, 
pp240-68. See also David Miller, “National Responsibility and Global Justice,” Critical 
Review of International Social & Political Philosophy, Vol. 11, Issue 4, December 2008, pp. 
383-99. 
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of cases.   Below I offer a discussion of Miller’s overall views on collective 
responsibility.  After the summary, I put forward some of my criticisms of his account 
and then apply collective responsibility in this revised form to my discussion of the 
international trade regime. 
 
3. Miller’s Account of Collective Responsibility 
 Miller argues that individuals may indeed be held responsible for the actions 
of their groups or collectives.  (These terms are used interchangeably by Miller.)  So, 
for example, if a collective causes environmental damage, engages in ethnic cleansing, 
then its members are, at least putatively, collectively responsible for these harms.  The 
responsibility is collective because it attaches to individual members in virtue of the 
role they play within the collective.
181
  Of course, the collective itself may be held 
responsible, but, as Miller explains, this really does not amount to much if we are 
serious about the normative implications of responsibility, which are meant to make 
agents accountable for the consequences of their actions and liable to make amends.  
In the end, Miller insists, it is persons who are equipped to deal with undoing or 
rectifying the harms of collectives, and so responsibility ultimately has to descend to 
the level of individuals.
182
   
Now Miller has a specific form of responsibility in mind.  He thinks that those 
individuals who are collectively responsible are generally outcome responsible for the 
                                                 
181 Miller, “Holding Nations Responsible,” p. 247. 
 
182 Ibid., p. 250.  
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harms caused by their collective.
183
   For Miller, if a person is outcome responsible, 
then she may be required to bear the cost – some or all of it, depending on the situation 
– of remedying harms and compensating the injured party.184   An individual may be 
outcome responsible for the harms she herself has caused or for those caused by her 
collective.  Outcome responsibility in other words may apply either where there is 
collective or individual responsibility, but in either case the person becomes liable for 
the harms done.  Miller distinguishes outcome responsibility from causal 
responsibility because he does not think that causal responsibility necessarily leads to 
outcomes responsibility.
185
  Outcomes that arise in unforeseeable and unintended ways 
usually do not entail outcome responsibility.  Furthermore,  Miller insists that we 
should not equate outcome responsibility to moral responsibility: a person may be 
outcome responsible for a particular harm without necessarily being morally blamed 
for it.
186
  If Smith is visually impaired and accidently bumps into and breaks a Ming 
vase on display, then presumably she ought to pay for it.  But we would not say that 
she deserves to be rebuked for having accidentally broken the vase.
187
  These 
distinctions seem right to me, and I think the separation of outcome responsibility 
from moral responsibility is especially important for it allows the imposition of 
                                                 
183 Ibid., p.245.  Miller attributes the term to Tony Honore´, which appears in Honore´’s, 
Responsibility and Fault, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999. 
 
184 Ibid. 
 
185 Ibid., p. 246. 
 
186 Ibid. 
 
187 We are assuming here that Smith was not doing anything out of the ordinary like running 
around flailing her arms and bumping into things.  Perhaps under these circumstances some 
moral blame might not be out of place. 
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liability without having to establish moral culpability or blame, which is much harder 
to do.
188
  So from now on  it will be with outcome responsibility that I will be 
concerned with in my discussion of collective responsibility. 
It is one thing to specify the moral demands that are implied by outcome 
responsibility, but it is quite another thing to justify the attribution of outcome 
responsibility on the basis of membership.  So how does Miller justify such an 
ascription?  In his discussion of justification, Miller distinguishes between two types 
of collectives: the first type he calls the “like-minded group model,” and the other, 
“the cooperative practice model.”189  The like-minded group consists of members who 
are brought together because they share a common cause – a group of rioters, criminal 
gangs, etc. fall within this category.  The second type consists of persons who are part 
of a “common practice” and share in the benefits created through cooperation, and 
there is no “requirement that the group in question should share a common 
identity.”190  With respect to each type of group, Miller offers a series of rationales for 
holding their members responsible.  Participants in a mob, for example, are 
responsible because they participated in a “collective activity that was certain to inflict 
                                                 
188 What really is the point then of moral responsibility if just like outcome responsibility the 
agent is liable for the harms done?  It seems to me that one thing that can be said about 
someone who is also morally responsible is that she may deserve to be punished, and this may 
be reflected in the cost of remedial measures imposed on her, or in the way she is treated – for 
instance she may be deprived of her freedom as retribution for the things that she did.  Persons 
who are outcome responsible are not being punished, nor do we think that they deserve to be.    
 
189 Miller, “Holding Nations Responsible,” p. 249. 
 
190 Ibid., p.253. 
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damage on other people.”191  Miller maintains that it does not matter whether the 
actual outcome was intended by these participants as long as it was reasonably 
foreseeable – and insists that this is certainly the case with participants of an angry 
mob who happen to enter a vulnerable neighborhood.  Nor does it matter, according to 
Miller, whether an individual rioter did any of the actual damage herself because she 
“shared in the general aim” of her group.192   
In another example, Miller extends collective responsibility to whites in the 
post-bellum South “for keeping blacks in a state of subjugation,” including those who 
rejected the worst forms of racial animus.  He maintains that we are justified in casting 
a wide net of collective responsibility because even the less racist white Southerners 
who disapproved the way some of their fellow Southerners treated African-Americans 
nevertheless “shared in the set of cultural values” that encouraged such conduct.193  
This sharing of certain values amounted to a form of participation, for it generated an 
ethos of racial intolerance.  Even passive members, in maintaining their allegiance to 
norms and values that underpinned the notion of white supremacy, contributed to a 
climate of racial hatred that led to lynchings and beatings.      
In his exposition of the second model of a collective, Miller again asks us to 
consider an example.  Suppose an employee-controlled company is engaged in a 
manufacturing process that causes environmental damage to a river.  Miller argues that 
the employees of the company are outcome responsible for the environmental damage 
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and thus should jointly bear the cost of cleaning it up.  They (causally) contribute to 
the environmental damage to the river and also benefit from the activities of the 
company – they make a living, express their creativity at work, and so on.  But, Miller 
contends, collective responsibility also extends to everyone, including those who 
objected to causing the environmental pollution.  This is so because they too 
benefitted from a common practice: they enjoyed the benefits of their job, had a fair 
opportunity to influence company policies, and “so they must be prepared to carry 
their share of the costs…that stem from the external impact of the practice.”194  
Miller’s contention is that a member’s participation in and benefit from the common 
practice of her collective together are sufficient to make her outcome responsible for 
its actions. 
The examples of collectives given by Miller point to the following common 
features.  First, members contribute to the activities or practice of their collective.  
That contribution, however, does not have to be one that results in a harm: the 
individual rioter does not have to throw a single stone because her mere presence can 
be enough to encourage her fellow members to commit a violent act.  Of course, when 
a member does participate in an action that causes a harm, it is much easier to find her 
outcome responsible.  The passive white Southerner is held responsible because his 
support of values that underpin white supremacy normalizes and validates racial 
discrimination practiced by others.  Second, members derive a benefit from the 
activities of their collective.  This seems particularly true with cooperative ones, and 
both states and nations are prime examples of such collectives.  Within states or 
                                                 
194 Ibid., p. 253. 
 246 
nations, individual members benefit by having access to public goods.  Benefits that 
flow to individual members, however, do not have to be in the form of public goods – 
though public goods perhaps make a stronger case for collective responsibility.  
Members of ‘like-minded’ collectives also stand to gain from their membership: they 
may, for instance, derive a psychological benefit from having others join them in 
pursuing an end that is particularly important to them.   The key point, for Miller, 
about collective responsibility is that to be outcome responsible a member has to both 
contribute to and benefit from the cooperative activities of her collective.  
This basic claim about collective responsibility suggests that it can be extended 
to any collective as long as there is both contribution and benefit.  As mentioned 
before, this is the case with states and nations.  But this can be applied to other large 
systems or regimes of cooperation.  (Indeed, cooperative collectives are examples of 
systems of cooperation.)  In particular, we can extend this to international regimes of 
cooperation, including the international trade system.  Miller himself directs his 
attention to nations in his discussion of collective responsibility and eschews the 
mention of states.
195
   Yet there is nothing in his discussion that prevents states and the 
                                                 
195 Miller insists that nations in particular may be held collectively responsible for what they 
do.  Indeed, such collective responsibility implies that members of a nation may be held 
outcome responsible for the harms done by their nation, either to outsiders or to other 
members.  For him, members of a nation are both participants in and beneficiaries of an 
ongoing cultural project carried out by the nation.  And so as participants and beneficiaries, 
members have to own up, at times, to the deleterious consequences of the national project.  
My qualms with Miller have to do with making nations the loci of collective responsibility.  
Nations in pursuing their cultural agenda have to work through states.  When a  particular 
cultural aspect of a nation is under threat for whatever reason, laws are generally passed to 
protect it from going extinct.   Canada for instance has language laws that try to maintain the 
importance of the French language throughout the commonwealth and especially in Quebec so 
that Quebecoise culture remain vibrant and not overwhelmed by the more dominant culture of  
English speaking Canadians.  Canada of course is multicultural, liberal democracy and so it 
may argued that only more or less liberal states intervene on the side of marginalized cultures.  
 247 
citizenry from collective responsibility.  Nor is there anything to suggest that 
international systems and their participants are immune from responsibility.   
States generate all sorts of harms, and in particular they produce injustice, 
which is a type of social harm.  As we saw earlier, states engender injustice when their 
basic structure does not instantiate a conception of justice.  This demand on the basic 
structure is made because the coercion exercised by the state has to be justified, which 
can only be done by applying a conception of justice.  The presence of coercion is 
essential in defining the outcomes generated by the state as injustice and therefore as 
harms: without it, these special harms would not be there, nor would there be a need to 
alleviate them.  The significance of coercion is thus two-fold: first, the presence of 
coercion can turn a certain outcome into injustice; second, coercion makes certain 
systems of cooperation possible, systems which would not endure without it and 
which immerse persons in a collective. 
                                                                                                                                            
A nation  that is the dominant one within the state, or the only one for that matter certainly 
does not need any assistance from the state.  The claim that a nation can carry out is business 
independently of the state is not quite right.   For one thing, a state can make it very difficult  
to pursue a national project and it can do so with a legal system that is hostile to this endeavor.  
This does not happen with respect to a dominant nation or one that is exclusive because in 
these cases the state is in sync with the nation; the laws are such that they allow the nation to 
express itself, through its cultural forms for example.  My point here is that nations act 
through their own states and that brings in state coercion into the picture.  National projects 
are outcome of state coercion.  But when coercion is involved, those who contribute to the 
national project are not merely members of that nation.  On the contrary, it is all citizens of the 
state that have to participate in the national project: English speaking Canadians participate in 
the preservation of Quebecoise culture by abiding by the language laws of Canada.  When 
only members of a nation are held collectively responsible, we may be undercounting the 
number of actual participants when non-national citizens are involved.  Thus I would argue 
that when…  the collective we in fact have is the citizenry, for those who participate in the 
coercion that is carried out by the state are precisely its citizens, not just members of a nation.  
So coercion is in some sense the political glue that engenders a collective that is just 
synonymous with the citizenry of a particular state. 
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When the basic structure of a state fails to live up to the standards of a 
conception of justice and there is thus structural injustice within the state, citizens of 
that state are prima facie outcome responsible for these injustices.  That is at least 
what I want to defend.  We have before us all of the ingredients of collective 
responsibility.  The state certainly can be described as a collective.  Its members are 
the citizens of that state and they work together to produce a cooperative product.   
They are bound to one another by the laws of their state and are kept from making 
themselves exempt from obeying them by the coercive power of the state.  In a typical 
state, citizens also have access to certain public goods.  How rich the set of public 
goods is and whether access to them embraces some form of egalitarianism will 
depend on how wealthy and just the state is. What is important to note here is that the 
benefits of being a citizen cannot be insignificant if we are to make citizens liable to 
the harms of their state.  Indeed, it would seem unfair to burden a person in the way 
that outcome responsibility seeks to do if the benefits of citizenship are trivial or non-
existent.  This means that in the context of a failed or outlaw state, we cannot make 
sense of imposing collective responsibility on ordinary citizens of that state.  But 
barring such cases, people generally benefit considerably from living in a state that is 
competent enough to provide even such basic provisions as personal security, basic 
education, protection of private property, and so on.  Individual citizens through social 
and political  cooperation also enable the state to carry on in the way that it does; in 
particular, they enable the state to enforce its laws within the territory that is under its 
sovereign control.  As I argued elsewhere, the practice of good citizenship – i.e. 
obeying the law, recognizing that the state has the authority to enforce its laws, being 
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economically productive, making a good faith effort in  participating in the political 
process where this is allowed – makes it possible for the state to be an effective 
enforcer of its laws.
196
  One important consequence of such enforcement is that if the 
laws are unjust, the state in enforcing them is acting in an unjust way – it is 
committing injustice.  Ordinary citizens in so far as they enable the state to behave in 
this way thus contribute toward engendering such injustice.  That is to say, citizens 
become complicit in the harms generated by their collective, which is the state.   In 
light of such contribution and the fact that citizens of a typical modern state derive 
certain important benefits, a case can be made for their collective responsibility.        
Collective responsibility on the part of citizens of a state entails that they are, 
at least, outcome responsible for the structural injustices caused by their state.  And 
outcome responsibility makes individual citizens liable for these injustices.  A state 
that generates structural injustices – because the distribution of rights and entitlements 
is unfair – has a basic structure that falls short of ideal justice.  Liability for these 
injustices requires that those responsible should remedy the harms done.  In this case, 
this means that individual citizens ought to, through collective action, undo these 
structural injustices.  Of course, these structural injustices would disappear if the basic 
structure were to instantiate a conception of justice.  The responsibility that falls on 
individual citizens thus would require that they endeavor to make their state apply a 
conception of justice to its basic structure.  In other words, they have a duty to see to it 
that their state transitions from being structurally unjust to being ideally just.  It should 
                                                 
196 In another paper, I suggests ways in which individual citizens contribute to one another’s 
coercion.  For the most part this consists in enabling the normal functioning of the state, which 
can they go on and enforce its laws.  See my, “Response to Nagel and Blake.” 
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not surprise us that the demands of outcome responsibility fall within the ambit of 
transitional justice.   
Similarly, participants of the international trade regime are outcome 
responsible for the injustice caused by that regime.  Certain essential drugs are much 
less accessible to the poor.  The change in the patent laws has made a substantial 
impact on the wellbeing of persons who are subject to the global patent system.  And 
as we saw earlier, this has to be justified.  To do this, TRIPS may have to be amended 
so as to include a subsidized transfer of essential medicines to states that cannot afford 
to pay monopoly prices.  My contention here is that doing nothing at this point would 
constitute an injustice.  This specific result is an outcome of the international trade 
regime,  which also happens to be coercive.  It is not coercive in a straightforward way 
where there is a central and unified agent that directly coerces its subjects.  States are 
coercive in this way, but not the trade regime.  From the standpoint of justification, 
however, this hardly matters.  The trade regime does indeed coerce individuals, but 
this happens when the WTO works jointly with individual member states.  The 
process of coercion is started by the WTO, but it ultimately descends to the level of 
individual citizens.   But this difference in how coercion is enforced does not 
diminishes the need for justifying the outcomes generated by the trade system, for the 
effect on individuals is the same: they are forced to obey international intellectual 
property laws that have also been nationalized.  If the trade regime continues to 
operate by denying people access, then it is unjust in that respect.  Because the trade 
regime also constitutes a collective, its participants may be held prima facie outcome 
responsible for this specific injustice and be required to rectify it.    
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4. Limitations on Collective Responsibility 
So far I have argued that outcome responsibility based on citizenship and 
membership within the international trade system may compel a transition toward 
greater institutional justice.  That said, not every member can be found outcome 
responsible.  It would be a terrible mistake for instance if members who are victims of 
their own collective are saddled with collective responsibility for these harms.  If an 
account of collective responsibility is to be plausible at all, it has to have the 
conceptual resources to exclude certain members from outcome responsibility.  Miller 
is aware of this difficult problem and offers an interesting solution.  Miller formulates 
two kinds of exceptions or exemptions to outcome responsibility.  The first exemption 
applies to individuals who have gone out and done something substantial against the 
wrongs or injustices committed by their collective or group.  As I interpret Miller, the 
idea behind this exemptions is that the morally decent and conscientious person has 
already done her part in trying to rectify the harms caused by her collective, and so it 
would be wrong or unfair to demand that she also take part in remedying these harms 
once her collective is ready and willing to discharge its obligation, as stipulated by 
outcome responsibility, to its victims.  The second exemption applies to individuals 
who are members of a collective and who have been seriously victimized by their 
collective.  An oppressed minority is a case in point.  According to Miller, it would be 
wrong to hold members of a deeply vilified community outcome responsible for the 
harms done by the larger collective – i.e. nation or state – when they are themselves 
targets of these harms.  Thus, German Jews should not be held outcome responsible 
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for the terrible fate the befell them during the Nazi period, even though they were 
members of the German nation as well as citizens of the German state.   
In the section that follows, I examine Miller’s exemptions to outcome 
responsibility and suggest how his account of exemptions might be revised to fall 
more squarely in line with our intuitions about collective responsibility.  I claim that 
Miller’s second exemption is spot on: we clearly do not want to hold victims outcome 
responsible for their victimization.  But I also think that Miller’s explanation for why 
we ought not hold victims responsible is not entirely convincing.  Instead, I offer an 
explanation along Kantian lines that I think is more plausible and can be generalized 
to include other forms of victimhood that ought to exclude persons from outcome 
responsibility.  On the other hand, I maintain that Miller’s justification of the first 
exemption understates the extent to which even morally decent individuals may be 
unjustly rewarded by being part of a predatory collective.  I provide an extensive 
discussion of this exemption and argue that the morally decent person should still be 
held outcome responsible, though to a lesser extent.  In place of Miller’s first 
exemption, I suggest another exemption, which Miller himself does not bring up.  I 
claim that some members of a collective qualify to be exempt from outcome 
responsibility because the imposition of the cost of remedying a harm is unreasonably 
burdensome on them.
197
  When it comes to large political entities, like the state or the 
                                                 
197 An  unreasonable burden is one that would severely diminish a person’s overall life 
prospects.  However, it has to be emphasized that what is at issue here is the cost of making 
the victim whole that goes beyond the cessation of active participation in committing a harm 
or injustice.  Even poor white Southerners may not continue to benefit from racist and 
discriminatory policies even if this means that their livelihood would be harmed as a result.  
But they may be made exempt from contributing to a tax-financed project of undoing the 
legacy of white supremacy in the South if such contribution involves burdens that are severe 
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trade regime, and the remedy calls for some form of economic redistribution, the 
economically worst-off members may be entitled to be exempt, for the loss to them 
may be substantial enough to seriously diminish their life prospects.
198
 
 
5. Exemptions to Outcome Responsibility 
In his work on outcome responsibility, David Miller contends that under 
certain circumstances persons should be excused from being held outcome responsible 
for the offences or crimes committed by their group or collective.  He argues for two 
types of exemptions from outcome responsibility by way of discussing two examples 
from history.
199
  In this section, I examine each of these examples in some detail, 
focusing specifically on what Miller thinks they purport to show.  I then raise some 
objections to Miller’s rationale for granting exemptions to outcome responsibility and 
instead offer my own explanations for them.  
Let me first turn my attention to Miller’s example of a white Southerner living 
in the post-bellum South.
200
  The imagined white Southerner – let us call him Jones – 
is not a victim of his collective; in fact, he is part of the perpetrator class that is 
responsible for the injustices done to African-Americans.  Yet, according to Miller, 
Jones can eschew outcome responsibility for the sins of his collective if he stands up 
                                                                                                                                            
enough to be considered unreasonable. The implication here is that those who are outcome 
responsible and for whom the burdens are not severe should assume a greater share of the 
remedying the harm.    
 
198 This of course in large part depends on nature of the economic redistribution. 
 
199 Miller, “Holding Nations Responsible,” pp. 254-65.  
 
200 Ibid., pp. 254-57. 
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to the racial practices of his fellow white Southerners.
201
  But, Miller insists, mere 
disapproval by the individual of what is being done in the name of white supremacy is 
not enough to avoid being outcome responsible.  The reason for this is that Jones may 
still contribute to the practice of white supremacy in other ways.
202
  According to 
Miller, Jones has to come out against his collective in a more radical way.
203
   Thus if 
Jones were to participate in Civil Rights marches, this may be radical enough to annul 
his share of collective responsibility.  Still, the question is, why does such oppositional 
activism have this effect of erasing outcome responsibility?  Miller’s own answer to 
this question is not entirely clear.    
At one point in the discussion, Miller says that those individuals who choose to 
remain members and struggle against the injustices committed by their collective from 
the inside remain on the hook for outcome responsibility.
204
  This suggests that 
perhaps the way to annul being outcome responsible through overt and radial 
opposition to the crimes of one’s collective is to exit that collective once and for all.  
This would fit well within Miller’s narrative of the morally decent white Southern.  So 
when Jones repudiates the core values of his group by standing up to its racism, he has 
essentially made himself into a nonmember.  The explanation for not finding Jones 
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 Miller notes that sometimes being too much of an activist – i.e. publically demonstrating 
one’s allegiance to racial equality – may be asking a member to do too much if this means 
having one’s life threatened.  Miller concludes that although we have to be fairly active in our 
opposition to the immoral or unjust conduct of our collective we are also not expected to be 
heroic.  Just how robust our activism ought to be depends in large part on the political context 
in which we find ourselves. 
 
204 Miller, “Holding Nations Responsible,” p. 256. 
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outcome responsible becomes pretty straightforward: Jones is not responsible because 
he is not part of the relevant perpetrator group anymore, he has made his exit.   
One difficulty with this is that there are collectives where an exit is not an 
option or the morally decent person still prefers to remain a member of her collective, 
but wants the collective to change its ways.  Where this is the case, the morally decent 
person will remain a member and therefore on the hook for outcome responsibility 
despite her oppositional activism.  However, it seems morally arbitrary to treat a 
continuing member differently from a member who chooses to exit when the two are 
morally decent to the same extent.
205
   
                                                 
205
 Miller I think anticipates this objection to some extent.  He suggests that when there is 
procedural unfairness that denies a member access to or influence over the decision-making 
process of the group, that person is excused from outcome responsibility, or such 
responsibility is diminished, despite the lack of activism on her part.  But why exactly does 
this provide the individual with an exemption?  Perhaps the idea here is that it matters whether 
a member is disposed toward taking a radical stand against the injustices of her collective and 
that such a disposition therefore should be rewarded accordingly without asking the individual 
to do the impossible or expose her life to a serious risk.  Access to the decision-making 
process is important because it offers a way for a member to voice her opposition to the 
policies or objectives being pursued by her group.  In other words, access to the decision-
making process permits a member to engage in the kind of oppositional activism that makes 
her an outsider and gets her out of outcome responsibility.  If the conscientious member is 
prevented from such activism because it is too dangerous or she is kept out of the decision-
making process, Miller claims that such a member should nevertheless be excused from 
collective responsibility.  She is in some sense given the benefit of the doubt provided she has 
the right frame of mind – the frame of mind that makes her an activist counterfactually: if she 
could engage in an exit-inducing activism, she would.   
 What is interesting about this case is that the individual is excused or made exempt 
from collective responsibility even though she does not engage in any radical activism – 
which also implies that she is still a member of her collective.  The reason for this, as I 
understand Miller, is that she has the right disposition toward radical activism and that appears 
to be enough.  But the kind of radical activism that Miller has in mind is precisely the sort that 
if practiced would make the individual an outsider of her collective.   
The difficulty with this is that it still presupposes at least a desire to make an exit: if 
the individual did not face all these difficulties, she would make herself an outsider and 
extricate herself from her collective.  Another way of stating this is to say that the individual is 
disposed toward making herself an outsider.  However, this way of expanding the scope of the 
exemption seems to run into the second prong of the original objection, which is that there are 
cases where the agent despite her radical activism still sees herself as a loyal member, and if 
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The deeper problem with Miller’s view is that it still seems wrong to exempt 
Jones even in light of his opposition to the racist culture of the South.  His solidarity 
with those on the side of civil rights indicates that his heart is in the right place, but it 
may not be enough to absolve him entirely of outcome responsibility.  It may not be 
enough because as a white Southerner Jones benefits, despite his activism, from a 
social arrangement that is morally reprehensible.  His opposition may dispose Jones to 
reject some of the morally tainted benefits that come his way, but he cannot refuse all 
such benefits, and this is an important point that has to be emphasized.  The culture of 
the American South was so deeply imbued with white supremacy that it was simply 
not possible to live a life that was not marked by it in some way.  Access to even such 
basic goods as education, healthcare, individual security, meaningful employment, due 
process, reflected the vast divide between African-Americans and Southern whites.  
But to refuse these goods entirely, even if this could be done, is not something that one 
could reasonably expect the morally decent person to do, for this would mean 
condemning her to a life of hardship, unrealized potential, even premature death.
206
  
This suggests that not even Jones, who detested the racism of his day, could 
realistically keep himself from benefitting from a social arrangement that was 
extremely unjust.  Because Jones has been unjustly rewarded simply in virtue of being 
                                                                                                                                            
there is to be a exemption for good deeds performed, she deserves it as much as the former 
member. 
 
206
 Also, in many cases we really do not have a choice about the basic goods we are given: as 
children we are sent to school; when we are sick we have to take the care we are given; when 
we are in trouble with the law, we have face a judicial system that favors those of us who are 
white, educated, well-off, etc. 
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white, he is still obligated to do his part in setting things right and undoing the legacy 
of slavery in the South.   
It may be argued that Jones’s activities should count for something.  For 
instance, Jones’s activism may be viewed as a way of assuming his share of 
responsibility for what has been done to African-Americans and doing his part to put 
an end to an ongoing injustice, without waiting for his fellow white Southerners to 
repudiate their racism en masse.  Jones, in other words, is paying forward his 
contribution toward ending racial discrimination by engaging in an individual effort 
well before there is any coordinated action on the part of other white Southerners to 
remedy the grave injustice of white supremacy, and by discharging his moral debt to 
the victims of his collective now, Jones is relieved of making further sacrifices in the 
future.   Or, it may be said that his activism is a way to neutralize or offset the 
contribution he may be making to the harmful activities of his collective.
207
  By 
refusing to live in neighborhoods with discriminatory ordinances or restrictive housing 
covenants, by declining to frequent businesses that mistreat black Americans, by 
fighting against segregation in schools, Jones may be able to neutralize the 
contribution he unintentionally makes to maintaining the Southern culture of white 
supremacy.
208
   
                                                 
207
 Jones, for example, may be residing in a town where African-Americans are not permitted 
to own or rent a home, where local businesses refuses to serve non-whites, where schools are 
segregated.  Simply in virtue of living in a typical town in the South, before the legislative 
reforms of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Jones could not help but be entangled in a culture of 
racism. 
 
208
 The above explanation seems to cover a broader range of cases than the first, which appears 
to work for cases where there is already a harm and the morally decent member is trying to put 
an end to it.  If we suppose, on the other hand, that a collective is about to or is in the process 
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The problem with these explanations is that no matter what Jones does he 
simply cannot help but benefit in a way that is morally problematic.  Jones is perhaps 
not complicit in the harms of white supremacy in the way that his fellow white 
Southerners are, but he is nonetheless complicit.  Jones is an unjust beneficiary of a 
social arrangement that is rigged in his favor, and he is thus obligated to put an end to 
an arrangement that gives him benefits that rightly belong to someone else.  It is not 
up to Jones to singlehandedly change the system of basic entitlements in the South, but 
nonetheless he is expected to participate in a collective project that aims to do that.   
In some cases forcing a benefit on a person when that benefit should have gone 
to someone else, the person who is in fact entitled to it, does not generate being liable 
to the rightful owner on the part of the actual beneficiary.  But Jones’s predicament is 
not one of these cases. When an intangible good is involved, a benefit may be 
conferred on a person who is not entitled to it without her having a chance to refuse.
209
  
                                                                                                                                            
of causing a harm, the morally decent member’s activism should be understood as trying to 
prevent this harm from coming about.  But if this is right, it cannot be said that what the 
member is doing is assuming his share of rectifying an injustice because the injury has not yet 
taken place – in fact, the activist’s intention is to prevent the injury from occurring in the first 
place.    
 
209
 When physical goods are involved things are a bit more straightforward.  Consider the 
following case.  If someone offers me a stolen Bugatti I have to be ready to hand it over to the 
rightful owner.  If I refuse to accept, then the issue of liability does not even come up for me.  
I never did anything to the owner: I never asked for the car to be stolen, and when it was 
delivered to me, I promptly refused – if the real owner were to appear and demand his car, I 
would be happy to comply.  Here the fault lies strictly with the thief.  On the other hand, if I 
were to accept the gift and use it for some period of time, even though I never participated in 
the act of stealing the Bugatti, I nevertheless would have done something wrong.  By using the 
car, I benefitted in a way that I should not have – I did not have a right to it.  The owner has 
every right to take it away from me and if I damaged his precious Bugatti while it was in my 
possession, I am liable for the damages.  With objects like cars, yachts, etc., we generally have 
to agree to take possession – and the act of taking possession signals such acceptance – before 
we can derive any benefit; and if we have no right to the benefit, we can rightly be chided for 
that, because we had the power to refuse, which we failed to do. 
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In such cases, it would seem inappropriate to morally censure the undeserving 
beneficiary because her agency was never involved; it just happened to her and in an 
unexpected way.
210
  Even though I was the undeserving beneficiary, the benefit 
arrived in a way that did not involve any intentional action on my part to shift the 
benefit toward me.  The difference between intangible goods and tangible ones is that 
there is no way for me to restore the benefit to the rightful owner: once the benefit is 
conferred it is entirely exhausted on me.
211
  But the fact that I end up as the 
beneficiary of an intangible does not make me any less innocent.    
However, even with intangible things, one’s agency may at a later stage come 
into play.  This I think is so when the wrong beneficiary extracts additional value from 
the benefit at a point when she has a choice in the matter, which cannot be incidental 
to something to which she has a right.  So if I were to use the good in a way that 
would get me additional value from it because I saw there was such value to be gotten 
out of it and I wanted it,  I would be intentionally extracting further gains from a 
benefit that did not rightly belong to me.  This act of extraction starts to implicate my 
agency in the following ways.  First, I intentionally accept a benefit, albeit a derivative 
one, to which I am not properly entitled and I exercise active choice in the matter, 
because after all I did not have to do it.   Second, the act of extraction is my way of 
indicating that the benefit has value for me, that I have internalized it as having 
                                                                                                                                            
 
210 So if Smith, my neighbor, pays a painter to paint his house, but the painter paints my house 
instead, Smith cannot demand payment from  me. 
 
211 So unlike a car, I cannot transfer the labor the painter put into my house to Smith, which 
means that in the end I remain a more permanent beneficiary, whether I like it or not.  With a 
stolen Bugatti, I have to restore it to its owner. 
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meaning for me in a way that it does not for someone who thinks the benefit makes 
only a marginal difference to her life.  When I start taking away additional value from 
something that should not have been mine or to which I was never entitled, it seems 
right to hold me accountable and liable for the benefit that I am receiving.  In other 
words, I am no longer an innocent bystander and may be required to compensate the 
victim in some way.
212
   
With respect to an unjust distribution of basic goods like education, healthcare, 
security, opportunities for meaningful employment, the situation is not unlike the one 
where we continue to extract value from that which we do not rightly deserve.  It is of 
course true that we generally do not have much say in how these goods are distributed, 
but we continue to benefit from them.  For most of us we cannot help but extract value 
from these important goods in a way that makes a difference to our lives because they 
are so foundational to living a meaningful life – the extraction, in other words, 
becomes intentional and begins to generate real value for us.  But this fact does not 
extinguish our liability to set things right.  Jones is no exception to this because he 
continues to enjoy benefits that in a more just social arrangement he would not have. 
Miller’s second example points to another category of individual members 
who ought to be exempt, and these are members who constitute an oppressed 
minority.
213
  During Nazi-era Germany, it would have been a travesty of justice to 
                                                 
212 Two additional factors strengthen the case for liability.  If the extraction of additional value 
is persistent or continuous, it seems that there is more reason to think that I owe it to the 
victim to undo the harm that was done to her.  It also matters whether the taking of additional 
value further injures the victim, and if it does, then I am even more complicit and my duty to 
rectify the harm more substantial. 
 
213 Miller, “Holding Nations Responsible,” pp. 264-65. 
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hold German Jews responsible for their persecution by the Nazi regime.  But why is 
this so, we may ask, if German Jews at the time made significant contributions to the 
German culture and were part of the German nation?  (And if not nation, then of the 
German state, since German Jews were also citizens of the German state.)  Miller 
offers two distinct rationales for their exemption from collective responsibility.
214
  
First, because it matters for outcome responsibility whether a person actually benefits 
from her membership, the distribution of the burdens and benefits of membership 
becomes morally significant, according to Miller.
215
  When a certain minority is 
saddled with most of the burdens but few of the benefits “it will be hard to justify the 
claim that their membership alone makes them responsible for the consequences of 
national decisions.”216  In other words, fairness in the distribution of burdens and 
benefits is a necessary condition for outcome responsibility.  Miller’s argument seems 
to be that where the distribution is so skewed that there is a distinct subset of 
individual members who are disadvantaged as a result, that subset avoids being 
outcome responsible for the harms of the collective.  German Jews at this time were 
excluded from most of the benefits of national membership, and thus clearly fell 
within this subset.  Miller’s second argument for exempting German Jews refers to the 
reconfiguration of the German national identity that was occurring at the time.
217
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According to Miller, notions of racial superiority that became incorporated into the 
German national identity by the Nazis were so repugnant to the Jews that they simply 
stopped identifying themselves as being German.  But once this happened, “the very 
idea of the nation as a cooperative practice” began to dissipate.218  According to 
Miller, German Jews ostensibly detached themselves from the German nation, and 
thus could not be held outcome responsible because, for all intents and purposes, they 
were no longer members of the German collective.       
Miller is clearly right to exclude oppressed minorities from collective 
responsibility.  But his reasons for the exemption are not entirely convincing.  First of 
all, grounding an exception in unfair distribution makes it much too broad.
219
   
Standards of fairness are very demanding, and no large-scale system of cooperation in 
existence today, be it a state or an international regime, distributes its benefits and 
burdens in anything like a fair way.   This would make too many individual members 
exempt.  Moreover, what the German Jews suffered may be called unfair, but this 
hardly gets to the heart of what they experienced.  Nor would it be accurate to say that 
the burdens faced by German Jews were of the sort that one normally associates with 
being a member of a collective.  The crimes that were perpetrated against German 
Jews should not be characterized as the disproportionate imposition of the burdens of 
cooperation, for the hardships they faced had little to do with the demands of 
                                                 
218 Ibid. 
 
219 Of course it might be that Miller has in mind distribution that is radically unfair.  Thus 
some systems of cooperation might be unfair but no so unfair as to create exemptions.  
Unfortunately, Miller does not specify the standard of fairness he has in mind, and so it is hard 
to judge in the end just how plausible his argument is.   
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cooperation or with being part of a cooperative enterprise – in fact, the hardships were 
anathema to cooperation.  Lack of fairness in the distribution of benefit and burdens of 
cooperation simply does not strike the right note in explaining away collective 
responsibility.  Miller’s second argument is no less problematic, for it relies on 
conjectures that do not appear to be historically accurate.  German Jews were certainly 
disgusted by many of the aspects injected into German culture and identity by the 
Nazis.  Yet, many German Jews who found themselves in exile produced great works 
of art, and continued to see themselves as part of the same tradition as that of Goethe, 
Heine, Bach, and as the real vanguards of German culture.   Indeed, there was a deep 
schism between Germans and Jews, but this was something that was done by the 
Nazis, and those Germans who sympathized with them, not by the Jews, who for 
centuries remained loyal subjects of the German state.
220
 
It seems to me that a better explanation for exempting members of an 
oppressed minority should instead examine the status of the individual member and 
how she is treated by her collective.  An explanation that has Kantian undertones has a 
better chance to zero in on how a collective may sever its moral connection to 
individual members.  I suggest that when an individual member fails to be recognized 
as a moral agent and is, instead, viewed purely instrumentally by her collective, she is 
not being treated with minimal decency and respect.  Such disrespect involves, in part, 
having a member’s basic needs and interests qua moral person not be given any moral 
                                                 
220 For a rich discussion of Germany under the Nazi regime, see Evans, The Third Reich in 
Power, New York: The Penguin Press, 2006.  Before the unification of Germany in 1871, 
there were Jews living in Prussia, Bavaria, and other Germanic principalities and kingdom, 
and they were generally viewed as loyal subjects.  
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consideration by the collective.
221
 Instead, the member is valued on purely 
instrumental grounds, as a contributor to the cooperative product: she is valued 
because she works on a plantation, is law abiding, is deferential to the right sorts of 
people, etc.  When an individual is mistreated to such an extent that she no longer 
counts as a moral agent, i.e. someone who is entitled to basic rights and capable of 
leading an autonomous life, the reciprocity between the collective and the member, 
which is expected under normal conditions, is broken and the individual at that point 
owes nothing to her collective, including accountability or responsibility for the things 
done by her group.  The collective has behaved so badly toward its member that it 
does not deserve to benefit from her in any way.
222
   
What happened in Nazi Germany was an example, albeit an extreme one, of 
treating a member with such moral indecency.  The German state in the hands of the 
                                                 
221 So for instance when one’s basic needs and interests, that is, those needs and interests that 
essentially define the individual, do not figure into the design or delineation of some of the 
aims of the collective, this amounts to a form of treatment that does not live up to even 
minimal decency or respect.   
 
222
 Earlier, I mentioned that Nagel’s notions of the special involvement of agency and the 
special relation may be conceptually linked to outcome responsibility.  The type of 
mistreatment that I have in mind makes sense of this connection.  When an individual is badly 
mistreated by her collective, there is no agency to speak of because there is no recognized 
moral agent.   The reason for this lies in the fact of the denial of her humanity.  The mistreated 
individual is denied most of the benefits that come from group membership.  She may benefit 
in some limited way from being a member but not because she “deserves” it in virtue of being 
a person endowed with some measure of dignity but because she has instrumental value  that 
has to be protected.  Thus while it may be true that she contributes to the coercion of her 
fellow members, she does so not as someone who is recognized as a genuine moral person.  
Instead, her contribution is that of an instrument that is wielded and manipulated by others 
who do not have their dignity diminished in quite the same way.  This suggests that a person 
who has her humanity denied cannot stand in a relation to her fellow members as someone 
who is complicit in their coercion because that requires that she be complicit qua autonomous 
agent, which is precisely what she is prevented from being.  I can thus agree with Nagel that 
without the special involvement and the special relation there is no outcome responsibility 
falling on the individual. 
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Nazi regime denied their Jewish victims their very humanity, and to such an extent 
that everything became permissible, including their physical annihilation.  But the 
kind mistreatment I have in mind here may be exhibited in other ways as well.  A 
person, for instance, may be treated merely as a cog in the cooperative scheme, a beast 
of burden who is there because her participatory labor is needed to ensure that the 
collective achieves its aims.  Her life outside what she does for the collective is more 
or less ignored, and her basic rights may be infringed at any time so that she is kept in 
line and maximizing her contribution.  It may well be that the mistreated individual 
benefits from some of the cooperative goods that the group provides, but this is so 
only incidentally and not because the goals of the collective were designed to advance 
the interests and needs of members like her.  The benefits accruing to her are an 
accidental by-product or a trickling-down of advantages meant for others, members 
whose interests are given consideration and reflected in the objectives pursued by the 
group.   
There are numerous examples of such treatment: slavery, serfdom, indentured 
servitude, extreme forms of capitalist exploitation.  The slaves in the American South 
were essential for the agrarian economy of the region.
223
  Yet they were kept out of the 
political process entirely because they were perceived by the white majority as not 
having the capacity for political agency or of being of such low rank as not to deserve 
the right to political participation.  And even though some slaves in the South did 
benefit from being part of the American polity, despite their diminished political and 
                                                 
223 For a good discussion of the political economy of the South, see Roger Ransom, Conflict 
and Compromise: The Political Economy of Slavery, Emancipation, and the American Civil 
War, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989. 
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social standing, in so far they lived in a functioning state and not in a state of nature, 
they were certainly unintended beneficiaries, since the American political system was 
not designed to take their interests into account – in fact, in many ways it did the 
opposite.  It may even be said the rule of law benefitted slaves to some extent.  But 
this must not exaggerated, since the rule of law was also an instrument of oppression 
by keeping people in line through the exercise of enforcing racist and unjust laws by 
the state.  Similarly, the blacks of South Africa during apartheid were useful for the 
white minority in so far as they contributed to the cooperative product of South Africa, 
but they were deprived of equality by a political system that was intentionally 
designed to predominantly serve the interests of the white minority.   
These two examples, in particular, suggest that it would be entirely wrong to 
attribute collective responsibility to slaves in the American South and to black South 
Africans during apartheid for the terrible things done by their respective states.   It 
goes without saying that they should not be held responsible for what was being done 
to them by their state.  But we also want to say that victims of slavery and of apartheid 
should not be held responsible for what was done by their state to others.  Thus slaves 
ought not be held responsible for what the American government was doing to Native 
Americans; nor should black South Africans be held responsible for their 
government’s support of the racist policies of Rhodesia.224 
 There is I think yet another set of members who ought to be given an 
exemption from outcome responsibility.  Miller does not mention this particular 
category in his account.  This omission, however, is a mistake, and one which I will 
                                                 
224 For a good discussion of South Africa’s policy toward Rhodesia, see Jonathan Farley, 
South Africa, London: Routledge, 2008.  
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try to correct.  Some members deserve an exemption not because they are poorly 
treated or tried to prevent or rectify the harms caused by their collective.  Rather, they 
should be exempt from outcome responsibility because the cost of remedying a harm 
may be unreasonably burdensome for them – or, they may simply lack the capacity to 
participate in a collective project that aims to rectify a past harm.  In a state, the 
example that immediately comes to mind is the economically disadvantaged.  We 
think that our poorest compatriots should be exempt from most forms of government 
taxation. Part of the reason for this, of course, is that taxation schemes designed to 
achieve a more equitable distribution of income and wealth are meant to benefit the 
economically disadvantaged, and asking the poor to make themselves even poorer 
would seem counterproductive.  However, taxation, even in a progressive society, is 
not always about redistributing wealth to help the poor.   It is also about providing 
public goods that benefit everyone, regardless of economic standing.   Nonetheless, 
even when taxation is directed at promoting public welfare, we think the worst-off 
should not be made to contribute if this results in a (significant) decrease in their life 
prospects.  I think that something similar can be said about a tax-financed project that 
aims to compensate or make whole victims who suffered at the hands of their group or 
collective. A case in point, in a US context, would be an attempt by the US 
government to undo the legacy of racism in America.  Even here the burdens of such 
an enormous endeavor ought to be shared fairly, even if this means that poor whites 
are excused from making an economic contribution to the state.  What poor white 
Americans cannot do is to continue to benefit from racist policies and practices even if 
the removal of such policies and practices makes them worse off than they were 
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before.  In other words, they cannot keep infringing on the rights of others.  But they 
ought to be exempt from making a positive economic contribution if this exacts a 
heavy toll on their life prospects.  This proposition I think also applies to other 
collectives where the economically disadvantaged can be identified.  
 In the next section, I apply outcome responsibility and the two exemptions – 
one offered by Miller and the other by me – to the international trade regime.   
 
6. WTO and Collective Responsibility 
 If the international trade regime is a collective and the increasing non-
affordability of patented drugs that are essential to health is a result that is generated 
by this system, who then is responsible for remedying this injustice?  Recall that what 
is at issue here is the transition toward a more just international trade system and how 
such a transition ought to be carried out.
225
  The list of those individual members who 
potentially may be held outcome responsible consists of citizens of member countries.   
However, given the set of exemptions delineated above, that list may in fact shrink 
considerably.  Thus the exemptions to outcome responsibility will influence who in 
the end will be responsible for the problem of access. 
                                                 
225 It has been my contention in this paper that the problem of transition falls within non-ideal 
theory and includes a different set of considerations from those involved in the task of 
constructing a conception of justice.  With respect to the problem of transition, the place that 
persons occupy within their state, or any other coercive system, and the role they play in 
coercing their fellow citizens or fellow members matter to the kinds of obligations they have 
that require them to effectuate changes that are meant to generate a more just system of 
cooperation.  On the other hand, once a conception of justice is in place and the system is 
ideally just, it no longer makes sense to tie what we owe one another, qua citizens or qua 
members of system of cooperation, to the political or social roles that we play.  That is 
because when we find ourselves in a such a position, our task is to maintain an ideally just 
cooperative regime, which can only be done by carrying out the demands of justice, as 
specified by a conception of justice.     
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It may be argued that the real challenge in holding participants of the trade 
regime outcome responsible comes from the fact that so many of the WTO member 
states are nondemocratic.  The ordinary citizen from one of these states must surely be 
exempt from outcome responsibility because by being denied her right to political 
participation she is being mistreated in precisely the sort of way that makes her 
exempt from outcome responsibility for the harms generated by her state.  Moreover, 
curtailed as she is from domestic political participation, she simply cannot contribute 
to international coercion.  If this is the case, this has the potential to exempt most 
citizens from non-democratic member states.   
However, I do not think this conclusion quite follows.  Many citizens in the 
end will be exempt from outcome responsibility, but not simply because they live in 
nondemocratic states.  The reason for this is twofold.  Indeed, there are some truly 
egregious states that are members of the WTO.  But not all nondemocratic member 
states mistreat their citizens in ways that would warrant their exemption.  Certain 
nondemocratic states exhibit concern for their ordinary citizens by tapping into the 
social values and norms that are generally accepted by the public at large in forging 
their policies.  In such states, citizens do not have a direct way to influence the policies 
of their state, but their needs and interests are not entirely ignored, since the state does 
invoke basic values that have common currency.
226
  This suggests that nondemocratic 
                                                 
226 Rawls’s decent hierarchical societies are examples of non-democratic societies where 
persons are showed respect by their state because the policies of the state are regulated by a 
comprehensive conception of the good which is more or less endorsed by the people.  See 
Rawls, The Law of Peoples, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1999.   It is important to 
point out that such decent societies do not actually exist in the real world.  Nevertheless, what 
this does suggest is that a nondemocratic political system is not strictly opposed to individual 
human dignity.   
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states are capable of treating their citizens with some measure of dignity.  
Furthermore, even in some nondemocratic states, people contribute to coercion (both 
internationally and domestically) and benefit from state membership and WTO 
membership in ways that warrant holding them outcome responsible to some extent.
227
 
Thus, what matters for outcome responsibility is not simply whether the state is 
nondemocratic, but how the individual citizen fares under its political system.  The 
fact that a state is nondemocratic itself constitutes a form of mistreatment, a disregard 
for some of the moral powers that the citizen as a moral agent possesses.  But such 
mistreatment does not amount to denying her basic humanity.   
 I think that a good way to illustrate how these exemptions work is to examine 
particular member countries where the exemptions may be relevant.  Consider, for 
example, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, which has been a member of the WTO since 
2005.
228
  Saudi Arabia is a hereditary monarchy.
229
  The current King is Abdallah bin 
                                                                                                                                            
 
227 Recall that for Miller contribution to and benefit from a  collective practice are a sufficient 
condition for a prima facie case of outcome responsibility.  There is contribution because 
citizens by being generally law abiding enable the state to behave coercively.  Domestically, 
the state is enabled to enforce its own laws, and, with respect to the trade regime, the state is 
enabled to enter the WTO and collaborate with the other member states into forcing individual 
members into complying with WTO rules.  But contribution to or participation in enabling the 
state to engage in coercion does not require a democratic form of government.  Moreover, it is 
also perfectly conceivable that citizens of nondemocratic state may benefit from residing in 
their state and from their state being a member of the WTO.  Of course, if there is a benefit, 
such a benefit must accrue to a person in a way that recognizes her basic humanity, as an 
autonomous agent and possessing basic rights. 
 
228 World Trade Organization,  Saudi Arabia and the WTO, available at 
www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/countries_e/saudi_arabia_e.htm.  
 
229 David Sorenson, An Introduction to the Modern Middle East: History, Religion, Political 
Economy, Politics, Boulder CO: Westview Press, 2008, chap. 5.  See also, Central Intelligence 
Agency, World Factbook: Saudi Arabia, available at www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-
world-factbook/geos/sa.html. 
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Abd al-Aziz Al Saud. No elections take place in Saudi Arabia to elect the head of 
government because the current King is also the Prime Minister.
230
  Nor is the 
legislature, the Majlis al-Shura, subject to popular vote, since it is the King who 
decides who becomes a member of the legislative council.
231
  In Saudi Arabia, sharia 
is the source of all domestic laws, thus making religious law the foundation of the 
country’s constitution.232  Despite the fact that Saudi Arabia is not a democracy, I 
would not hesitate to say that its citizens may be found prima facie outcome 
responsible.  There is evidence to suggest that the Saudi public is generally supportive 
of what the government does in its role as a member of the WTO.
233
  Moreover, as the 
largest producer of oil, Saudi Arabia has benefitted tremendously from its membership 
in the WTO and participation in the international trade system.
234
  Although individual 
citizens are not shown the kind of respect that as moral agents they ought to be given, 
they are not entirely deprived of it either: as fellow Muslims, they are viewed as 
possessing dignity in virtue of being God’s creation and as having interests, i.e. 
religious ones, that are intrinsically valuable.  Their treatment by the state is thus of 
the sort that would not outright exempt them from outcome responsibility because as 
citizens of Saudi Arabia they are accorded some measure of respect. 
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On the other hand, the same cannot be said about the Democratic Republic of 
Congo (DRC), which has been a member of the WTO since 1997.
235
  The DRC has 
been involved in a regional war since 1998, and despite a peace accord signed in 2003, 
violence in the country is still widespread.
236
  The people of the DRC have suffered 
terribly at the hands of the national government, its army, and numerous rebel groups 
that are being propped up by foreign powers.
237
  The International Red Cross has 
estimated that close to 4.5 million people have perished from the conflict, most from 
hunger and preventable diseases.
238
  Human Rights Watch has found that over the past 
six years, over 40,000 women have been victims of rape or sexual assaults.
239
   In 
much of the country, food continues to be rationed and most of the population does 
not have access to clean water.
240
  Hundreds of thousands of people have been 
displaced from their homes, many of whom are physically and mentally disabled and 
                                                 
235 World Trade Organization, The Democratic Republic of Congo and the WTO, available at 
www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/countries_e/democratic_republique_congo_e.htm.   
 
236 For a general discussion, see United Nations, Office of the High Commissioner for Human 
Rights, Report on the Most Serious Violations of Human Rights and International Law 
Committed within the Territory of the Democratic Republic of the Congo between March 1993 
and June 2003, August 2010, available at 
www.ohchr.org/Documents/Countries/ZR/DRC_MAPPING_REPORT_FINAL_EN.pdf. 
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 Arnaud Gorgemans et al, “Between a Rock and a Hard Place: The Intensification of 
Violence Against the Population of South Kivu in the Democratic Republic of Congo by 
Rwandan Armed Groups and the Forces of the Democratic Republic of the Congo,” EurAc, 
April 15, 2005. 
 
238 The International Red Cross, The Democratic Republic of Congo, available at 
www.icrc.org/web/eng/siteeng0.nsf/htmlall/congo_kinshasa?opendocument 
 
239 Human Rights Watch, Seeking Justice: The Prosecution of Sexual Violence in the Congo 
War, 2005, available at www.hrw.org/en/reports/2005/03/06/seeking-justice-0.  
 
240 Fiona Fleck, “The Democratic Republic of Congo: Quantifying the Crisis,” Bulletin of the 
World Health Organization, Vol. 87 Issue 1, 2009. 
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unable to earn a living.
241
  Infant mortality is one of the highest in the world.
242
  If 
there ever was a country that needed our compassion, it is the DRC.  The people of 
this country are so badly off that they are in no position to do anything about the 
harms caused by the international trade system.        
The DRC exemplifies the basic rationales for exempting individual citizens.  
First, the circumstances that most Congolese find themselves in are simply not 
commensurate with even a minimal form of dignity.   The national government is 
undemocratic, ineffectual, and highly corrupt.  The revenues that flow to the 
government from the sale of highly prized minerals are not used to build domestic 
infrastructure or provide public goods to the Congolese.
243
  Instead, these revenues for 
the most part go toward the funding of the national army, which, far from providing 
protection to the people, has in fact been involved in widespread human rights 
abuses.
244
  The Congolese are thus victims of a predatory regime and see none of the 
advantages of living in a state.  As I argued above, without conditions that make 
minimal dignity possible, the Congolese owe nothing to their state, including being 
liable to the harms caused by it.   
                                                 
241 Human Rights Watch, Always on the Run: The Vicious Cycle of Displacement in Eastern 
Congo, 2010, available at www.hrw.org/en/reports/2010/09/14/always-run-0.  
 
242 Benjamin Coghlan et al, “Mortality in the Democratic Republic of Congo: a Nationwide 
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Second, and more importantly, the DRC is a failed state.  The national 
government is unable to carry out even the most basic functions of a state, functions 
and responsibilities which the modern state is designed to implement.
245
  Indeed, the 
DRC may not even constitute a state at all, thus leaving the Congolese effectively 
stateless.  Whatever the case may be – whether the DRC is not actually a state or 
merely one that is severely debilitated – the following seems clear.  First, the 
Congolese qua citizens do not coerce one another because the rule of law is absent and 
there is no cognizable legal system, only brute force seems to prevail. Second, and 
more importantly, the Congolese also have nothing to do with the coercion that goes 
on within the WTO because such contribution can only happen through a viable, 
functioning state, which they do not obviously have. The upshot of this is that they 
cannot be held outcome responsible for the harms caused by the trade system. 
Ravaged by a regional war on its territory and ruled by a corrupt and weak 
government, the DRC is in economic shambles despite being resource rich.  Both the 
World Bank and the IMF rank it as the world's poorest country, with a per capita GDP 
of about $300.
246
  This brings us to the final ground for exempting the people of the 
DRC: they are simply too poor.  Undoubtedly the fact that they reside in a failed state 
                                                 
245 Here it may argued that there is no outcome responsibility  because the Congolese are not 
beneficiaries.  Specifically they do not benefit from the DRC being a member of the WTO.  
The revenues that come from the mining industry are mostly captured by private companies, 
which pay a percentage to the national government. The Congolese who are employed by 
mining companies work under terrible conditions.  I have seen no evidence to suggest that the 
WTO membership has made a difference to these workers who are the only Congolese to see 
any benefits from the mineral trade.    
 
246 Based on data provided by Foreign Policy and the Fund for Peace, available at 
www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2010/06/21/2010_failed_states_index_interactive_map_and_
rankings. 
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contributes to their (economic and social) desperation, but even with a functioning 
state the Congolese would still be too poor and therefore exempt from outcome 
responsibility.  The average Congolese would be exempt because she does not have 
the economic wherewithal to assist in undoing the harms stemming from the 
implementation of TRIPS; an imposition of such liability would be unfair because it 
would constitute an unreasonable burden.   
As a least developed country, the DRC is not atypical when compared to the 
other member states.  Of the hundred and fifty individual states that are members of 
the WTO, twenty-one percent are considered least developed. And of these least 
developed member countries, twenty-five percent are not free and thirty-eight percent 
are failed states.
247
   If the remedy of the problem of access to essential drugs requires 
some form of economic redistribution, such redistribution would have to leave out the 
thirty-two least developed countries that are members of the WTO.
248
  The 
redistributive remedy thus would have to fall on the remaining members that do not 
happen to be disqualified for other reasons.   
On the hand, as a failed state, the DRC appears to be more atypical.  In the 
world currently, there are twenty countries that are considered to be in a critical state 
                                                 
247 Mali is the only country that is ranked as free and is also a LDC.  See Freedom House, 
Freedom in the World, 2010, available at www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=505. 
 
248 It is important to note here that the transition toward a more just trade system will involve 
more than simply economic redistribution.  The WTO for instance may not have the 
institutional capacity to implement such redistribution.  There may be other structural 
problems as well.  Now with respect to institutional reform, even citizens from least developed 
countries are in a position to support such changes because not much else, other than their 
support, is being asked of them.  In other words, the burden with respect to certain remedies 
may not be all that great as to be unreasonably taxing.    
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of failure.
249
  Of these, only twelve are WTO members, or eight percent of the total 
WTO membership.  Of the twelve that are WTO members, seven are also least 
developed countries, and thus could be made exempt on the basis that their citizens are 
too poor.  Zimbabwe, Cote d’Ivoire, Pakistan, Kenya, and Nigeria are failed states that 
are not least developed.  If, in addition to least developed countries, the deeply failed 
states should also be made exempt, then the citizens of these member countries should 
also be excused from contributing to a redistributive remedy.
250
      
Global poverty of course is not concentrated in only the least developed 
countries.  Developing countries have their share of the world’s poor.  Sixty percent of 
the world’s poor reside in India and China.251  Thus we also have to conclude that the 
poor in developing countries must be exempt as well.  Moreover, it seems to me that 
even the very poor in developed countries should also qualify for being exempt from 
outcome responsibility because the burden of redistribution is likely to be substantial, 
and therefore unreasonable, for them as well.    
What is more, the WTO’s trade regime has not been all roses for developed 
member countries.  There are costs associated with open trade even for countries like 
the U.S., costs which are not spread out evenly, but disproportionately affect the 
                                                 
249 These are, in descending order, Somalia, Chad, Sudan, Zimbabwe, DRC, Afghanistan, Iraq, 
Central African Republic, Guinea, Pakistan, Haiti, Cote d’Ivoire, Kenya, Nigeria, Yemen, 
Burma, Ethiopia, East Timor, North Korea, and Niger.  See Foreign Policy’s Failed States 
Index, available at www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2010/06/21/2010_failed_states_index. 
  
250 The reason for this is not that they are poor, even though the majority of the citizens from 
these countries are still desperately poor,  but either that there isn’t a way to make of sense of 
a citizen making a contribution to the coercive imposition of an intellectual property system or 
that a citizen is so badly mistreated by the state that she owes nothing in response.   
 
251 According to data provided by the World Bank.  
 277 
working classes – specifically, those engaged in the rapidly contracting manufacturing 
sector – as American firms, in order to stay competitive, increasingly rely on 
outsourcing semi-skilled and low-skilled labor to countries where the cost of such 
labor is significantly less.  This has generated unemployment and underemployment 
among millions of American workers who are facing a dim economic future.
252
  Many 
of these displaced workers have fallen into the ranks of the economically least 
advantaged, with little or no prospects of ever re-entering the labor force with jobs that 
are comparable to what they had before.
253
   
 What we have here is yet another harm that is generated by the international 
trade system, but one that is directed at citizens residing in the US, namely, those 
American workers who were once employed by the manufacturing sector. The 
significance of this for the present discussion is that we have an additional set of 
individuals who are economically harmed by the WTO’s trade regime, but who are 
also expected to make an economic contribution toward resolving the problem of 
access.  This I think suggests the following question: How do we allocate 
responsibility in a wealthy state like the US when the US itself has citizens who have 
suffered economically from its trade policies?  Would it not be unjust, as might be 
argued, to saddle a person, who has already lost so much economically, with a 
requirement to assist people in faraway places avoid a premature death?  As I have 
tried to argue, individuals, regardless of where they live, qualify to be exempt from 
                                                 
252 See Michael Spence, “The Impact of Globalization on Income and Employment: the 
Downside of Integrating Markets,” Foreign Affairs, July/August 2011. 
 
253 See Gary Greenberg, “Manufacturing Depression,” Harper’s Magazine, Volume 314, Issue 
1884 (May 2007), pp. 35-46.  
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outcome responsibility, if they are sufficiently destitute such that any contribution on 
their part to alleviate the problem of access would constitute an unreasonable burden.  
And this certainly would include the American worker who has lost her job and has 
been swept into the economic underclass of the least advantaged.   
This leaves out individuals who have managed to avoid becoming part of 
America’s economic underclass – either because they found other employment or have 
a partner who is employed – but nonetheless are not as well off as they once were.  In 
this case, an economic contribution would still be in order provided it is done in 
accordance with a progressive scheme that reflects the relative economic standing of 
each contributor.  This of course does not include policies that may be instituted in the 
US that aim to help those Americans who have lost out because of the globalization of 
trade.  In other words, Americans collectively may decide that some of their 
compatriots have not obtained a fair share of the economic gains from global trade and 
that as a result economic assistance has to be given.  Such assistance may be shown in 
the form training or educational programs that teach new skills, placement programs 
that try to help unemployed workers find gainful employment, welfare programs that 
provide temporary financial support to unemployed workers and their families until 
they reenter the work force, and so on.  But it may also include a provision that 
exempts them from making an economic contribution toward alleviating the problem 
of access.  Such differences in the treatment of one’s compatriots are acceptable in my 
view because I find domestic conceptions of justice, given the way in which the world 
is arranged, still indispensable.  And because as compatriots our lives are more closely 
entangled than as participants of international trade, there are many more ways in 
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which we can harm one another, and so an assumption of greater outcome 
responsibility seems quite plausible in a domestic context.
254
          
 To go back to the two aforementioned exemptions to outcome responsibility, 
we are left, in the final analysis, with citizens from democratic member states – 
excluding the worst-off, and possibly others for whom the additional burden would be 
unreasonable, as determined by local standards of justice – and those from 
nondemocratic ones – excluding the poor – that treat their citizens with, at least, 
minimal decency to bear the cost of remedying the problem of access to essential 
medicines. With respect to nondemocratic states, minimal decency is the relevant 
threshold, I suggest, below which citizens stop being collectively responsible for the 
transgressions of their state.
255
  If individual citizens are so badly treated that it cannot 
                                                 
254 There is still the important issue of priority.  In other words, what happens when the 
problem of access and the problem of displaced Americans workers who have lost out because 
of international trade cannot be simultaneously dealt with – because the US, given its current 
economic woes, does not have the economic resources?  Should American workers be given 
priority over the global poor who lack access?  I think that priority may be shown for the 
reasons powerfully elucidated by Richard Miller in his work on patriotism and justice.  See 
his, “Cosmopolitan Respect and Patriotic Concern.”  Yet, in my view, the acceptable range of 
applicability of priority is more limited: priority is acceptable only when comparable harms 
are involved, and I leave it to our pre-theoretic considered convictions to judge whether harms 
are comparable.  But I also think that in many cases the urgency of priority is exaggerated.  
Now it may be the case that the US federal government does not have the budget to 
generously fund programs that aim to alleviate the suffering of needy  Americans as well as 
global poor.  But much of this is caused by the fact that the richest Americans and the largest 
American corporations have not been doing their fair share for the American people.  If they 
were, the federal government would not be in the state that it now is in.  Under these 
circumstances, talk of priority is out of place, since its implementation would not achieve a 
just  outcome.  The reason for this is that priority would keep in place the current de jure 
distribution of wealth and income in the US, which by any  conception of  domestic justice 
worth mentioning would be unjust. 
       
255 I do not mean to suggest that the least advantaged in wealthy liberal democratic member 
states and the economically disadvantaged in poor developing member countries are exempt 
from contributing to any type of collective action that aims to remedy a past injustice.  It 
would certainly be wrong not to repeal a racist or discriminatory law even if it benefits poor 
white Americans in the deep South.  But once direct and active victimization of African-
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be said that they are shown even minimal respect, then indeed such citizens would be 
exempt.  But not all non-democracies mistreat their people to such an extent.  Even 
thoroughgoing religious states like Saudi Arabia allow their people some freedom to 
express themselves in ways that they find meaningful.  Their responsibility may be 
diminished, because they are not given the kind of respect that they deserve, but it is 
not entirely extinguished either.  
The remedy to the problem of access is, as I have argued, part of non-ideal 
theory.  Our obligations that fall within non-ideal theory are concerned with enabling a 
coercive system of cooperation to transition toward ideal justice, which is a point 
where a liberal conception of justice fully applies to the basic structure of the 
cooperative regime.  This involves two basic tasks.  First, preparing the system of 
cooperation for implementing a conception of justice.  This requires, for instance, the 
construction of institutions that are necessary for distributing the burdens and benefits 
of cooperation in the manner specified by a conception of justice.  The second basic 
task is to remove the injustices that are currently being committed by the cooperative 
regime.
256
  I have been suggesting that the use of economic redistribution of some 
form may be necessary to correct the lack of access to essential medicines.  But this 
                                                                                                                                            
Americans through racist policies and laws is no longer occurring and the issue becomes one 
of restitution and making victims whole again through tax-financed programs of education, 
job creation, economic revitalization of depressed communities,  and so on, poor white 
Americans may be exempt from contributing to these programs if the economic burden on 
them would be substantial. 
       
256 These tasks are generally complimentary.  Thus to stop legally sanctioned racial 
discrimination it is of course necessary to repeal discriminatory laws.  But this may not be 
enough.  Other discriminatory laws may spring up in the near future and so perhaps a 
government entity to monitor such problematic laws and policies might be needed.  Racial 
discrimination may also leave a terrible legacy behind it that would have to be undone.  To do 
this, certain new institutions would have to be created that specifically deal with addressing 
the lingering effects of racial discrimination.        
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may not be enough: certain institutions within the WTO may have to be created so that 
such redistribution can be carried out.  If we, as citizens of member states, are found to 
be outcome responsible, we have to do both: removing the social harms and building 
the institutions that are necessary to permanently cure our cooperative system of these 
social ills.      
 
 
C. The WTO and the Liberalization of Trade 
For the most part in this discussion, I have focused on the TRIPS Agreement 
and the problem of access that its implementation appears to give rise.  Of course,  
overcoming this difficult problem would not by itself transform the WTO into a 
system of cooperation where (ideal) justice prevails.  I have tackled one aspect of what 
I perceive to be a harmful side-effect of the international trade regime, but there are 
others, which perhaps are just as acute and deserving of attention from political 
philosophers.  What I would like to do next is address a more general problem with the 
WTO, which I think implicates the core values of the organization.  I must admit that 
my treatment of this problem is somewhat superficial.  My intention is not so much as 
to offer a comprehensive solution, but rather to outline what I find to be a deficiency 
of the WTO and the economic policies it is committed to pushing across the world.  
A fundamental aim of the WTO is of course to liberalize international trade in 
goods and services.   Behind this is the view embraced by the WTO that open trade is 
economically beneficial to all who practice it because it spurs domestic economic 
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growth.
257
  However, the link between open trade and economic growth is not that 
straightforward, as current research on economic growth seems to suggest.
258
   But this 
is not being acknowledged by the WTO, as its exuberance for trade liberalization 
continues to outpace the empirical evidence for its position on trade.  Much of the 
conviction that trade liberalization is good for growth has been based on several high 
profile cross-country studies.
259
  However, a spate of articles has recently emerged 
criticizing the more influential of these studies on open trade. One of the most 
                                                 
257
 There is literature of a theoretical nature that suggests that liberal trade policies should at 
least in theory lead to economic growth.  Some economists have pointed out that increase in 
international trade may facilitate the transfer of knowledge and technology from several 
sources, including inter alia from the importation of technical goods, from greater access to 
the sources of innovation, and from foreign direct investment. See R. Almeida and A. 
Fernandez, “Openness and Technological Innovations in Developing Countries,” Journal of 
Development Studies,  2008, 44(5), pp. 701-27.  Others have argued that liberalization allows 
the capture of benefits that arise from increasing returns from scale and product specialization.  
Paul Romer for instance has argued that trade liberalization is positively correlated with 
increase in productivity.  According to him, liberalization increases the supply of intermediate 
goods which then stimulates competition among local firms, prompting them to adopt 
technologically and eliminate factor inefficiencies.  See Romer, “Growth Based on Increasing 
Returns Due to Specialization,” American Economic Review, 1989 77(2), pp. 56-62; see also 
A. Alesina, E. Spolaore, and R.  Wacziarg, “Economic Integration and Political 
Disintegration,” American Economic Review, 2000,  90(5), pp. 1276-96. 
 
258  See L. Alan Winters, “Trade Liberalization and Economic Performance: An Overview,” 
The Economic Journal, 114 (February) pp. 4-21; Axel Bortmann, Matthias Busse, and Silke 
Neuhaus, “Institutional Quality and Gains from Trade,” Kyklos, Vol. 59, 2006, pp. 345-68; 
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Organization and the Shrinking of Development Space,” Review of International Political 
Economy, 10:4 November 2003, pp. 621-644. 
 
259  See D. Dollar, “Outward-oriented Developing Economies Really Do Grow Moe Rapidly: 
Evidence from 95 LDCs, 1976-1985,” Economic Development and Cultural Change, 1992, 
vol.40 (3), pp. 523-44;JA Frankel and D. Romer, “Does Trade Cause Growth?” American 
Economic Review, 1999, vol. 89 (3) (June), pp. 379-99; JD Sachs and AM Warner, “Economic 
Convergence and Economic Policies,” Brookings Papers in Economic Activity, 1995, (1), pp. 
1-95; Jeffrey Sachs and Andrew Warner, “Economic Reform and Process of Global 
Integration,” Brookings Paper on Economic Activity, 1, 1995, pp. 1-118. 
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prominent critical pieces is a paper by Francisco Rodriguez and Dani Rodrik.
260
  In it, 
Rodriguez and Rodrik dissect the methodology used to draw a causal link between 
open trade and economic growth.  For instance, they argue that Sachs and Warner, in 
their very influential paper, “Economic Reform and Process of Global Integration,” 
define the openness indicator in a conceptually problematic way.
261
  For Sachs and 
Warner, an economy is deemed closed if any of the following conditions are met: the 
economy had average tariff rates that are higher than 40; its nontariff barriers covered 
on average more than 40% of the imports; it had a socialist economic system; it had a 
state monopoly of major exports; its black market premium exceeded 20% during 
either the decade of the 1970s or the decade of the 1980s.
262
 When the openness 
variable is plugged into growth regression, there appears to be a high correlation 
between open economies and economic growth.
263
  But as Rodriguez and Rodrik 
insist, the problem with the analysis is that when openness is construed as a 
combination of several indicators, it is hard to see what explanatory role barriers to 
trade are playing.  Indeed, they argue that the real work is being done by the last two 
factors and not by direct measures of barriers to trade, suggesting that where the state 
does not control major exports and the black market has a trivial presence, a country 
                                                 
260 F. Rodriguez and D. Rodrik, “Trade Policy and Economic Growth: a Skeptic’s Guide to the 
Cross-national Evidence,” in NBER Macroeconomics Annual, B. Bernanake and K. Rogoff, 
eds, Cambridge, MIT Press, 2000.  
 
261 Rodriguez and Rodrik, “Trade Policy and Economic Growth,” pp. 15-24. 
 
262 Sachs and Warner, “Economic Reform and Process of Global Integration,” pp. 22-53. 
 
263 Economies that are open according to their definition experience growth that is 2.5% higher 
than does that are not.  See ibid. 
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may experience growth without fully liberalizing its trade.  In a similar vein, 
Rodriguez and Rodrik contend that David Dollar’s measurement of distortions to trade 
has serious conceptual flaws.
264
  The measurement variable does not so much track 
trade barriers as indicate serious instability in economic policies of a state, which itself 
is likely to be a cause for poor economic performance.
265
   
Rodriguez and Rodrik, along with other development economists, have 
injected a considerable amount of skepticism about a direct link between openness and 
growth, and the pro-liberalization camp has been put on the defensive.
266
  As some 
have suggested, current theory of economic growth is still a work in progress and 
many gaps remain in our understanding.  Further research may vindicate those who 
say there is a causal connection between liberalization and growth, but we have not 
reached this point.
267
  Yet, the WTO is behaving as if the debate about liberalization is 
over and as a policy it is unequivocally and uniformly a good thing.  The current state 
of research on economic growth raises serious questions about whether it makes sense 
                                                 
264 Rodriguez and Rodrik, “Trade Policy and Economic Growth,” p. 20. 
 
265 Rodriguez and Rodrik suggest that it is the instability in the nominal exchange rate policies 
that explains the absence of growth,  and not trade restrictions. See “Trade Policy and 
Economic Growth,”  p.  20. 
 
266 This is not to say of course that papers that have been critical of empirical studies that link 
trade liberalization to growth are the last work on the subject.  Research has recently come out 
supporting the original studies; but so has research that casts further doubt.  See e.g. JA 
Frankel and AK Rose, “An Estimate of the Effect of Common Currencies on Trade and 
Growth,” (2002), Quarterly Journal of Economics, vol. 117 (469), pp. 437-66. 
 
267 There has been some pushback from the pro-growth camp.  Research has recently come out 
supporting the original studies and so has research that casts further doubt.  See e.g. JA 
Frankel and AK Rose, “An Estimate of the Effect of Common Currencies on Trade and 
Growth,” (2002), Quarterly Journal of Economics, vol. 117 (469), pp. 437-66.  
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for the WTO to push its liberalization agenda on all its member states, when the 
debate on what the best path is to economic development still rages on.
268
   
These uncertainties about trade liberalization would seem tolerable if it turned 
out that members states generally did well when implementing the WTO’s trade 
policies.  But this clearly has not been the case: there are many developing countries 
that either continue to languish or in some cases have done worse once they began to 
liberalize.  What is worrying is that the WTO may be forcing developing member 
states to adopt trade policies that are in fact harmful to them – and there is indeed 
evidence that suggests that openness is simply not working for many of these 
countries.
269
   
There is now an ever expanding body of literature that attempts to answer why 
trade liberalization is not working for many developing countries.  A growing number 
of economists argue that good institutions are a key to making openness lead to 
growth.
270
  Moreover, as Rodrik et al maintain, the quality of institutions is the single 
                                                 
268 This does not mean that we should wait until we have certainty; important decisions are 
made under conditions of uncertainty all the time.  What I think this does suggest is that the 
WTO should proceed with some caution.  It ought to keep an eye out on the best available 
evidence and what such evidence seems to say about the methods used to expand trade.  If at 
this point there is no best way for achieving economic growth, then some freedom should be 
given to member states that are not seeing any dividends from liberalization to experiment 
with other policy options.  
 
269
 See Dong-Hyeon Kim and Shu-Chin Lin, “Trade and Growth at Different Stages of 
Economic Development,” Journal of Development Studies, Vol. 45, No. 8, 2009, pp. 
1211-1224; Michael Beaney and David Greenaway, “The Impact of Terms 
of Trade and Real Exchange Rate Volatility on Investment and Growth in Sub-
Saharan Africa,” Journal of Development Economics, Vol. 65, 2001, pp. 491-500; 
Joseph Stiglitz and Andrew Charlton, Fair Trade for All,  New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2007. 
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most important determinant of long-run economic development, outpacing the 
influence of trade and geography.
271
  Several studies have recently been done that 
suggest that states with an institutional quality above a certain threshold see an 
increase in growth once they begin to transition toward greater openness in trade; on 
the other hand, states with low institutional quality, when instituting similar policies, 
tend to do worse than they would if they were to exercise less openness.
272
  
Institutional quality thus matters to a state’s macroeconomic health when it decides to 
implement liberal trade policies.  Developing member states, especially those that are 
least developed, run a very high risk of not having an adequate institutional 
framework.  If the current research is to be believed, member states that lack good 
institutions are not going to benefit from liberalizing trade – in fact, liberalization 
might make things worse for them.  But if institutions matter, this should influence 
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how the WTO pushes states to liberalize.
273
  Indeed, some economists have suggested 
precisely that.
274
  What is more, there is no evidence to suggest that good institutions 
might actually be bad for growth.  That is to say, the risk from having good 
institutions is virtually nil for developing countries in the WTO.
275
  But the upside 
may be significant and may fill in the explanatory gap for why trade liberalization can 
be such a hit or miss in relation to developing states.    
   If institutions matter and there is only an upside to them, the WTO has to 
take this into consideration vis-à-vis its trade policies.   If Haiti clearly lacks the 
institutions to make openness work for its economy, then, I suggest, Haiti has a 
                                                 
273 I am not saying that an organization like the WTO has no role to play in the world.  
Certainly trade should be encouraged and trade wars discouraged, but this basically requires 
preventing states from engaging in extreme forms of protectionism.  (Protectionism where I 
get to place my goods in your market, but get to prevent your goods from entering my market, 
is of course prudentially foolish because it will quickly lead to a trade retaliation from the 
other side.)  But there is quite a bit of space between extreme protectionism and no 
protectionism at all, and some states that might want to situate themselves along this 
continuum should run into trouble with the WTO for having done so.  
 
274 See Robert Wade, “What Strategies are Viable for Developing Countries Today?” 
 
275 The economic literature on the importance of good institutions does not suggest that 
developing countries cannot achieve high levels of economic growth without establishing 
good institutions that exemplify the rule of law, regulatory transparency, and government 
accountability.  For, instance, Edward Miguel and Raymond Fisman give the example of 
Indonesia, which under the Suharto regime achieved relatively high growth rates – about six 
percent – but was also incredibly corrupt.  The Suharto family made billions of dollars by 
having the central government award lucrative contracts to companies controlled by individual 
family members.  See Edward Miguel and Raymond Fisman, Economic Gangsters: 
Corruption, Violence, and the Poverty of Nations, (Princeton, Princeton University Press) 
2010.  I think that what this suggests is that some countries can achieve economic growth 
despite being very corrupt.  In other words, corruption in Indonesia continues to be  an 
obstacle to economic development, but Indonesia is doing other things right so that there is 
economic growth.  But if corruption were to be decrease, the contention of people like Rodrik 
is that this would only help the Indonesian economy, especially in the long run.  What has also 
be said is that Miguel and Fisman take Indonesia to be corrupt, especially at the top, but not 
that  corrupt, and believe that if it were a lot more corrupt, and corrupt in a very diffuse and 
pervasive manner, Indonesia would not have been able to generate the same growth rates.   
See ibid. 
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legitimate complaint against the WTO.  That is because the putative justification for 
compelling states to liberalize trade is the contention that this is good for all – and in 
particular for developing states.  But if it turns out that it is precisely poor developing 
countries like Haiti that experience the fallout from liberalization without any of its 
benefits, and the gains instead are directed at the industrialized world, no one would 
hesitate to conclude that this outcome is profoundly unfair.  This would implicate the 
major parts of the WTO as unjust.  So how should the WTO be reformed to avoid such 
unjust outcomes?   
I think there are two options available to the WTO.
276
  First, the WTO may 
relax its obligations under GATT and GATS and allow members that are struggling 
under its regime the option to experiment with a different set of trade policies.  One 
such alternative might be to permit a struggling member to partially re-raise its trade 
barriers until it is in a better position to take advantage of open trade – when it has the 
right institutional framework, for instance.   
The second approach for the WTO is to maintain the same basic obligations, 
but make the development of good institutions part of the package.  This would mean 
                                                 
276
 It has to be acknowledge that the WTO’s trade policies are operating under a cloud of 
uncertainty at this point.  Under these circumstances, the rational approach for the WTO is to 
exercise epistemic modesty and  flexibility.  It has to be epistemically modest because its 
policies may turn out to be wrong and have a harmful effect, especially on the poorest and 
most vulnerable of its member states.  Epistemic modesty also requires that the WTO keep up 
with the latest research on economic growth in case its current views are proven to be wrong, 
and when this is indeed shown to be the case, it has to be flexible enough to amend its 
policies.  Flexibility is also required during periods when there is serious disagreement over 
one or more of its policies – i.e. whether there is a direct link between open trade and 
economic growth.  When there is such disagreement among economists, the WTO should 
allow members states that appear not to be thriving under its current rules, the flexibility to opt 
out and experiment with different policies as long as there is good science that supports these 
policies.  These two options for the WTO capture this rational approach under conditions of 
uncertainty.         
 
 289 
that trade policy is not simply about lowering or removing trade barriers, but also 
about having good domestic institutions.  This approach has the advantage that it does 
not require the WTO to make a significant departure from its current policies.  
Moreover, it avoids the problem of having to decide which states, if any, qualify to opt 
out, at least temporarily, from liberalizing trade. These two features make the second 
approach the more realistic option for the WTO.  Working out the various opt-out 
options in the end might prove to be an intractable problem: there are too many, often 
inconsistent, alternatives to open trade, and there may be too many member states 
trying to take advantage of these options.  What is more, opting out goes against the 
very purpose of the  WTO, and it is hard to see how the WTO can be convinced of 
making such a radical departure.    
There are, however, two difficulties with making good institutions part of trade 
policy.  First, there may be disagreements over which institutions are necessary to 
make openness work and thus have to be improved.  The second difficulty has to do 
with whether the WTO has the proper authority to require states to develop these 
institutions.  The first problem might not be that intractable, for there is a good deal of 
agreement that a core set of institutions are important for growth when combined with 
liberalization: these are institutions that (1) protect robust property rights, (2) correct 
for externalities, asymmetries in information, and market failure, and (3) achieve 
market stabilization.
277
  The WTO may begin by including provisions that deal with 
                                                 
277 See Dani Rodrik and Arvind Subramanian, “The Primacy of Institutions.”  Again, the 
significance of these institutions – and of good institutions in general – is not that they are 
necessary to achieve economic growth, but that a national economy that is undergirded by 
good institutions is going to do better than if it did not have them.  This, I think, can be said 
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the development or strengthening of these particular institutions.  Once there is 
reliable evidence that other institutions may have similar benefits, the list of necessary 
institutions may be expanded to include them as well.   
With respect to the second problem, I think that the right approach is to leave 
the decision up to individual states.  If a particular state undertakes to implement more 
liberal trade policies without developing the right sorts of institutions – of its political 
economy – that are essential to make these policies work, then it runs the risk of 
failure.  If the aforementioned institutions are beneficial for the success of open trade, 
then it is surely in the interest of individual states to bring their institutional 
framework up to speed; failure to do so carries its own penalty and so there is no 
                                                                                                                                            
even about such economies as China and Russia, where there has been significant economic 
growth without a consistent protection of private property. 
     Russia would probably do better with better protection of private property.  Russia has had 
a very hard time attracting foreign investors, in part because investing in the country is fraught 
with all kinds of dangers.  Corporate raiding is still a widespread problem in Russia, making it 
difficult for legitimate companies - both foreign and domestic - to operate freely and invest in 
their businesses.  This results in the lack of foreign direct invest - because foreign companies 
simply don't want to risk losing their companies and assets to corporate raiders  -  and capital 
flight - because domestic companies try to move as many of their assets as possible offshore.   
     China, on the other hand, is a more difficult case, since it has done extremely well despite 
not having a system of property rights that is as robust as that of the US.  This is certainly a 
problem for Rodrik, since he does place a great deal of importance on a strong system of 
property rights and regards such a system as a good institution.  However, Rodrik might 
respond to this problem in the following way.  First, he might suggest that China would do 
even better with a more robust system of property rights.  After all, there is no evidence to 
suggest that China has done well in part because it has a much weaker system of property 
rights.  A different response would be to say that China's system of property rights, though not 
as robust as that of the US, is nevertheless good enough - it is certainly better than that of 
Russia.  So perhaps this is more of a threshold issue: China has system that is good enough, 
given its current position along the economic trajectory that it has taken.  At a different 
position along this trajectory, China, in order to maintain its economic progress, would have to 
embrace a system that offers better protection.  In other words, whether an institution is good 
is relational question and depends on the current economic conditions of a particular state.  
This makes the determination of what is a good institution much harder to do, but it does not 
make the concept hollow: it may still be the case that for a country to grow economically it 
has to engender the right sorts of institutions.   
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reason to force them into making these changes.
278
  This approach of giving states the 
option to embrace institutional change has the feature that the types of institutions that 
the WTO can recommend may be quite robust.  Rodrik, for instance, in addition to the 
core set mentioned above also thinks that institutions that provide a social safety net, 
that quell social instability, that promote democratic governance are also beneficial for 
growth when combined with openness.
279
  Requiring states to develop such 
institutions would involve a significant interference with state sovereignty.   And 
although I am not in principle against putting pressure on states to make them embrace 
greater democratic governance, the WTO is not the right forum in which to do this.  
Thus it is much less objectionable, and in the long run just as effective, to leave the 
building of good institutions up to the states themselves.  Still, the WTO has to be in a 
                                                 
278 The difficulty with this is that what may be good for the country as a whole may not be in 
the interest of the ruling elite who stand to gain from a status quo where there is less rule of 
law and corruption is part of the political landscape.   In these cases, the WTO can try to 
persuade  individual states to develop the right institutions.  But I just do not see what more 
the WTO can do when facing a recalcitrant government that is acting in bad faith.  Still, this 
does not mean that nothing can be done about corrupt governments and their proxies.  There 
are legal instruments that currently exist that may be used to combat foreign corruption.  I 
certainly favor the development of international law that specifically targets the worst forms of 
corruption.  But I do not think the WTO is the right forum for this.   
 
279
 Dani Rodrik, “Institutions for High-Quality Growth: What They Are and How to Acquire 
Them,” Institutions, Globalisation and Empowerment, Kartik Roy and Jorn Sideras (eds.) 
Cheltenham, U.K. and Northampton, Mass. 2006, pp. 19-55; Dani Rodrik, “Globalisation, 
Social Conflict and Economic Growth,” Globalization and Productivity, David Greenaway, 
Holger Gorg, Richard Kneller, (eds.) Globalization of the World Economy series, Vol. 20,  
Cheltenham, U.K. and Northampton, Mass. 2008, pp. 338-53.   It must be noted that there is 
quite a bit of controversy with respect to democratic governance as an independent causal 
factor for economic development.  China seems to be a great counter-example to this: China 
has been outperforming every major national economy in the world for the past decade and yet 
it is undemocratic, ruled by a coterie of technocrats chosen within the ranks of the Communist 
Party of China.  Economists like Rodrik, however, think that over the long run states that are 
governed democratically are going to do better – because undemocratic states are less 
politically stable.  And so to property judge the Chinese miracle, we have to observe how 
China fares in the future.        
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position to assist individual states in their effort to improve their institutions by giving 
them technical advice. 
Of course, there is still the possibility that the WTO’s recommendations about 
which institutions to improve and how, along with its mandate to liberalize, might turn 
out to be economically unsound.  There is always the possibility that policies that are 
in line with the most up-to-date and accurate economic research might still prove to be 
harmful to the economy of a member state.  It has to be recognized that poor 
developing and least developed members run a high risk of being harmed by the 
policies of the WTO.  That is because there are so many ways in which liberalization 
may falter for them.  Despite its efforts to reform its institutions, a state may still lack 
the institutional quality – one that is above the requisite threshold – to make 
liberalization work for it.  Country-specific conditions such as social cohesion, 
geography, availability and quality of education, and so on, make locating this 
threshold an imprecise science, requiring several trials before the appropriate level of 
institutional goodness is reached.   
This uneven distribution of risk is problematic from the standpoint of justice: it 
is hard to see why the most vulnerable members of the WTO should run a much 
higher risk of failure when indeed their participation in the trade regime contributes to 
the benefits that the more industrialized members enjoy, and although they themselves 
are in a position to benefit, those benefits are certainly not substantially greater than 
what is directed at the more advanced countries to warrant the increase in risk.  A 
more just regime would require a more equal allocation of risk throughout the WTO.  
What such an allocation of risk should be has to be adduced by a conception of justice, 
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and the need for a conception of justice is especially acute since the imposition of risk 
is a product of coercion.  In the meantime, some justice can still be done by employing 
more remedial measures to alleviate the most serious burdens falling on the poorest 
and most vulnerable members of the WTO.
280
  This much the WTO can do now.    
                                                 
280
 One way to do this is to protect vulnerable members from significant economic downturns 
– e.g. precipitous fall in the GDP or a gradual decline that takes place over several years – 
which palpably affect the wellbeing of individual citizens.   If, for instance, basic social 
services have to be cut because of a shortfall in state’s budget for social welfare programs like 
healthcare, this is something against which vulnerable states should be protected.  To prevent 
these cuts economic assistance in the form of redistribution may be given at least until the 
crisis is over.  This can be done by setting up  a fund which can then be used to support a 
vulnerable member during an economic emergency. 
294 
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